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Issues: (i) Whether section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to proceedings on the original side of a Chartered High Court so as to make orders of a Single Judge appealable to a Division Bench. (ii) Whether an order refusing appointment of a receiver and interim injunction is a "judgment" within clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Issue (i): Whether section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to proceedings on the original side of a Chartered High Court so as to make orders of a Single Judge appealable to a Division Bench.
Analysis: The Code applies to High Courts subject to the express exceptions in Part IX and the rules made thereunder. Section 104 creates a right of appeal from the orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1, and nothing in the Letters Patent excludes that operation. The saving provision in section 4 preserves special laws, but does not show any inconsistency between the Code and the Letters Patent. Sections 117, 120 and 129, together with Order 49 Rule 3, indicate that the relevant appellate provisions of the Code continue to operate on the original side of a High Court. The right created by the Code is therefore supplementary and does not curtail the Letters Patent jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The appealability created by section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 applies to the original side of the High Court and supports an appeal from the Single Judge's order.
Issue (ii): Whether an order refusing appointment of a receiver and interim injunction is a "judgment" within clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Analysis: A judgment under clause 15 is not confined to a final decree or to the Code's narrow definition of judgment. The controlling test is whether the order finally determines a controversy, or affects a valuable or substantive right, or has the traits and trappings of finality in the suit or an ancillary proceeding. Purely procedural or routine interlocutory orders do not qualify, but orders affecting important rights, such as refusal of interim relief which may seriously prejudice a party, do. An order refusing a receiver or injunction affects valuable rights in an ancillary proceeding and possesses sufficient finality to fall within the clause.
Conclusion: The impugned order was a "judgment" within clause 15 and the intra-court appeal was maintainable.
Final Conclusion: The intra-court appeal against the Single Judge's refusal of interim relief was maintainable, and the Division Bench's dismissal of the appeal on maintainability was set aside with a remand for decision on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operate on the original side of Chartered High Courts, and an interlocutory order is a "judgment" under clause 15 of the Letters Patent only when it conclusively affects a valuable right or otherwise bears the traits of finality in the proceeding.