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Issues: Whether section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 barred an appeal to the Division Bench under section 109(5) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 against an order passed by a single Judge under section 109(2) and section 109(4) of that Act.
Analysis: Section 100A of the Code, both as originally inserted and as amended, was held to regulate further appeals in the categories of appeals contemplated by sections 96, 100 and 104 of the Code. The Code itself preserves special law by section 4(1) and by the saving language in sections 96, 100 and 104. The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 was treated as a special statute conferring an express substantive right of further appeal under section 109(5), while section 109(8) made the Code applicable only subject to the Act and the Rules. The absence of a separate limitation provision in the Rules did not affect that substantive right. The earlier authorities on Letters Patent appeals under the Code were confined to the Code framework and did not control a statutory appeal created by the special Act.
Conclusion: Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 does not bar an appeal under section 109(5) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and the preliminary objection to maintainability fails.
Ratio Decidendi: A special statute conferring an express right of appeal from a single Judge to a Division Bench is not overridden by section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because the Code yields to special law and does not impliedly repeal a substantive appellate right created by such special legislation.