1976 (9) TMI 174 - SC - Indian Laws

Court Upholds Legal Representation Rules in Industrial Disputes

PARADIP PORT TRUST, PARADIP Versus THEIR WORKMEN

PARADIP PORT TRUST, PARADIP Versus THEIR WORKMEN - 1977 AIR 36, 1977 (1) SCR 537, 1977 (2) SCC 339 Issues Involved:1. Representation of parties before the Industrial Tribunal.2. Interpretation of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.3. Role and limitations of legal practitioners in representing parties.4. Validity and scope of power of attorney for legal representation.5. Distinction between officers and legal practitioners in the context of representation.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Representation of parties before the Industrial Tribunal:The primary issue revolves around the representation of the Paradip Port Trust by Shri T. Misra, an advocate, before the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the Union's objection to Misra's representation, citing that his relationship with the Trust was that of a client and lawyer, not employer and employee. The Tribunal emphasized that 'Merely by execution of a power-of-attorney, the restrictions attached to a legal practitioner contained in sub-section (4) of the Act cannot be circumvented.'2. Interpretation of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:Section 36 outlines the representation of parties in industrial disputes. Sub-sections (1) and (2) provide unconditional rights for workmen and employers to be represented by specified officers. Sub-section (3) imposes a total ban on legal practitioners in conciliation proceedings. Sub-section (4) allows representation by legal practitioners before Labour Courts, Tribunals, or National Tribunals only with the consent of the other parties and the leave of the Tribunal. The Court clarified that sections 36(1) and 36(2) are independent and not subject to the conditions of section 36(4).3. Role and limitations of legal practitioners in representing parties:The judgment highlighted the historical context and legislative intent behind restricting legal practitioners' involvement. The Act aims to balance the unequal strength between employers and workmen, ensuring fair adjudication. The Court stated, 'Employers, with their purse, naturally, can always secure the services of eminent counsel,' justifying the need for consent and leave under section 36(4).4. Validity and scope of power of attorney for legal representation:The Court rejected the notion that a power of attorney could enable a legal practitioner to represent a party without adhering to section 36(4). The judgment stated, 'A lawyer, simpliciter, cannot appear before an Industrial Tribunal without the consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal merely by virtue of a power of attorney executed by a party.'5. Distinction between officers and legal practitioners in the context of representation:The Court distinguished between officers of employers' associations and legal practitioners. It clarified that a legal practitioner could represent a party only if they are an officer of an association or a federation of employers, or an office bearer of a trade union, and not in their capacity as a legal practitioner. The judgment emphasized, 'If a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practising advocate, the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him.'Conclusion:The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The Court upheld the restrictions on legal practitioners representing parties without the necessary consent and leave, ensuring adherence to the legislative intent of the Industrial Disputes Act. The judgment reinforced the distinction between officers and legal practitioners and clarified the valid scope of representation under the Act.