Letters Patent appealability turns on whether an order determines rights on the merits, not on merely initiating mandamus proceedings.

An order is a "judgment" under clause 15 of the Letters Patent only if it determines a right or liability on the merits, whether finally or in part. A mandamus order that merely authorises proceedings to begin, without deciding any substantive issue between the parties, does not meet that test and is not appealable. Treating mandamus proceedings as civil proceedings and reading clause 15 with the civil procedure framework did not alter that result, because the impugned order did not finally or partially resolve the controversy.

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Issues: Whether the order directing issuance of a writ of mandamus was a "judgment" within clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1865 and therefore appealable.

Analysis: The expression "judgment" in clause 15 was construed as a decision affecting the merits of the controversy by determining some right or liability. A final judgment determines the whole cause, while a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only part of it. An order that merely authorises proceedings to be taken, without itself deciding any question between the parties, does not satisfy that test. The mandamus order under challenge only initiated the process by which liability would later be ascertained and did not finally or partially determine the substantive rights in dispute. The Court also treated mandamus proceedings as civil proceedings and read clause 15 alongside the civil procedure framework, but that did not convert the impugned order into an appealable judgment.

Conclusion: The order issuing mandamus was not an appealable judgment under clause 15 and the appeal was not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: An order is a "judgment" for clause 15 only if it determines a right or liability on the merits; a merely initiating or procedural order that does not decide the controversy is not appealable.

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