Issues: (i) Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues; (ii) Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances; (iii) Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate; (iv) Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Issue (i): Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues.

Analysis: Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 require disclosure of known encumbrances in the sale certificate. Rule 9(7) requires deposit of the amount necessary to discharge such encumbrances, and Rule 9(9) permits delivery free from known encumbrances only upon that deposit. A purchaser acquiring property with express notice of statutory encumbrances cannot obtain removal of the recorded entries without their discharge.

Conclusion: Removal of the recorded departmental encumbrance without payment of the disclosed statutory dues is impermissible. This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances.

Analysis: Statutory priority under Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Section 31B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 enables secured creditors to realise secured debts in priority to government dues. That priority does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, particularly the obligation to settle disclosed encumbrances before delivery of the property free from them.

Conclusion: Secured-creditor priority does not override the mandatory procedure for discharge of known encumbrances. This issue is against the appellant bank's claimed relief.

Issue (iii): Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate.

Analysis: Issuance and registration of a sale certificate do not by themselves terminate the secured creditor's statutory rights where its entire debt remains unrecovered and recovery proceedings concerning the borrower continue.

Conclusion: The secured creditor had not become functus officio, and the objection to maintainability fails. This issue is in favour of the appellant bank.

Issue (iv): Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Analysis: An attachment imposing a legal burden on property and restricting its transfer, further mortgage, or charge is an encumbrance. Its entry in the encumbrance certificate gives notice of the restriction, and its effect is consistent with the concept of a charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The departmental attachment is an encumbrance that must be discharged in accordance with Rule 9(7). This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Final Conclusion: A sale expressly made subject to known statutory encumbrances remains so burdened until the prescribed amounts are deposited and the encumbrances are discharged; statutory priority cannot be used to erase those recorded burdens without compliance with the mandatory sale rules.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor's statutory priority over government dues does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 for discharge of known encumbrances before delivery of property free from them.

Issues: Whether a notice issued under Section 153C for assessment year 2010-11 was within the applicable limitation period.

Analysis: The satisfaction note was recorded in assessment year 2024-25. Under Section 153A read with Section 153C, the extended ten-year period, applicable where escaped income exceeds Rs. 50 lakh, could extend only up to assessment year 2015-16 when computed backwards from assessment year 2024-25. Assessment year 2010-11 consequently fell outside the permissible period.

Conclusion: The notice for assessment year 2010-11 was time-barred and invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether the predicate allegations disclosed scheduled offences under the PMLA; (ii) Whether the attached properties could be retained as value equivalent to proceeds of crime notwithstanding claimed licit sources or pre-dating acquisition; (iii) Whether the confirmation order was non-speaking; (iv) Whether use of guideline or current market value invalidated the attachment; and (v) Whether valid reasons to believe existed for attachment and adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the predicate allegations disclosed scheduled offences under the PMLA.

Analysis: The charge sheet included offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. These offences fall within the relevant parts of the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The fact that alleged mining-law violations were not themselves scheduled offences did not displace the scheduled offences disclosed in the predicate proceedings.

Conclusion: The predicate allegations disclosed scheduled offences and furnished a valid basis for proceedings under the PMLA.

Issue (ii): Whether the attached properties could be retained as value equivalent to proceeds of crime notwithstanding claimed licit sources or pre-dating acquisition.

Analysis: Section 24 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 placed the burden on the appellants to establish licit sources. The claimed granite-quarrying income, agricultural income, interest, cash holdings and real-estate income remained unsupported by reliable documentary material and were not substantiated by the income-tax returns produced. Independently, the attachment was of property representing the value equivalent of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u). For such equivalent-value attachment, the independent source and the date of acquisition of the substitute properties were immaterial.

Conclusion: The attached properties were liable to attachment as value equivalent to proceeds of crime.

Issue (iii): Whether the confirmation order was non-speaking.

Analysis: The confirmation order addressed the rival material concerning the predicate offences, quarrying licences, claimed sources of income, absence of reliable evidence for the acquisitions, recorded reasons to believe, and the applicable standard for attachment. It contained findings responsive to the material objections raised.

Conclusion: The confirmation order was a speaking order and was not vitiated for want of application of mind.

Issue (iv): Whether use of guideline or current market value invalidated the attachment.

Analysis: Section 2(1)(zb) defines value with reference to the fair market value on the date of acquisition, or the date of possession where acquisition date cannot be determined. Guideline value or current market value was therefore not the proper statutory measure. However, the alleged proceeds of crime were quantified from the value of illegally extracted granite rather than from the valuation of the attached properties. The valuation error did not affect the legal basis for attachment, particularly where the attached assets represented only a fraction of the alleged proceeds.

Conclusion: The use of guideline or current values was erroneous but did not invalidate the attachment.

Issue (v): Whether valid reasons to believe existed for attachment and adjudication.

Analysis: The recorded reasons linked the scheduled offences and alleged proceeds of crime to the listed assets, and identified the risk of their transfer, disposal or encumbrance frustrating confiscation proceedings. The reported sale of certain attached properties reinforced the apprehension of alienation. Section 5(1) required material supporting a prima facie belief, not conclusive proof. A separate communication or recording of reasons was not required under Section 8(1) before the adjudicatory process was commenced.

Conclusion: The reasons to believe under Section 5(1) were legally sufficient, and no separate requirement under Section 8(1) was breached.

Final Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for attachment of assets as value equivalent to alleged proceeds of crime were satisfied, and the confirmed attachment remains legally sustainable notwithstanding the valuation error.

Ratio Decidendi: Property equivalent in value to proceeds of crime may be attached under the PMLA irrespective of its independent source of acquisition or whether it was acquired before the predicate offence.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on Business Support Services received from a group company is admissible.

Analysis: Business Support Services comprising common corporate and operational support provided to group entities were taxable services, and the service tax charged through invoices had been paid and accepted by the revenue authorities. Allocation of the provider's expenses among group entities, without a separate profit element, did not alter the character or taxable value of the services. The services had a direct nexus with the recipient's manufacturing business. Where the service provider's tax assessment had not been revised, credit could not be denied by recharacterising the invoiced services at the recipient's end. Identical disputes for earlier and subsequent periods had also been decided consistently on this basis.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit of the service tax paid on the Business Support Services was admissible; its disallowance and the consequential demand and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether sale outside the factory of electricity generated from bagasse attracts the 6% payment obligation under Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Bagasse is agricultural waste or residue and is not the outcome of manufacture. Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 consequently does not apply to electricity generated from bagasse. The settled position consistently excludes electricity wheeled to a State electricity distribution authority from the requirement to pay 6% of its value.

Conclusion: No amount under Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is payable on electricity generated from bagasse and cleared outside the factory.

Issues: Whether the Deputy Commissioner could block input tax credit exceeding the pecuniary limit prescribed under the Commissioner's administrative order.

Analysis: The Commissioner's administrative order prescribed a pecuniary limit of Rs. 1 crore for blocking input tax credit. The personal affidavit acknowledged that input tax credit exceeding that limit had been blocked and was subsequently unblocked. Exercise of statutory power requires adherence to the jurisdictional limits fixed by the competent administrative authority.

Conclusion: The Deputy Commissioner had no pecuniary jurisdiction to block input tax credit exceeding Rs. 1 crore.

Issues: Whether rejection of an appeal for non-response to a notice could be sustained when the appellant asserted that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond control and fell within the condonable period.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the ordinary limitation period but within the period in which delay could be condoned under Section 107(4). The asserted medical circumstances preventing a response to the notice were not shown to be ungenuine. A fair opportunity was therefore required for the appellant to explain the delay and for the appellate authority to consider that explanation after hearing the appellant.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to an opportunity to establish sufficient cause for the delayed appeal; the rejection without such consideration could not stand.

Issues: (i) Whether failure to pay part of the invoiced consideration within 180 days contravened the second proviso to Section 16(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether a financial/commercial credit note for a value discount permitted retention of input tax credit under the Board clarifications; and (iii) Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and imposition of penalty were sustainable, and what interest liability survived.

Issue (i): Whether failure to pay part of the invoiced consideration within 180 days contravened the second proviso to Section 16(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The second proviso required a recipient availing input tax credit to pay the supplier the value of supply and tax within 180 days, failing which proportionate credit was required to be added to output tax liability with interest. The ledger established that part of the invoice value remained unpaid beyond 180 days. No contemporaneous agreement or evidence established that the discount had been agreed and the reduced consideration settled within that period.

Conclusion: The 180-day payment condition was breached in respect of the unpaid value until its subsequent waiver, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a financial/commercial credit note for a value discount permitted retention of input tax credit under the Board clarifications.

Analysis: A financial/commercial credit note did not reduce the original transaction value or the supplier's tax liability, and the supplier had borne tax on the undiscounted invoice value. The Board clarifications provided that the recipient need not reverse input tax credit attributable to a discount settled through such a note. Section 168(1) made these directions binding on departmental officers, and the later clarification was beneficial and clarificatory of the earlier circular. Upon waiver of the unpaid balance, no further consideration remained payable by the recipient; the third proviso to Section 16(2) and Rule 37(4) consequently enabled retention or re-availment of the credit.

Conclusion: The recipient was entitled to retain the input tax credit based on the original invoices after accounting for the financial/commercial credit note, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and imposition of penalty were sustainable, and what interest liability survived.

Analysis: Section 74(1) required fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. Detection in audit alone did not establish suppression where the unpaid balance and its write-back were recorded in the audited accounts, and the view that reversal was unnecessary was bona fide. Section 75(2) required the matter to be treated as one under Section 73(1) where the ingredients of Section 74 were not established. Nevertheless, proportionate credit had remained unreversed after expiry of 180 days until receipt and accounting of the credit note, attracting interest under Section 50 for that intervening period.

Conclusion: The Section 74 charge and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee; interest on proportionate credit for the intervening period remained payable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The commercial settlement preserved the credit entitlement but did not retrospectively extinguish interest arising from retention of proportionate credit during the earlier period of non-payment.

Ratio Decidendi: A financial or commercial credit note that leaves the supplier's original tax liability unchanged and settles unpaid consideration permits the recipient to retain or re-avail input tax credit, though statutory interest remains payable for the period during which proportionate credit was retained after the 180-day limit.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority's failure to address the cited precedent and statutory amendment affected its conclusion; (ii) Whether the resort building and civil structures qualified as plant and machinery under Section 17(5)(d), including under the unamended functionality test; (iii) Whether the resort was constructed on the assessee's own account despite its accommodation, event and photo-shoot activities; (iv) Whether any balance input tax credit fell outside Section 17(5)(d); and (v) Whether the interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority's failure to address the cited precedent and statutory amendment affected its conclusion.

Analysis: Sections 75(6) and 107(12) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require reasoned orders that address the points for determination and the basis of decision. The cited precedent, the retrospective amendment and the claim concerning residual credit ought to have been addressed by the appellate authority. However, Section 113(1) permitted complete adjudication of the issues on the existing record after both sides were heard, and all contentions were determined afresh.

Conclusion: The omission did not invalidate the conclusion, and no prejudice was caused to the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the resort building and civil structures qualified as plant and machinery under Section 17(5)(d), including under the unamended functionality test.

Analysis: Section 124 of the Finance Act, 2025 retrospectively substituted "plant and machinery" for "plant or machinery" in Section 17(5)(d) from 01.07.2017. Explanation 1 to Section 17 expressly excludes land, buildings and other civil structures from plant and machinery. The resort building and associated civil structures consequently cannot qualify for the exception. Even under the earlier wording, the functionality test did not extend to hotel or resort buildings, which remain premises in which the hospitality business is conducted rather than the business apparatus.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on goods and services used to construct the resort building and its civil structures was blocked, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the resort was constructed on the assessee's own account despite its accommodation, event and photo-shoot activities.

Analysis: Section 17(5)(d) applies even where construction inputs are used in the course or furtherance of business. Construction on own account includes a building used as the setting for the taxable person's own business, whereas construction intended for sale, lease or licence to another stands differently. The resort was used to provide the assessee's accommodation, restaurant and event services; no evidence identified any portion as constructed for sale, lease or licence to a third party. Section 155 placed the burden of proving credit eligibility upon the assessee.

Conclusion: The resort was constructed on the assessee's own account, and the construction-related credit was blocked, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether any balance input tax credit fell outside Section 17(5)(d).

Analysis: Section 17(5)(d) does not bar credit on every purchase made for establishing a resort; applicability depends on the nature and purpose of each item, rather than its accounting classification. Credit on the invoice-wise items identified by the assessee as electrical equipment, air-conditioners and expensed purchases had already been allowed. No further invoice, supplier, category or evidence established that the remaining credit related to movable assets or qualifying plant and machinery rather than construction of civil structures.

Conclusion: No part of the balance input tax credit was shown to fall outside Section 17(5)(d), against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Under Section 50(3) and Rule 88B(3), interest arises only on wrongly availed and utilised input tax credit, measured by the extent to which the electronic credit ledger balance falls below the disputed credit. Interest was confined to the extent of actual utilisation, with no interest imposed where the ledger balance remained sufficient. Section 73(8) relieved penalty only upon payment of tax and interest within thirty days of the notice; otherwise, Section 73(9) required the prescribed penalty.

Conclusion: The interest and penalty were correctly computed and sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The retrospective statutory exclusion of buildings and civil structures from plant and machinery, together with construction on own account and failure to establish any additional eligible item, sustained the denial of the disputed credit and the consequential liabilities.

Ratio Decidendi: From 01.07.2017, Section 17(5)(d) excludes input tax credit on goods and services used to construct a building or civil structure on the taxable person's own account, because such property cannot qualify as defined plant and machinery merely because it is used to provide taxable hospitality services.

Issues: Whether detention, tax demand and penalty under Section 129 for an un-updated Part-B of an e-way bill, where the vehicle had reached the consignee's premises and the omission was immediately cured, were legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 129 applies to goods while in transit. The vehicle had completed its journey and was stationary at the consignee's registered premises when it was intercepted; hence, the jurisdictional condition of goods being in transit was absent. Valid tax invoices and Part-A of the e-way bill accompanied the goods, and the Part-B omission was promptly rectified, establishing substantive compliance and a curable procedural defect without revenue loss or mens rea. Section 126, the applicable circular, and the doctrine of proportionality required moderation rather than punitive action for such a bona fide technical lapse. The adjudication was also vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, since the personal hearing was conducted after the date borne by the adjudication order, offending audi alteram partem.

Conclusion: The detention, tax demand and penalty under Section 129 were illegal and unsustainable; the amounts recovered under protest were directed to be refunded with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: (i) Whether the re-investigation was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the investigative authority was functus officio and a fresh Standing Committee reference was required before re-investigation; (iii) Whether the re-investigation was barred by limitation under Rule 129(6), including the validity of the extension; (iv) Whether the revised methodology and re-investigation denied the respondent natural justice; (v) Whether failure to pass on the additional input tax credit benefit contravened Section 171(1), and the consequential relief.

Issue (i): Whether the re-investigation was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction.

Analysis: A binding jurisdictional precedent found the earlier real-estate profiteering methodology legally unsustainable because input tax credit and buyer collections do not correlate uniformly during a project's life cycle. The applicable methodology requires project-wide GST savings to be apportioned across the total saleable area on a per-square-foot basis. Remitting pending matters to correct that legal infirmity ensured conformity with binding precedent and did not amount to an impermissible review of a concluded adjudication. No fundamental statutory prohibition or jurisdictional defect was established.

Conclusion: The re-investigation was valid and was not void ab initio, against the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the investigative authority was functus officio and a fresh Standing Committee reference was required before re-investigation.

Analysis: The doctrine of functus officio did not apply because the original report, founded on a flawed methodology, had not culminated in a final adjudicatory order. Rule 133(4) permitted remand for re-investigation, while the original reference under Rule 128 remained operative. The fresh exercise was undertaken pursuant to remand within the same proceedings rather than through a suo motu reopening.

Conclusion: The investigative authority was not functus officio, and no fresh Standing Committee reference was required, against the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the re-investigation was barred by limitation under Rule 129(6), including the validity of the extension.

Analysis: Rule 129(6) does not prescribe a consequence of abatement upon expiry of the reporting period. Its time limit is directory, not mandatory, particularly having regard to the beneficial and consumer-welfare character of the anti-profiteering framework. Complete documents were furnished only in August 2025, and the respondent could not rely on delay attributable to its own non-production of records.

Conclusion: The re-investigation was not barred by limitation, and the extension was valid, against the respondent.

Issue (iv): Whether the revised methodology and re-investigation denied the respondent natural justice.

Analysis: The revised methodology followed binding law and was not an arbitrary alteration of standards. Notice of re-investigation, an opportunity to supply documents, service of the report, and repeated opportunities to file objections were provided. The respondent elected to confine its defence to preliminary objections and did not contest the computation on merits.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the principles of natural justice, against the respondent.

Issue (v): Whether failure to pass on the additional input tax credit benefit contravened Section 171(1), and the consequential relief.

Analysis: Section 171(1) requires actual transmission of input tax credit benefit through commensurate reduction in price and is a beneficial provision requiring purposive construction. Once records establish an accrued benefit, the evidential burden lies on the supplier to show that it was passed on. The uncontroverted computation showed an increase in credit ratio from 2.37% to 8.42%, producing a per-square-foot benefit of Rs. 40.33 and an aggregate unpassed benefit of Rs. 31,20,542 for 66 eligible homebuyers. No evidence of price reduction, adjustment, credit note, refund, or other transmission of the benefit was produced. The contravention period ended before Section 171(3A) came into force.

Conclusion: The respondent contravened Section 171(1) by failing to pass on Rs. 31,20,542 to 66 eligible homebuyers; the amount is payable with interest at 18% per annum, and no penalty is imposable.

Final Conclusion: The remand and corrected project-wide methodology were sustained, and the additional input tax credit saving was required to be restored to the eligible homebuyers with interest; the pre-effective-date period excluded penal liability.

Issues: Whether the Revenue appeals warranted consideration despite the low tax effect and the claimed exception to the monetary-limit policy for proceedings under section 263.

Analysis: The claimed exception for revision proceedings does not require the tax effect to be disregarded in every case. The tax difference was approximately Rs. 7 lakhs, substantially below the Union policy threshold of Rs. 2 crores for Revenue litigation before the High Court, and the transactions did not indicate recurring or multiple disputes.

Outcome: The appeals were dismissed as below the monetary limit; the questions of law were left open.

Issues: (i) Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in reassessment proceedings before disposing of the assessee's objections to reopening; (ii) Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 within four weeks after rejecting the assessee's objections to reopening.

Issue (i): Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in reassessment proceedings before disposing of the assessee's objections to reopening.

Analysis: Under the pre-1 April 2021 reassessment framework, a return filed pursuant to a notice under Section 148 is processed as a return under Section 139. Scrutiny of that return commences with a notice under Section 143(2). Recorded reasons must be furnished on request, and objections to reopening must be determined by a speaking order before the assessment is proceeded with. Since such objections may establish that jurisdictional requirements for reopening are absent, initiating scrutiny before their disposal reverses the mandatory sequence. The notice under Section 143(2) was issued even before the recorded reasons were furnished.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 143(2) cannot be issued before the assessee's objections to reopening are disposed of by a speaking order. The impugned notice was invalid and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an Assessing Officer may issue a notice under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 within four weeks after rejecting the assessee's objections to reopening.

Analysis: Where objections to reopening are rejected, the reassessment procedure requires a four-week interval from service of the order rejecting those objections before further assessment steps may be taken. The notice under Section 142(1) was issued before expiry of that mandatory interval and therefore breached the prescribed procedural safeguard.

Conclusion: A notice under Section 142(1) cannot be issued within the mandatory four-week interval following rejection of objections to reopening. The impugned notice and consequential action were invalid and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reassessment scrutiny cannot validly commence until reopening objections have been decided by a speaking order and the mandatory interval for challenging that decision has expired.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-2021 reassessment scheme, notices initiating scrutiny or calling for assessment details constitute proceeding with the assessment and may be issued only after a speaking disposal of reopening objections and completion of the required four-week interval.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging conditions of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy; and (ii) Whether the bank-guarantee condition of Rs. 6 crore for provisional release of the seized barge was unreasonable and excessive.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition challenging conditions of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 110A confers discretion to prescribe security and conditions for provisional release, while Section 128 provides an appellate remedy. However, writ jurisdiction could be exercised where the conditions imposed were ex facie excessive and unreasonable on the facts.

Conclusion: The alternate statutory remedy did not bar exercise of writ jurisdiction in the circumstances, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank-guarantee condition of Rs. 6 crore for provisional release of the seized barge was unreasonable and excessive.

Analysis: The discretion under Section 110A must be exercised reasonably on relevant material while safeguarding revenue. The substantially lower bank guarantee required for release of the vessel to which the seized fuel had been transferred, the disputed valuation material regarding the barge, and the voluntary payment already made were relevant to assessment of an appropriate security. The impugned security was therefore disproportionate to the circumstances.

Conclusion: The bank-guarantee requirement was reduced from Rs. 6 crore to Rs. 50 lakh, while the remaining provisional-release conditions were retained, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The security for provisional release was recalibrated to ensure reasonable, case-specific protection of revenue while preserving the other applicable conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Discretion to impose security for provisional release under Section 110A must be exercised reasonably on relevant case-specific material and cannot sustain an excessive condition.

Issues: (i) Whether the seizure of gold under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was founded on the requisite reasonable belief that the gold was liable to confiscation; and (ii) Whether the gold was liable to confiscation and the appellants to penalty despite the owner's purchase documents.

Issue (i): Whether the seizure of gold under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was founded on the requisite reasonable belief that the gold was liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Section 110(1) requires the proper officer to form an independent reasonable belief, based on objective material, that goods are liable to confiscation. The gold was initially seized by the railway police and handed to Customs. The seizure records disclosed no foreign markings, and the sole marking "W" did not establish foreign origin. Customs did not independently verify the alleged foreign origin or form a subjective satisfaction on credible material; mere suspicion that the gold was smuggled was insufficient.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the seizure lacked the reasonable belief required under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (ii): Whether the gold was liable to confiscation and the appellants to penalty despite the owner's purchase documents.

Analysis: The owner produced purchase invoices for auctioned gold ornaments, bank records and income-tax returns, and explained their conversion into gold pieces. As these documents were not discredited, they were admissible evidence and discharged the burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. The burden consequently lay on Revenue to establish that the gold was smuggled, but no cogent evidence of foreign origin or smuggling was produced.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: the gold was not liable to confiscation and no penalties were imposable.

Final Conclusion: Absence of an independently formed reasonable belief and failure to prove foreign origin or smuggling precluded confiscation of the gold and penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs seizure must rest on the proper officer's independent reasonable belief founded on objective material indicating foreign origin or smuggling; where the claimant discharges the statutory burden and Revenue produces no such proof, confiscation and penalty cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether imported non-sterile latex examination gloves that were sterilised, repacked and relabelled before retail sale qualified for Special Additional Duty refund under Notification No. 102/2007-Customs dated 14.09.2007.

Analysis: The exemption notification repeatedly refers to the sale of the "said goods", invoices for sale of the "imported goods", and payment of VAT on sale of "such imported goods"; these requirements mandate sale of the imported goods themselves. Sterilisation, repacking and relabelling constituted deemed manufacture under Section 2(f) and the Third Schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1944, as also evidenced by payment of concessional central excise duty on the processed goods. The goods sold were consequently manufactured goods and not the imported goods sold as such. Strict construction of exemption conditions precluded the claimed refund.

Conclusion: Refund of Special Additional Duty under Notification No. 102/2007-Customs dated 14.09.2007 was unavailable; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether waiver under the proviso to Section 244(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 was validly granted for maintaining proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 where the waiver application was filed after the company petition and the adequacy and genuineness of the members' consent were disputed.

Analysis: Section 244(1)(b) permits members of a company without share capital to seek relief under Section 241 where not less than one-fifth of the total members support the proceeding, subject to the Tribunal's discretionary power to waive the eligibility requirements. The company petition had from its inception pleaded the basis of maintainability and relied on consent from 209 members. The accepted electoral list showed 977 eligible voting members, making the consent sufficient to meet the statutory threshold. The subsequent waiver application, filed as a precaution amid disagreement over the membership strength, did not render the petition incompetent. The assertion that consents were forged or uninformed was unsupported; the burden to establish those facts lay on the party alleging them, and no evidence, expert verification, or testimony of any member disputing consent was produced. The waiver jurisdiction does not extend to deciding the merits of oppression and mismanagement allegations. Section 244(1)(b) requires a purposive and regulatory construction to prevent frivolous litigation without obstructing access to judicial remedies.

Conclusion: The waiver order was valid, and the proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 were maintainable.

Issues: Whether an interim order granting substantive relief could be made without affording an effective opportunity to answer the interlocutory application and without recording reasons.

Analysis: Interim relief materially affecting parties' rights requires a reasoned prima facie assessment. Non-filing of a reply in the main proceedings or in the interlocutory application, without proof of an effective opportunity to respond, cannot by itself justify such relief. Section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the principles of natural justice require an effective hearing and recorded reasons.

Conclusion: An ex parte interim order granting substantive relief without an effective opportunity of hearing and recorded reasons is vitiated.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal cannot grant materially rights-affecting interim relief solely because a party has not filed a reply; it must afford an effective opportunity of hearing and give reasons for the relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?; (ii) Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?

Analysis: The existence of a debt and default is a jurisdictional fact for assumption of insolvency jurisdiction. A jurisdictional fact procured through fraud or collusion cannot sustain the exercise of statutory power. In public-law proceedings, deception of the adjudicatory process or a collusive presentation of facts undermines the integrity of the process and permits correction despite the ordinary finality of an admission order. The purported operational debt was conclusively found to be illusory and presented through collusion to procure CIRP and a moratorium.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall admission of CIRP by dismissing a Section 9 application founded on fraudulent and collusive jurisdictional facts.

Issue (ii): Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Analysis: Before admission, insolvency proceedings are in personam between the initiating creditor and the corporate debtor. Upon admission, CIRP becomes an in rem and collective process: the moratorium operates, management vests in the insolvency professional, claims of all creditors are collated, and the Committee of Creditors participates in resolution. The initiating creditor consequently ceases to control the process, and withdrawal is not unilateral. The original collusive applicant must be excluded and action under the Code may follow, but the continuation of CIRP depends on a reasoned assessment of the resolution professional's submissions, the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, the interests of stakeholders, and the capacity to conduct the process with integrity and transparency.

Conclusion: CIRP need not automatically terminate because the original Section 9 application was fraudulent and collusive. The Adjudicating Authority may continue it after hearing the resolution professional, the Committee of Creditors and affected stakeholders, while disallowing the original applicant from participation.

Final Conclusion: Fraudulent initiation permits recall of insolvency admission, but does not by itself extinguish a mature collective insolvency process; continuance depends on a transparent and stakeholder-informed determination directed to the statutory objects of insolvency resolution.

Ratio Decidendi: Fraud or collusion in jurisdictional facts permits recall of CIRP admission, but an admitted CIRP may continue where the Adjudicating Authority determines that collective stakeholder interests and the statutory purpose of insolvency resolution so require.