Article 32 relief may be refused for unreasonable delay, but a prior discretionary writ dismissal does not create res judicata.

A petition under Article 32 may be declined on the basis of unreasonable delay and laches even though no express limitation period applies, because stale claims can be refused as a matter of judicial discretion and public policy. The Court treated unexplained inordinate delay, including a belated attempt to revive a dispute after pursuing other remedies, as sufficient to deny relief. However, an earlier High Court writ dismissal on discretionary grounds, without adjudication on the merits of the constitutional claim, did not operate as res judicata or an analogous bar to a later Article 32 petition. The constitutional claim therefore failed on delay, not on any prior-merits bar.

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Issues: (i) Whether a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be rejected on the ground of unreasonable delay or laches though no express period of limitation is prescribed. (ii) Whether the earlier dismissal of the petitioners' High Court writ proceedings on discretionary grounds barred the present petition by res judicata or an analogous principle.

Issue (i): Whether a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be rejected on the ground of unreasonable delay or laches though no express period of limitation is prescribed.

Analysis: The majority held that the right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 is a constitutional remedy, but the Court may refuse relief where a claimant has slept over the alleged infringement for an inordinate period. The absence of an express limitation period does not prevent the Court from applying limitation principles by analogy as a rule of sound judicial discretion and public policy. The Court treated stale claims as capable of being declined where delay is unexplained or where the claimant had earlier pursued other legal remedies and later attempted to revive the matter after a long lapse of time.

Conclusion: The petition was liable to be rejected on the ground of unreasonable delay.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier dismissal of the petitioners' High Court writ proceedings on discretionary grounds barred the present petition by res judicata or an analogous principle.

Analysis: The earlier writ proceedings had been dismissed not on the merits of the constitutional validity of the levy but on discretionary considerations in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. A dismissal of that kind does not amount to an adjudication on the substantive right claimed and does not attract res judicata so as to bar a later petition under Article 32. The Court therefore distinguished between a decision on merits and a refusal to interfere on discretionary grounds.

Conclusion: The present petition was not barred by res judicata or a similar principle.

Final Conclusion: The overall effect of the decision is that the petitioners' constitutional claim failed because the Court refused relief on account of stale and belated assertion of the remedy, even though the prior High Court dismissal did not operate as a bar on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Relief under Article 32 may be refused where the claim is stale and the delay is unreasonable, and a prior writ dismissal on discretionary grounds without decision on merits does not by itself create a res judicata bar.

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