Limitation Act and special law appeals: Section 5 does not apply automatically where the statute fixes its own appeal period.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was construed as applying to special or local laws prescribing their own limitation period, and the phrase "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" was read as wide enough to permit Section 5 only where the statutory scheme so allows. The Court held that this does not make every provision of the Limitation Act applicable to special enactments; only the specified provisions operate unless expressly excluded, and the rest apply only by express adoption. On that construction, Section 5 did not apply proprio vigore to an appeal under Section 8(3) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, so delay could not be condoned.

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Issues: Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies so as to permit condonation of delay in an appeal filed under Section 8(3) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948.

Analysis: Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was construed as applying where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that in the Limitation Act, even if the general schedule does not provide a corresponding period for the particular appeal. The phrase "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" was held to be wide enough to include the application of Section 5, but not to make every provision of the Limitation Act applicable to special laws. The scheme of Section 29(2) was read as making only the specified provisions applicable unless expressly excluded, and the remaining provisions inapplicable unless expressly adopted. On that construction, Section 5 did not apply proprio vigore to an appeal under the special statute when the statute itself fixed the period of appeal.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the appeal under Section 8(3) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, and the delay could not be condoned.

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