Limitation Act applies to special leave applications under special law unless expressly excluded; delay may be excused.

Where a special law prescribes a limitation period for an application for special leave to appeal, but the Limitation Act schedule prescribes none, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply through Section 29 unless expressly excluded; accordingly, Section 5 can excuse delay. On that basis, the delay in filing the special leave petition was condoned. As to the remaining accused, the Court rejected the triviality reasoning and considered the acts to amount to hurt under the Penal Code, but declined special leave because the matter was old and the parties had already endured prolonged litigation and expense.

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Issues: (i) Whether the limitation provisions in Sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act applied to an application for special leave to appeal against acquittal under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether the delay could be excused; (ii) Whether special leave should be granted against the acquittal of the remaining accused.

Issue (i): Whether the limitation provisions in Sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act applied to an application for special leave to appeal against acquittal under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether the delay could be excused.

Analysis: The special law prescribed a period of limitation for an application under Section 417(3), while the schedule to the Limitation Act did not prescribe any period for such an application. In that situation, the special law and the Limitation Act were held to be different for the purpose of Section 29, with the result that Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, applied unless expressly excluded. As Section 5 was not excluded by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the delay could be considered on merits.

Conclusion: The limitation provisions applied, and the delay was rightly excused.

Issue (ii): Whether special leave should be granted against the acquittal of the remaining accused.

Analysis: The reasoning adopted for treating the acts as trivial was rejected, and the acts attributed to the remaining accused were held to amount to hurt punishable under the Penal Code. The acquittal reasoning was found unsound. However, the occurrence was old, and the parties had already undergone prolonged litigation and expense. On that ground, the Court declined to grant special leave.

Conclusion: Special leave was refused despite disagreement with the reasons given for the acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The delay in filing the special leave petition was condoned, but leave to appeal against the acquittal was declined.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special law prescribes a limitation period and the general limitation schedule provides none for the proceeding, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply through Section 29 unless expressly excluded.

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