Special limitation for special leave against acquittal bars condonation of delay under the Limitation Act.

Special leave applications against acquittal orders under the Criminal Procedure Code were treated as governed by a special limitation regime, because Section 417(4) prescribed a specific period for such applications. The court held that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act extends beyond mere computation of time and excludes other Limitation Act provisions where a special law applies. Section 5 was therefore inapplicable, and delay in filing the special leave application could not be condoned.

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Issues: Whether delay in making an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of Section 29(2) of that Act.

Analysis: Section 417(4) prescribed a special period of limitation for applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal and therefore operated as a special law for a particular subject. The expression "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" in Section 29(2) was held to cover not merely computation of time but all provisions relevant to deciding whether a proceeding is within time. Section 5, being one of those provisions, was held inapplicable where a special law prescribes the limitation period and the scheme of Section 29(2) excludes the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion: The delay could not be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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