Article 32 compensation and absolute liability reshape remedies for victims of hazardous industrial harm.

Article 32 was read as extending beyond preventive relief to remedial compensation where a fundamental right has already been violated, and the Court accepted liberal locus standi and epistolary jurisdiction for public-spirited bodies acting for victims unable to approach the Court directly. The note also states that enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities owe an absolute and non-delegable duty to compensate for harm caused by accidents in the course of such activity. Liability was treated as independent of fault and as a distinct rule adapted to modern industrial risk, replacing reliance on the traditional Rylands v. Fletcher framework for such enterprises.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a petition for enforcement of the right to life under Article 32 could be entertained on the basis of applications made by public-spirited bodies for compensation to victims of an industrial gas leak. (ii) Whether an enterprise carrying on a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is subject to an absolute and non-delegable duty to compensate for harm caused by an accident in the course of such activity.

Issue (i): Whether a petition for enforcement of the right to life under Article 32 could be entertained on the basis of applications made by public-spirited bodies for compensation to victims of an industrial gas leak.

Analysis: Article 32 is not confined to preventive relief and extends to remedial relief where a fundamental right has already been violated. In proceedings concerning persons who are poor, disadvantaged, or otherwise unable to approach the Court directly, the Court may adopt a non-hypertechnical approach and entertain applications brought by public-spirited individuals or organisations. The Court also approved epistolary jurisdiction and broad locus standi, holding that access to justice should not be defeated by insistence on rigid formality in the presentation of the claim.

Conclusion: The applications for compensation were held maintainable under Article 32 and were not rejected on the preliminary objection as to form or locus.

Issue (ii): Whether an enterprise carrying on a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is subject to an absolute and non-delegable duty to compensate for harm caused by an accident in the course of such activity.

Analysis: The ordinary rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was found inadequate for modern hazardous industries. The Court laid down a new principle for enterprises engaged in inherently dangerous activities, holding that such enterprises owe an absolute duty to the community to ensure that no harm results from the activity. Liability was treated as independent of fault and unaffected by the ordinary exceptions applicable to strict liability, because the enterprise alone benefits from the activity and is best placed to prevent and absorb the risk as part of its social cost.

Conclusion: An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity was held absolutely liable to compensate all persons affected by harm resulting from an accident in the operation of that activity.

Final Conclusion: The Court broadened constitutional access to remedial relief for victims of environmental harm and, in doing so, formulated the doctrine of absolute liability for hazardous industries while leaving open the final determination on Article 12 applicability.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fundamental right has been violated, Article 32 permits the Court to grant remedial relief including compensation in appropriate cases, and an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is absolutely liable for harm caused by an accident in that activity.

---