1997 (11) TMI 518 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court sets aside High Court order, quashes complaint against appellants for lack of evidence

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the complaint and proceedings against the appellants. It held that ... Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 - Inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - Abuse of process of court - Prima facie sufficiency of complaint and preliminary evidence for summoning - Duty of Magistrate before issuing summons in a complaint case - Relevance of statutory licensing and Fruit Products Order to criminal liabilityExtraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 - Inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 and Section 482, because it considered that remedies under the Code were available, was incorrect in the facts of this case. The power of judicial review in criminal matters is discretionary and to be exercised sparingly, but it is available to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice. Where a complaint and the preliminary evidence do not make out a case against the accused and would nevertheless compel the accused to undergo the ordeal of a criminal trial, the High Court may and should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction rather than leave the accused to seek relief at great disadvantage through the subordinate court. The High Court improperly forestalled both the magistrate and itself by concluding, without referring to material on record, that the allegations were not so absurd or inherently improbable as to justify quashing the proceedings.High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction; its refusal was erroneous and is set aside.Prima facie sufficiency of complaint and preliminary evidence for summoning - Duty of Magistrate before issuing summons in a complaint case - Whether the Magistrate had sufficient prima facie material to summon the appellants for trial under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - HELD THAT: - The Court emphasised that a Magistrate must apply his mind to the allegations and preliminary evidence before summoning accused in a complaint case; he is not a mere passive recipient of evidence and may question witnesses to test truthfulness. On the record before the Magistrate and relied upon by him, there was no material to show how the appellants were responsible for manufacture, bottling or supply of the adulterated beverage. The averments and the preliminary evidence showed only that the appellants had licensed or permitted use of their brand name for bottling by another entity; there were no facts connecting the appellants with the manufacture or adulteration of the product. Consequently, the order summoning the appellants did not rest on material establishing a prima facie case against them.The summons to the appellants were not supported by sufficient prima facie material and could not stand.Relevance of statutory licensing and Fruit Products Order to criminal liability - Abuse of process of court - Whether absence of any material showing that the appellants held manufacturing licence or performed statutory obligations under the Fruit Products Order bore on the maintainability of proceedings and justified quashing - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the Fruit Products Order prescribes specific obligations and identification marks for manufacturers and that there was no evidence on the record that the appellants were shown as manufacturers on the bottle or that they held the requisite licence. The complaint's chain of information traced responsibility through intermediaries and did not establish the appellants' role in manufacture or packaging. Given the lack of connection and the statutory regime governing manufacturers, proceeding against the appellants in these circumstances amounted to an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, leaving the appellants to face trial despite absence of any material linking them to the alleged offence would be unjust.Proceedings against the appellants, in view of absence of material connecting them with licensed manufacture or packaging and the resulting abuse of process, must be quashed.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside; the complaint and proceedings against the appellants are quashed and the name of the presiding Magistrate (first respondent) is struck out from the array of parties. Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.2. Adequacy of remedies under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.3. Validity of the complaint under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.Summary:Jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution:The appellants challenged the High Court's refusal to quash the complaint filed against them u/s 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The High Court dismissed their writ petition under Articles 226 and 227, suggesting that the appellants should seek discharge u/s 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the complaint was groundless. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court has vast powers under Articles 226 and 227 to prevent abuse of process and ensure justice. It emphasized that summoning an accused is a serious matter and the Magistrate must apply his mind to the facts and law before issuing summons.Adequacy of remedies under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:The High Court advised the appellants to approach the Magistrate for discharge u/s 245 of the Code. However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court prematurely concluded that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the appellants, effectively foreclosing the Magistrate's discretion. The Supreme Court held that the appellants should not be compelled to undergo the agony of a criminal trial when the complaint does not prima facie constitute any offence against them.Validity of the complaint under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954:The complaint alleged that the appellants were responsible for selling adulterated 'Lehar Pepsi.' The Supreme Court observed that the complaint and preliminary evidence did not establish that the appellants were manufacturers of the beverage. The bottle cap did not mention the appellants as manufacturers, and there was no evidence of their involvement in the manufacturing process. The Court highlighted the requirements under the Fruit Products Order, 1955, which mandates specific labeling for manufacturers, which was not met in this case.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction to quash the complaint, as the proceedings against the appellants were an abuse of the process of law. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the complaint and proceedings against the appellants were quashed.