Fresh cognizance after remand and Section 138 limitation rules upheld, while curable complaint defects and liability defences were left for trial

A fresh cognizance and summoning order passed after remand was upheld because the earlier quashing order had set aside only the original cognizance and left other objections open; the later order was based on the complaint material and pre-summoning statement, and the accused had no right to be heard before process at the pre-cognizance stage. The court further held that limitation in a Section 138 complaint is reckoned from the date of filing the complaint, that defects in the complaint concerning authorization and affidavit had already been permitted to be cured, and that such curable issues could not justify quashing. Allegations about blank security cheques and absence of liability were treated as trial issues, not grounds to stifle prosecution under Section 482 CrPC.

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Issues: (i) Whether the fresh order of cognizance and summoning passed after remand was illegal for violating the earlier High Court order, amounting to a review, or for denying the accused an opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether the complaints and the subsequent proceedings were liable to be quashed on the grounds of limitation, alleged defect in authorization and affidavit, and absence of a legally enforceable liability.

Issue (i): Whether the fresh order of cognizance and summoning passed after remand was illegal for violating the earlier High Court order, amounting to a review, or for denying the accused an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The earlier quashing order had set aside only the original cognizance order and had left the other objections open. After the record was returned, the trial court proceeded afresh, recorded the complainant's preliminary statement and thereafter passed the impugned cognizance order on the basis of the complaint material and pre-summoning statement. The court held that the earlier procedural irregularities in the intervening orders did not vitiate the later fresh cognizance order, and that the accused had no right to be heard before issuance of process at the pre-cognizance stage. The court also held that the trial court had not exercised any impermissible power of review.

Conclusion: The challenge to the fresh cognizance and summoning order failed; the order was held to be valid and legal.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaints and the subsequent proceedings were liable to be quashed on the grounds of limitation, alleged defect in authorization and affidavit, and absence of a legally enforceable liability.

Analysis: The court held that the defect in the complaint regarding the name and representation of the company had been permitted to be cured and that the earlier orders allowing filing of the affidavit and amendment had attained finality. It further held that for a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the relevant date for limitation is the date of filing of the complaint, and not the later date of cognizance or process. The court declined to examine the factual defence regarding blank security cheques and alleged absence of liability in the inherent jurisdiction, holding that such issues were matters for trial and that Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution.

Conclusion: The pleas of limitation, incompetence of complaint and absence of liability were rejected; quashing was refused.

Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was not warranted, and the petitions were found meritless. The prosecution under the dishonoured cheque complaints was allowed to continue before the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: A fresh cognizance order passed after remand, on the basis of the complaint material and pre-summoning statement, is not invalid merely because earlier procedural steps were irregular, and pre-process hearing to the accused is not contemplated; limitation under Section 138 is tested from the date of filing of the complaint, while curable defects already permitted to be rectified cannot justify quashing in inherent jurisdiction.

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