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Issues: (i) Whether the order returning the complaint and directing filing of fresh separate complaints before cognizance was without jurisdiction. (ii) Whether the subsequent complaints and cognizance-summoning orders disclosed a prima facie case warranting interference.
Issue (i): Whether the order returning the complaint and directing filing of fresh separate complaints before cognizance was without jurisdiction.
Analysis: The complaint was returned at the pre-cognizance stage. Cognizance in a complaint case begins when the court applies its mind under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, especially by proceeding under Section 200. Until that stage is reached, the court may refuse to take cognizance and return the complaint in appropriate situations. The scheme of Sections 201, 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the authorities relied upon show that return of the complaint before cognizance is not impermissible in law. The court also held that the question whether the accused should ultimately face a joint trial or separate trials remained open and could be considered later on an appropriate application, so the pre-cognizance order did not prejudice that right.
Conclusion: The order returning the complaint was valid and did not call for interference.
Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent complaints and cognizance-summoning orders disclosed a prima facie case warranting interference.
Analysis: The complaints alleged a common pattern of acquisition-related manipulation, preparation of back dated orders, altered revenue entries, and receipt and layering of compensation amounts as proceeds of crime. The court examined the role attributed to each category of accused, the statutory scheme under Sections 3C, 3D and 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956, and the ingredients of money-laundering under Sections 2(u), 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It found that the allegations, supported by the complaint material, were sufficient at the summoning stage to show prima facie involvement of the petitioners. The court reiterated that summoning is a serious judicial act but does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, only enough material to justify proceeding.
Conclusion: The cognizance and summoning orders in the subsequent complaints were upheld and no interference was warranted.
Final Conclusion: The petitions failed in entirety, as the complaint-return order was held lawful and the later complaints and summoning orders were found sustainable at the prima facie stage.
Ratio Decidendi: A complaint may be returned before cognizance at the pre-inquiry stage, and at the stage of summoning the court need only determine whether the complaint and accompanying material disclose a prima facie case sufficient to proceed, without entering into a final adjudication on joint trial or guilt.