Belated use of inherent criminal jurisdiction may be treated as abuse of process when quashing is sought after unexplained delay.

Section 482 inherent jurisdiction is not governed by the Limitation Act, but it must be invoked within a reasonable time. A belated petition to quash an FIR and subsequent proceedings, filed after years without a convincing explanation for the delay and after the trial had advanced, may be treated as a gross abuse of process and refused as not maintainable. Where the petitioner knew of the / allegations from the outset and waited until long after charge was framed, stale invocation of inherent powers will not justify interference.

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Issues: Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of an FIR and the subsequent proceedings could be entertained when it was filed after inordinate delay and laches.

Analysis: The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not controlled by the Limitation Act, but it is still to be invoked within a reasonable time. A petition seeking quashing of criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to disturb the progress of the trial at a belated stage without explanation for the delay. Here, the FIR and charge-sheet had been in existence for years, the petitioner was aware of the allegations from the beginning, and no convincing explanation was offered for waiting until long after the charge was framed. The Court held that such stale invocation of inherent jurisdiction amounted to gross abuse of process and was not a proper case for interference.

Conclusion: The petition under Section 482 was barred by inordinate delay and laches and was not maintainable; it was dismissed.

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