Petition to quash FIR dismissed due to two-year delay; court cites abuse of process, upholds trial court's findings.

The HC dismissed the petition to quash the FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C., citing inordinate delay and lack of sufficient explanation for the two-year delay post-framing of charges. The court emphasized that the petition was highly belated, constituting an abuse of the legal process, and upheld the trial court's prima facie findings under Sections 409 and 420 IPC.

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Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
2. Applicability of ingredients of Section 409 and 420 IPC.
3. Delay and laches in filing the petition.
4. Applicability of limitation principles to Section 482 Cr.P.C. petitions.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Quashing of FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:
The petitioner sought the quashing of FIR No. 692/99 registered under Sections 409 and 420 IPC. The complaint alleged that the petitioner, while working as Deputy Manager at the State Bank of India, executed unauthorized transfers and pocketed commissions, amounting to approximately Rs. 3.25 lakhs, collected from various exporters without depositing the same in the bank. The petitioner argued that the FIR should be quashed as the ingredients of Sections 409 and 420 IPC were not satisfied.

2. Applicability of ingredients of Section 409 and 420 IPC:
The petitioner contended that the charges framed under Sections 409 and 420 IPC did not meet the necessary ingredients as laid down by the Apex Court. The court, however, noted that the trial judge had already applied their mind and found a prima facie case against the petitioner, justifying the framing of charges. The court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, only a prima facie case needs to be established, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Delay and laches in filing the petition:
The court addressed the issue of delay and laches, noting that the FIR was registered in 1999, and the charges were framed in 2009. The petition for quashing the FIR was filed in 2011. The court observed that the petitioner was aware of the accusations since 1999 and should have approached the court at the earliest possible stage. The court referenced judgments from other High Courts, which held that petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be filed within a reasonable time, typically within 90 days, to avoid disturbing the progress of the case at a belated stage.

4. Applicability of limitation principles to Section 482 Cr.P.C. petitions:
The court acknowledged that Section 482 Cr.P.C. starts with a non-obstante clause and is not conditioned by any law of limitation. However, the court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that the principle of laches or inordinate delay is not applicable. The court cited judgments from other High Courts, which held that petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be filed within a reasonable time, and any delay must be adequately explained. The court found that the petitioner's delay of almost two years from the date of framing charges was inordinate and without sufficient explanation.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, stating that it was highly belated and inordinately delayed. The court emphasized that allowing such delayed petitions would disrupt the functioning of trial courts and constitute an abuse of the process of law. The petition was found to be misconceived and was accordingly dismissed.

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