Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to quash belated cheque dishonour complaints involving disputed facts and unused revision remedies.

Section 482 CrPC is a discretionary remedy and should not be used to bypass revision under Section 397 or to overcome inordinate delay and laches, particularly where the accused allowed the proceedings to continue and approached the High Court only at a late stage. In cheque dishonour matters under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act, alleged non-accrual of liability, defective notice, presentation of cheques, security-cheque character, resignation of directors, and double jeopardy are fact-sensitive objections that ordinarily require evidence and are not suitable for quashing at the pre-trial stage. The complaints and summoning orders were therefore left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches and for non-availment of the remedy of revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether the complaint proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were liable to be quashed on merits on the grounds of alleged non-accrual of liability, notice allegedly not being in terms of the agreement, presentation of both sets of cheques, resignation of some petitioners, and alleged double jeopardy.

Issue (i): Whether the petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches and for non-availment of the remedy of revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The inherent power under Section 482 is discretionary and is not meant to be used to bypass the statutory remedy of revision or to overcome the consequences of limitation. Where the accused allow the proceedings to continue for years, participate in ancillary proceedings, and approach the High Court only at a late stage without compelling justification, the petition may be declined on the ground of delay and laches. The pendency of settlement discussions does not, by itself, justify the prolonged inaction in challenging the summoning orders or the maintainability of the complaints.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were liable to be quashed on merits on the grounds of alleged non-accrual of liability, notice allegedly not being in terms of the agreement, presentation of both sets of cheques, resignation of some petitioners, and alleged double jeopardy.

Analysis: The objections raised on merits turned on disputed questions of fact, including the interpretation of the buy-back clause, the effect of the notice clause, the effect of the letter dated 15.07.2010, whether notice to the individuals constituted notice to the company, whether the cheques were issued only as security, the extent of subsisting liability at the time of presentation, and the effect of resignation of some petitioners from directorship. Such matters require evidence and cannot ordinarily be conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 482 at the pre-trial stage. The fact that the petitioners were signatories to the cheques and were described as persons in charge of the companies also weighed against quashing. The alleged parallel FIR did not warrant staying or quashing the cheque dishonour complaints.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The complaint cases and summoning orders were left undisturbed, and the trial court was left to proceed with the complaints on the evidence to be led before it.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should not be used to quash cheque dishonour complaints at a belated stage where the challenge depends on disputed factual issues requiring evidence, and such proceedings may also be refused when the petitioner has allowed an efficacious revision remedy to lapse and approaches the High Court after inordinate delay.

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