Wrongful restraint and vicarious liability fail where no personal act of obstruction is alleged, making summons unsustainable.

Wrongful restraint requires a voluntary and direct physical obstruction preventing a person from proceeding in a lawful direction, and mere status as a company director or officer does not create criminal liability. Where the complaint alleges no overt act, no personal participation, and no legally sustainable basis for vicarious criminal liability, summoning the accused is unsustainable. The inherent power to quash may be used when the allegations, even if accepted as true, do not disclose the offence and continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process; on these facts, the complaint and summons were liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether the Managing Director, directors and architect could be summoned for the offence of wrongful restraint in the absence of any overt act, physical obstruction or legally sustainable basis for vicarious criminal liability, and whether the High Court ought to have exercised inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal complaint and summons.

Analysis: Wrongful restraint requires a voluntary and direct physical obstruction preventing a person from proceeding in a direction in which that person has a right to proceed. Mere status as directors of the company, or the existence of disputes and civil or municipal proceedings concerning the property, was insufficient to fasten criminal liability. No overt act or physical obstruction by the appellants was attributed, and the complaint did not disclose any factual basis to infer common intention or personal participation in the alleged obstruction. The power to summon an accused is a serious matter and must be exercised only after the Magistrate applies mind to whether the complaint and supporting material disclose a prima facie offence. Where the allegations, even if accepted in entirety, do not disclose the ingredients of the offence and continuation of the proceedings would amount to harassment and abuse of process, the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be invoked notwithstanding the availability of discharge remedies.

Conclusion: The complaint and summons against the appellants could not be sustained, and the refusal to quash the proceedings was erroneous.

Final Conclusion: Criminal liability for wrongful restraint could not be attributed to the appellants merely because they were company functionaries, and the proceedings were liable to be quashed for lack of foundational allegations showing their personal involvement.

Ratio Decidendi: A company director or officer cannot be prosecuted for an offence requiring direct physical obstruction unless the complaint alleges specific acts showing personal participation or a legally recognised basis for criminal vicarious liability.

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