Inherent powers cannot expunge integral judicial reasoning where parties had notice and an opportunity to meet the allegations.

In proceedings seeking expunction of remarks from an earlier company judgment, the High Court held that inherent powers under section 151 CPC could not be used to remove passages forming part of the main reasoning; alteration of a signed judgment was confined to section 152 or review, and the application therefore failed. It further held that the managing directors could not invoke natural justice to secure expunction where they were not strangers to the proceedings, had notice of the allegations, and had an opportunity to file affidavits and meet the case. Remarks supported by the evidence and integral to the findings were not liable to be deleted.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, was maintainable for expunging remarks from an earlier judgment; (ii) whether the managing directors, though not separately arrayed as parties, could complain that the impugned observations were made without opportunity of hearing and therefore violated natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, was maintainable for expunging remarks from an earlier judgment.

Analysis: The power under section 151 is inherent and procedural, and cannot be used to circumvent express provisions governing review or correction of judgments. Alteration of a signed judgment is permissible only within the narrow limits of section 152 or through review. The impugned remarks were found to be part of the main reasoning and not accidental, clerical, or extraneous passages. As the application was not a review petition and did not concern an accidental slip or omission, the request to delete substantial portions of the judgment could not be granted under inherent powers.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable on that ground and the prayer for expunction failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the managing directors, though not separately arrayed as parties, could complain that the impugned observations were made without opportunity of hearing and therefore violated natural justice.

Analysis: In proceedings for reduction of share capital, the managing directors were not total strangers. The statutory scheme of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 shows that the company acts through its officers, and the managing directors were the real persons controlling and pursuing the scheme. The record showed that the allegations against them were known from the outset, objections were openly raised, and they were afforded opportunity to file affidavits and meet the charges. The remarks were also found to have direct support in the evidence and to form an integral part of the conclusions reached in the company petition. A complaint of breach of natural justice could not succeed where full opportunity existed but was not availed of.

Conclusion: The managing directors were not entitled to relief on the ground of violation of natural justice, and the remarks were not liable to be expunged.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the earlier judgment failed both on maintainability and on merits, because the impugned observations were treated as part of the substantive reasoning and not as removable accidental or irrelevant comments.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent powers cannot be invoked to expunge parts of a judgment that are integral to its reasoning; expunction is permissible only for truly extraneous, accidental, or wholly irrelevant remarks, and not where the affected persons had notice and opportunity to meet the case against them.

---