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Issues: (i) whether the State had locus standi to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expunction of adverse judicial remarks; (ii) whether the High Court had inherent power to expunge remarks made by itself or by a subordinate court to prevent abuse of the process of court or to secure the ends of justice; and (iii) whether the remarks made against the police force in the present case were of such an exceptional nature as to warrant expunction.
Issue (i): whether the State had locus standi to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expunction of adverse judicial remarks;
Analysis: The State was held to be a juristic person and the executive authority through which the police department functioned. Remarks directed against a department through which the State exercises executive power can make the State an aggrieved party. The fact that the State represents the executive as well as the judiciary did not create any legal bar to seeking redress where remarks were made against its executive administration. The existence of express rights of the State under various provisions of the Code also supported its capacity to move the court.
Conclusion: The State had locus standi to make the application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Issue (ii): whether the High Court had inherent power to expunge remarks made by itself or by a subordinate court to prevent abuse of the process of court or to secure the ends of justice;
Analysis: Section 561-A preserved the existing inherent powers of the High Court. The power to expunge judicial remarks was recognised as an exceptional jurisdiction, exercisable only in exceptional cases where necessary to prevent abuse of process or to secure justice. The view that such power existed, subject to strict restraint, was accepted as the correct one.
Conclusion: The High Court possesses inherent power to expunge judicial remarks in appropriate exceptional cases.
Issue (iii): whether the remarks made against the police force in the present case were of such an exceptional nature as to warrant expunction;
Analysis: The remarks were sweeping, general, and directed against the entire police force, although the case concerned the conduct of a single police officer. They were not based on evidence on record, were not necessary for the disposal of the matter, and lacked the judicial sobriety and restraint expected in judicial pronouncements. The court held that such broad condemnation of the police force was unjustified and likely to undermine public confidence in law and order administration. The remarks fell within the class of exceptional cases where expunction was necessary.
Conclusion: The remarks in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) ought to have been expunged.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the impugned remarks were directed to be removed from the order.
Ratio Decidendi: A High Court may, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, expunge judicial remarks only in exceptional cases where the remarks are unnecessary for the decision, unsupported by the record, and liable to amount to an abuse of the process of court or a failure of justice.