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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could re-open the correctness of an unappealed remand order by invoking Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (ii) Whether, after the abolition of the jagir and vesting of the properties in the State, the plaintiff's claim could be finally determined without impleading the State.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could re-open the correctness of an unappealed remand order by invoking Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure despite Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Analysis: A remand order passed under Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure was appealable. Since no appeal was taken against it, Section 105(2) precluded challenge to its correctness at a later stage. The inherent power under Section 151 could not be used to do what the Code prohibited, nor could it be employed as a substitute for an appeal or as an appellate power.
Conclusion: The High Court was not entitled to review the correctness of the remand order by resort to Section 151.
Issue (ii): Whether, after the abolition of the jagir and vesting of the properties in the State, the plaintiff's claim could be finally determined without impleading the State.
Analysis: Although the properties had vested in the State, the plaintiff still had an interest in establishing ownership on the date of commencement of the Jagir Abolition Act because that finding affected entitlement to compensation under that Act. The interests of complete justice required that the State be before the court so that the rights of all concerned parties could be decided finally.
Conclusion: The matter ought to have been decided after impleading the State, and the plaintiff's claim could not be finally disposed of in its absence.
Final Conclusion: The decision of the High Court was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh adjudication with the State impleaded, so that the rights of all parties could be determined in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A party cannot invoke inherent powers to bypass an express procedural bar or an available appellate remedy, and where a dispute affects the rights of the State after statutory vesting, complete adjudication requires the State's presence before final determination.