Issues: Whether an interim order granting substantive relief could be made without affording an effective opportunity to answer the interlocutory application and without recording reasons.

Analysis: Interim relief materially affecting parties' rights requires a reasoned prima facie assessment. Non-filing of a reply in the main proceedings or in the interlocutory application, without proof of an effective opportunity to respond, cannot by itself justify such relief. Section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the principles of natural justice require an effective hearing and recorded reasons.

Conclusion: An ex parte interim order granting substantive relief without an effective opportunity of hearing and recorded reasons is vitiated.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal cannot grant materially rights-affecting interim relief solely because a party has not filed a reply; it must afford an effective opportunity of hearing and give reasons for the relief.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?; (ii) Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall CIRP by dismissing an admitted Section 9 petition founded on fraud and collusion?

Analysis: The existence of a debt and default is a jurisdictional fact for assumption of insolvency jurisdiction. A jurisdictional fact procured through fraud or collusion cannot sustain the exercise of statutory power. In public-law proceedings, deception of the adjudicatory process or a collusive presentation of facts undermines the integrity of the process and permits correction despite the ordinary finality of an admission order. The purported operational debt was conclusively found to be illusory and presented through collusion to procure CIRP and a moratorium.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction to recall admission of CIRP by dismissing a Section 9 application founded on fraudulent and collusive jurisdictional facts.

Issue (ii): Whether CIRP can continue after its original Section 9 application is found to have been fraudulently and collusively initiated?

Analysis: Before admission, insolvency proceedings are in personam between the initiating creditor and the corporate debtor. Upon admission, CIRP becomes an in rem and collective process: the moratorium operates, management vests in the insolvency professional, claims of all creditors are collated, and the Committee of Creditors participates in resolution. The initiating creditor consequently ceases to control the process, and withdrawal is not unilateral. The original collusive applicant must be excluded and action under the Code may follow, but the continuation of CIRP depends on a reasoned assessment of the resolution professional's submissions, the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, the interests of stakeholders, and the capacity to conduct the process with integrity and transparency.

Conclusion: CIRP need not automatically terminate because the original Section 9 application was fraudulent and collusive. The Adjudicating Authority may continue it after hearing the resolution professional, the Committee of Creditors and affected stakeholders, while disallowing the original applicant from participation.

Final Conclusion: Fraudulent initiation permits recall of insolvency admission, but does not by itself extinguish a mature collective insolvency process; continuance depends on a transparent and stakeholder-informed determination directed to the statutory objects of insolvency resolution.

Ratio Decidendi: Fraud or collusion in jurisdictional facts permits recall of CIRP admission, but an admitted CIRP may continue where the Adjudicating Authority determines that collective stakeholder interests and the statutory purpose of insolvency resolution so require.

Issues: Whether personal guarantors could invoke liberty to revive appeals dismissed upon an OTS settlement when the settlement failed due to non-performance by the principal borrower and guarantors.

Analysis: The appeals had been treated as infructuous on the basis of the OTS, subject to liberty of revival if the settlement failed. The OTS required payment of the stipulated balance amounts and cooperation by the guarantors; apart from the upfront amount, no further payment was made. The liability of the principal borrower and guarantors was co-extensive. The revival liberty applied where the settlement failed because of default by the Bank, and could not be used by guarantors to benefit from their own failure to comply with the OTS.

Conclusion: The personal guarantors were not entitled to revival of the appeals.

Issues: Whether, after expiry of the CIRP period without receipt of a resolution plan and without a valid extension, liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be deferred because the Committee of Creditors had not approved liquidation by the requisite majority and subsequently sought directions.

Analysis: The CIRP period expired without a resolution plan being received under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or a valid extension under Section 12. Section 33(1)(a) mandates liquidation in those circumstances. This statutory consequence is distinct from liquidation initiated through a Committee of Creditors resolution under Section 33(2); consequently, failure of a separate liquidation proposal to secure the requisite voting threshold does not preclude liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). Commercial wisdom operates within, and cannot override, the statutory timelines and consequences prescribed by the Code. A post-expiry Committee of Creditors resolution seeking directions, subsequent expressions of interest, or eligibility under Section 240A cannot revive an expired CIRP.

Conclusion: No. Upon expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan or valid extension, liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) was mandatory, and approval of liquidation by the Committee of Creditors under Section 33(2) was not a condition precedent.

Issues: Whether the Enforcement Directorate may undertake further investigation and issue summons under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 after filing its complaint but before charges are framed, without prior leave of the Special Court.

Analysis: Explanation (ii) to Section 44(1) recognises further investigation and the bringing of additional oral or documentary evidence in respect of an offence of money laundering after a complaint has been filed. The requirement of permission under the proviso to Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to further investigation during trial. Trial commences upon framing of charges; as charges had not been framed, the matter had not entered the trial stage. Further investigation is a continuation of the original investigation, distinct from impermissible reinvestigation, and is supported by the statutory power under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The Enforcement Directorate could conduct further investigation and issue the impugned summons without obtaining prior leave of the Special Court before commencement of trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the services performed under the work orders were classifiable as goods transport agency service rather than mining of mineral, oil or gas service; (ii) Whether the appellant was entitled to small-service-provider exemption for management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, and the consequent tax, interest and penalties; (iii) Whether the separate service-tax demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the services performed under the work orders were classifiable as goods transport agency service rather than mining of mineral, oil or gas service.

Analysis: The work orders established that transportation of coal, slurry and related material was the predominant activity, while the remaining activities were incidental or ancillary. Applying composite service classification and the essential character test, the service was to be classified according to its principal transportation element. Where consignment notes are issued, liability for goods transport agency service is attracted on the specified corporate service recipients under the reverse charge mechanism; transportation without consignment notes falls within the negative list.

Conclusion: The services were classifiable as goods transport agency service and not mining service. The mining-service tax demand, related interest and penalty under Section 78 were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to small-service-provider exemption for management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, and the consequent tax, interest and penalties.

Analysis: The turnover from these two services remained within the exemption threshold in all relevant financial years except that it exceeded the threshold by Rs. 18,958 in 2010-11. Tax was consequently payable on the excess turnover for 2010-11 and on the taxable turnover of Rs. 8,66,678 for 2011-12, aggregating to Rs. 91,221, with interest. Suppression with intent to evade was not established. The amount already deposited was directed to be appropriated towards the confirmed tax and interest.

Conclusion: Service tax of Rs. 91,221 with interest was confirmed only for the specified taxable turnover for 2010-11 and 2011-12. No penalty under Section 76 was imposable, while the penalty under Section 77 for delayed filing of returns was upheld; the issue was partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the separate service-tax demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was sustainable.

Analysis: The adjudication order contained no finding supporting this demand. Further, if the demand concerned mining service, it failed for the same classification reason; otherwise, the turnover qualified for the small-service-provider exemption.

Conclusion: The demand for April 2013 to March 2014 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The enforceable fiscal liability was confined to the limited non-exempt turnover under management, maintenance and repair service and supply of tangible goods service, together with interest and the return-filing penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite service must be classified by its essential character, and incidental activities accompanying the predominant transportation of goods do not convert it into mining service.

Issues: (i) Whether the deputation of an expatriate employee by the overseas company constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service?; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable?

Issue (i): Whether the deputation of an expatriate employee by the overseas company constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service?

Analysis: The memorandum described the expatriate as an employee of the overseas company assigned to the assessee for a fixed and short duration. The statutory definitions cover temporary supply of manpower, and the relevant enquiry is the nature of the service provided by the overseas entity. Salary payments, tax deduction at source and issuance of Form 16 by the assessee did not alter the character of the arrangement. The binding principle governing seconded employees was applied.

Conclusion: The deputation constituted taxable Manpower Recruitment and Supply Service. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable?

Analysis: The demand was issued after the normal period, and the Department relied on audit and investigation to allege suppression. The applied limitation principle requires deliberate withholding of material facts; discovery during audit, without a reasoned establishment of such deliberate suppression, cannot by itself justify the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand was time-barred. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the service was found taxable on merits, the demand could not be sustained because the notice was barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Invocation of the extended period of limitation requires deliberate withholding of material facts; audit-based detection without a reasoned finding of such suppression is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be denied on alleged non-receipt of inputs where the Revenue relied on unadmitted third-party statements, uncertified third-party electronic records and limited transport discrepancies; (ii) Whether the Director's personal penalty under Rule 26 could survive without admissible proof of his knowing participation or of goods liable to confiscation; and (iii) Whether the Rs. 8,00,000 deposit made during investigation constituted an admission of liability

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be denied on alleged non-receipt of inputs where the Revenue relied on unadmitted third-party statements, uncertified third-party electronic records and limited transport discrepancies

Analysis: Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires the maker of an investigative statement to be examined and the statement admitted in evidence in the interests of justice, unless a specified statutory exception applies. The dealers' and transporter's statements were directly relied upon without compliance with this mandatory procedure and were therefore unavailable to prove their contents. The electronic data extracted from a hard disk seized from a third party was also inadmissible because the statutory safeguards and certificate required by Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were absent.

Analysis: No cogent financial trail established that payments made by the appellant-company had been returned in cash. Nor was there evidence of an alternative source of inputs, stock deficit, input-output mismatch, or transaction-specific non-transportation sufficient to displace the appellant-company's invoices, payment records, production records and duty-paid clearances. Sample vehicle-registration discrepancies and untested portal data could not establish non-receipt under every disputed invoice.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the denial of CENVAT credit, consequential interest and the corporate penalty were unsustainable and were set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the Director's personal penalty under Rule 26 could survive without admissible proof of his knowing participation or of goods liable to confiscation

Analysis: Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 requires transaction-specific proof of knowledge, active participation and conscious dealing with goods liable to confiscation. No admissible evidence established the Director's personal mens rea or overt involvement, and the foundation of the principal credit demand had failed.

Conclusion: In favour of the Director, the personal penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 was unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the Rs. 8,00,000 deposit made during investigation constituted an admission of liability

Analysis: A payment made during investigation, including one asserted to have been made under coercion or apprehension of coercive action, does not by itself amount to an unconditional admission of tax liability or establish fraudulent availment of credit.

Conclusion: The investigative deposit did not constitute an admission of liability.

Final Conclusion: The inadmissible and uncorroborated evidentiary material did not establish non-receipt of inputs or collusive availment of credit, leaving no sustainable basis for the related fiscal or personal penal consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: Third-party statements not admitted under Section 9D and electronic records not authenticated under Section 36B cannot sustain denial of CENVAT credit where independent, transaction-specific evidence does not establish non-receipt of inputs or the assessee's participation in fraud.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother; (ii) Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother.

Analysis: Proviso (b) to Section 138 requires the payee to give written notice to the drawer. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 raise a rebuttable presumption of service where notice is properly addressed and dispatched by registered post. The statutory requirement concerns giving notice, not proof of its personal receipt by the drawer. Once dispatch to the correct address is established, the burden lies on the drawer to show that the address was incorrect, that the notice was not tendered, or that the drawer had no knowledge of its delivery at that address. Receipt by a family member at the shared residential address does not, by itself, rebut that presumption.

Conclusion: Dispatch of the notice by registered post to the drawer's correct address satisfied the statutory requirement of giving notice; the unrebutted presumption of valid service applied notwithstanding receipt by the drawer's mother.

Issue (ii): Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Analysis: The earlier decision had disregarded binding larger-Bench authority establishing deemed service upon correct dispatch and had treated a spouse as equivalent to an unrelated third party without addressing whether the notice was sent to the correct address or whether the spouse resided with the drawer. Such an approach conflicts with the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the settled rule that the drawer must rebut it.

Conclusion: The earlier decision was per incuriam and cannot operate as binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: A correctly addressed statutory notice sent by registered post attracts a rebuttable presumption of service, and the drawer cannot defeat that presumption merely because a co-residing family member received the notice.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, dispatch of a correctly addressed notice by registered post constitutes giving notice and raises a rebuttable presumption of service, which the drawer must displace by credible proof of non-service or lack of knowledge not attributable to the drawer.

Issues: Whether a merits order quashing the issuance of process warranted recall because the complainant was unrepresented when the matter was finally heard.

Analysis: The order sought to be recalled had adjudicated the complaint on merits after considering the pleadings and record and applying Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Although the complainant had remained absent when the matter was heard, the record reflected prior adjournments sought on its behalf and no cogent ground or infirmity was established to justify reopening the merits determination.

Conclusion: Recall of the merits order was unwarranted.

Issues: Whether refund of unutilised input tax credit under the inverted duty structure is available where bulk sulphur and packaged sulphur attract the same GST rate but packing materials attract a higher rate, notwithstanding the CBIC circulars concerning identical input and output supplies.

Analysis: Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits refund where input tax credit accumulates because the tax rate on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. Packing materials used to make bulk sulphur marketable in customised packets qualify as inputs under Section 2(59), and the higher tax paid on such materials resulted in accumulated credit. Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST concerned accumulation arising from a reduction in the rate on the same goods and did not govern the stated facts. Further, instructions issued under Section 168(1) may secure uniform implementation but cannot curtail a statutory refund entitlement.

Conclusion: The taxpayer is entitled to refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure; the restriction urged by Revenue on the basis that input and output supplies are the same is not applicable.

Issues: (i) Whether accumulated input tax credit on higher-taxed packing materials used to package bulk sulphur is refundable under Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 notwithstanding that the principal input and output sulphur attract GST at the same rate.

Issue (i): Whether accumulated input tax credit on higher-taxed packing materials used to package bulk sulphur is refundable under Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 notwithstanding that the principal input and output sulphur attract GST at the same rate.

Analysis: Section 54(3)(ii) permits refund where input tax credit accumulates because the tax rate on inputs exceeds that on output supplies. Packing materials used for marketing sulphur in customised packets are inputs used in the course or furtherance of business; their GST rate of 18% exceeded the 5% rate on the outward supply. The restriction in the departmental circulars concerning identical input and output supplies could not curtail the statutory refund entitlement, since the power to issue directions for uniform implementation does not permit addition of restrictions absent from the statute.

Conclusion: The accumulated input tax credit attributable to the higher-taxed packing materials is refundable under Section 54(3)(ii), and the sanctioned refund remains valid.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 115JB applies to a banking company governed by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; (ii) Whether deduction for a provision for leave salary is allowable without actual payment under Section 43B(f); (iii) Whether UPS is entitled to depreciation at the computer-equipment rate.

Issue (i): Whether Section 115JB applies to a banking company governed by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Analysis: Section 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was applied in light of the settled position that a banking company governed by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is not subject to the minimum alternate tax provisions.

Conclusion: Section 115JB does not apply to the banking company; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction for a provision for leave salary is allowable without actual payment under Section 43B(f).

Analysis: Section 43B(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 validly regulates the timing of deduction for leave-encashment liability. Although such liability is a present accrued liability under the mercantile system, the statutory deduction is deferred until actual payment to the employee.

Conclusion: Deduction for the leave-salary provision is not allowable without actual payment; decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether UPS is entitled to depreciation at the computer-equipment rate.

Analysis: UPS was treated as an integral part of the computer system, there being no material establishing its independent functional use. It consequently attracts depreciation at the rate applicable to computer equipment.

Conclusion: UPS is eligible for depreciation at 60%; decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The banking company is outside the scope of minimum alternate tax under Section 115JB and is entitled to depreciation on UPS at 60%, but leave-encashment deduction is allowable only upon actual payment.

Issues: Whether the assessment order under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2010-11 was barred by statutory limitation.

Analysis: The satisfaction note was recorded in assessment year 2022-23. Under Sections 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the alleged escaped income exceeded Rs. 50 lakh, the applicable limitation extended to ten assessment years calculated backwards from that assessment year. The ten-year period extended only up to assessment year 2013-14; assessment year 2010-11 fell outside that period. The assessment was therefore a time-barred assessment.

Conclusion: The assessment order for assessment year 2010-11 was barred by statutory limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether offshore supply receipts under the first contract were taxable in India on the basis that a turnkey contract had been artificially split, the supplies were on CIF terms, and title passed only upon acceptance testing; (ii) Whether the Indian associate constituted a fixed place permanent establishment or dependent agent permanent establishment, creating a business connection and permitting attribution of offshore-supply profits; (iii) Whether Section 44BBB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be applied to compute income from the offshore supplies.

Issue (i): Whether offshore supply receipts under the first contract were taxable in India on the basis that a turnkey contract had been artificially split, the supplies were on CIF terms, and title passed only upon acceptance testing.

Analysis: Under Section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 7 of the India-Finland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, only income attributable to operations carried out in India may be taxed in India. The contractual arrangement comprised distinct offshore supply, onshore supply and onshore service contracts, and was not an artificial splitting of a single indivisible contract. The offshore contract was confined to supplies from abroad; title and payment were outside India. CIF terms, continuing responsibility for care and custody, performance guarantees, and acceptance testing did not defer transfer of title or convert the offshore transaction into an Indian taxable operation.

Conclusion: The offshore supply receipts were not taxable in India, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Indian associate constituted a fixed place permanent establishment or dependent agent permanent establishment, creating a business connection and permitting attribution of offshore-supply profits.

Analysis: Article 5(1) and Article 5(5) of the India-Finland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement require evidence of a fixed place at the assessee's disposal or of an agent acting dependently with requisite authority. The Indian associate conducted its own substantial and independent business. Its limited participation in customer meetings in relation to its own onshore scope did not establish an agency relationship or a permanent establishment. The survey material did not concern the assessee and did not establish the required nexus with the offshore supplies.

Conclusion: The Indian associate was neither a fixed place permanent establishment nor a dependent agent permanent establishment of the assessee, and no business connection or offshore-profit attribution arose, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 44BBB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be applied to compute income from the offshore supplies.

Analysis: Section 44BBB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns income of a foreign company from specified turnkey power-project activities and does not extend to revenue solely from offshore supply where property in the goods transferred outside India. Its application also lacked the necessary foundation of a permanent establishment or taxable Indian operations.

Conclusion: Section 44BBB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was inapplicable to the offshore supply receipts, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition relating to offshore supply receipts was deleted, as the supplies had no taxable territorial nexus with India and could not be subjected to presumptive computation.

Issues: (i) Whether the 2025 Customs Brokers Licensing Examination was invalid because 65 of 150 questions concerned Allied Acts, allegedly departing from past examination patterns; (ii) Whether the alleged out-of-syllabus, ambiguous, or difficult questions and answer-key errors warranted judicial interference, licences, or additional examination attempts.

Issue (i): Whether the 2025 Customs Brokers Licensing Examination was invalid because 65 of 150 questions concerned Allied Acts, allegedly departing from past examination patterns.

Analysis: Regulation 6(7) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 expressly permits questions on Allied Acts and other laws relevant to EXIM trade and customs clearance. The Regulation prescribes no numerical ratio or ceiling for questions from major Acts and Allied Acts. A pattern followed in earlier examinations does not create a binding restriction upon the expert examining authority.

Conclusion: The proportion of questions from Allied Acts did not invalidate the examination. The issue was decided against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged out-of-syllabus, ambiguous, or difficult questions and answer-key errors warranted judicial interference, licences, or additional examination attempts.

Analysis: Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is confined to patent illegality, mala fides, arbitrariness, or manifest error in the examination process. The expert-verified answer key carries a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only by a glaring error apparent without inferential reasoning. The objections disclosed, at most, questions of drafting precision, interpretation, or difficulty; they did not establish a facially demonstrable error in the answers or a departure from the notified syllabus. The framing, standard, and assessment of examination questions remain within the domain of subject experts.

Conclusion: No patent defect in the questions or answer key was established, and no entitlement to licences or additional attempts arose. The issue was decided against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The examination and its expert evaluation remain undisturbed, as the writ jurisdiction cannot be used to reassess academic choices absent a patent and demonstrable defect.

Ratio Decidendi: In competitive examinations, an expert-approved question paper and answer key may be displaced in judicial review only upon a patent, facially demonstrable error or arbitrariness; an unstipulated departure from past question patterns or mere difficulty is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether customs duty collected upon release of the detained gold jewellery could be quashed despite an unchallenged adjudication order making release conditional upon payment of such duty; (ii) Whether the detention charges were liable to be quashed as unlawful.

Issue (i): Whether customs duty collected upon release of the detained gold jewellery could be quashed despite an unchallenged adjudication order making release conditional upon payment of such duty.

Analysis: The adjudication order expressly permitted release only upon payment of redemption fine, applicable customs duty and penalty. The assessee did not challenge that order or pursue remedies against its conditions. The earlier writ proceedings directed release in accordance with that order and did not adjudicate its validity. A belated challenge to the duty condition through the present writ amounted to an impermissible indirect challenge to the unchallenged order.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: the customs-duty recovery could not be quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the detention charges were liable to be quashed as unlawful.

Analysis: No material established that the warehouse detention charges were recovered contrary to the governing statutory provisions.

Conclusion: Against the assessee: the detention charges were not liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The conditions for release under the unchallenged adjudication order remain binding, and the recoveries made pursuant to those conditions stand enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: An unchallenged adjudication order cannot be collaterally assailed in writ proceedings merely because its conditions have been implemented.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked for recovery of unpaid service tax; (ii) Whether interest and penalties for non-payment and concealment of collected service tax were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked for recovery of unpaid service tax.

Analysis: The service tax collected from service recipients for the disputed period was neither deposited nor disclosed in the balance sheets, and the statutory returns for that period were not filed. Section 73A of the Finance Act, 1994 mandates the immediate deposit of collected service tax. The non-disclosure of collected tax and prolonged non-payment constituted suppression of facts and intentional evasion, attracting the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was validly invoked and the service-tax demand was sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest and penalties for non-payment and concealment of collected service tax were sustainable.

Analysis: Statutory interest under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 followed the confirmed tax demand. Failure to pay the collected tax attracted penalty under Section 77, while the established suppression of facts justified penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: Interest and penalties under Sections 75, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The liability arising from collection, non-deposit and concealment of service tax, together with consequential interest and penalties, remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Collection of service tax without its deposit or disclosure in statutory returns and accounts constitutes suppression of facts, justifying invocation of the extended limitation period and penal consequences.

Issues: Whether the first appellate order was sustainable where the adjournment request was not considered, the appellant was not afforded a hearing, and the order did not state reasons for its decision.

Analysis: Section 107(8) of the Punjab Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires the Appellate Authority to afford an opportunity of hearing. Under Section 107(11), it must make necessary inquiry and confirm, modify or annul the challenged order; Section 107(12) requires a written order stating the points for determination, the decision and reasons. Non-appearance may permit ex parte adjudication, but does not permit dismissal for want of prosecution without a merits determination. The cryptic statement that the grounds were perused and that no interference was required did not satisfy the requirement of a speaking order.

Conclusion: The Order-in-Appeal was unsustainable for breach of principles of natural justice and the statutory duty to issue a reasoned decision on merits; the penalty merits were left open for fresh determination after hearing.