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Issues: (i) Whether, under Section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the appellate authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit of sixty days by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (ii) Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India to condone such delay and remit the appeal for decision on merits.
Issue (i): Whether, under Section 25 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the appellate authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit of sixty days by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: Section 25(1) of the special statute prescribed a limitation period of forty-five days for filing an appeal and permitted condonation only up to a further fifteen days on sufficient cause being shown. The statutory scheme made the limitation provision self-contained and indicated that the special law excluded the general power of condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once the legislature fixed an express outer limit, any further extension would render the words limiting condonation otiose.
Conclusion: The appellate authority had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond sixty days, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was inapplicable.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India to condone such delay and remit the appeal for decision on merits.
Analysis: The extraordinary writ jurisdiction is meant to enforce law, not to direct authorities to act contrary to an express statutory mandate. Where a special enactment prescribes both the limitation period and the extent of condonable delay, the High Court cannot, in the name of judicial review, enlarge that period or restore a time-barred appeal for merits consideration. Doing so would defeat the legislative intent underlying the limitation scheme.
Conclusion: The High Court could not condone the delay or direct the appellate authority to hear the matter on merits.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered against the appellant, the contrary earlier view was overruled, and the appeal was held to be barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a fixed limitation period with a limited power of condonation, that scheme excludes the general limitation provision and cannot be bypassed through writ jurisdiction to revive a time-barred appeal.