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<h1>Supreme Court Limits High Court's Power to Condone Delays in Filing Reference Applications</h1> The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacks the authority to condone delays in filing reference applications under Section 35-H of the Central Excise ... Power to condone delay - reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - limitation and condonation in appellate/reference proceedings - legislative intent excluding condonation - inapplicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act where statute prescribes or excludes condonationPower to condone delay - reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - legislative intent excluding condonation - High Court has no power to condone delay in presentation of a reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 35-H(1) prescribes the period within which an application for reference must be filed and contains no provision for condonation of delay. By contrast, other provisions of the Act (for example the proviso to Section 35-G and the limitation provision in Section 35-E(3)) expressly permit condonation or indicate outer limits, demonstrating that Parliament did not intend that delay in filing a Section 35-H reference could be condoned. Reliance on the Limitation Act, 1963 (Section 5) to supply condonation was rejected in light of the statutory scheme and precedents. The Court applied the reasoning in M/s Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors., which recognized that where the statute prescribes a specific period and a limited proviso for extension, there is an exclusion of a general power to condone under the Limitation Act; and in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., which explains that a statutory provision allowing condonation is governed by the law in force and that a mere expectation of an earlier benefit does not create an accrued right to condonation. On these bases the High Court's conclusion that it had no power to condone the delay in filing the reference was upheld. [Paras 6, 8, 9, 10, 11]Reference applications filed after the prescribed period under Section 35-H(1) cannot be condoned by the High Court; the appeals are dismissed.Final Conclusion: The High Court correctly held that it had no jurisdiction to condone delay in filing reference applications under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the appeals are dismissed without costs. Issues:1. Power of High Court to condone delay in presentation of reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.Analysis:The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the High Court has the authority to condone the delay in filing reference applications under Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Court noted that Section 35-H provides a specific time limit for filing reference applications and does not contain any provision for condonation of delay. The legislative intent behind Section 35-H was analyzed, highlighting that the Parliament did not intend to allow the condonation of delay in filing reference applications. The Court also compared this with provisions in Section 35-G and Section 35-E(3) which do allow for condonation of delay under specific circumstances, emphasizing the absence of such provision in Section 35-H. The judgment referred to the case of M/s Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. to illustrate the statutory limitations on condonation of delay in different sections of the Act.The Court further discussed the relevance of the Limitation Act, 1963 in condoning delays in filing reference applications. The judgment highlighted that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) and the Tribunal have the jurisdiction to condone delays beyond the prescribed period provided under the statute. It was emphasized that the legislative intent was clear in limiting the power to condone delays in filing reference applications under Section 35-H. The judgment referred to the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. to explain the principles regarding accrued rights, procedural laws, and the applicability of new statutes affecting time limitations. The Court concluded that the High Court was justified in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in filing reference applications under Section 35-H.In summary, the Supreme Court clarified that the High Court does not have the power to condone delays in filing reference applications under Section 35-H of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The judgment emphasized the legislative intent and statutory provisions that limit the condonation of delays in specific sections of the Act, highlighting the absence of such provision in Section 35-H. The Court also discussed the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the principles regarding accrued rights and procedural laws in determining the scope of condonation of delays in legal proceedings.