Special statutory limitation under Section 260-A: later amendment could not reopen a concluded dismissal for delay.

A special statutory appeal under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act was described as subject to its prescribed limitation period, and the general provisions of the Limitation Act were treated as inapplicable where no express power to condone delay then existed. The later insertion of Section 260A(2A) was stated not to reopen matters already concluded, because the earlier dismissal had attained finality and the amendment was confined to pending and future cases. On that basis, recall of the limitation dismissal and condonation of delay after final disposal were rejected.

---

---

Issues: Whether the earlier dismissal of the appeal for limitation could be recalled on the basis of the subsequently inserted Section 260A(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned after final disposal.

Analysis: The review turned on the nature of the limitation scheme under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as interpreted by the Full Bench and the Supreme Court authorities relied upon in the order. The limitation period for filing an appeal to the High Court was treated as a special statutory period, and in the absence of an express provision conferring power to condone delay, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were held inapplicable. The later insertion of Section 260A(2A) by the Finance Act, 2010 was not treated as reopening matters already concluded under the earlier legal regime, because the order had attained finality and the amendment was applied only to pending and future cases.

Conclusion: The request to recall the earlier order and condone the delay was rejected. The earlier dismissal for limitation stood, and the review petition failed.

Final Conclusion: The judgment affirms that a statutory appeal under Section 260-A had to be filed within the prescribed period, and absent a then-existing power to condone delay, a concluded dismissal for limitation could not be reopened merely because a later amendment introduced such power.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statutory appeal prescribes a limitation period without conferring power to condone delay, the general limitation provisions do not apply by implication, and a later amendment enlarging that power does not unsettle proceedings that have already attained finality.

---