High Court Upholds Conviction for Selling Adulterated Food Samples

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal despite the expiration of the sixty-day limit, as the Municipal Corporation had shown sufficient cause for the delay. Consequently, the petitions for special leave filed by the accused were dismissed, and the High Court's decision to convict them for selling adulterated food samples was upheld.

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Issues Involved:
1. Adulteration of food samples.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the time limit prescribed in Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Summary:

1. Adulteration of Food Samples:
The petitioner, Mangu Ram, a partner in the firm of M/s Ram Pershad Gondamal, was involved in selling adulterated samples of Phool Gulab. The Food Inspector of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi purchased two samples from the firm's shop, which were found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. Consequently, the Municipal Corporation filed complaints against Mangu Ram and the firm for an offence u/s 7 read with s. 15 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Judicial Magistrate acquitted them, granting the benefit of s. 19(2) of the Act, as the firm had purchased the samples from a presumably licensed manufacturer, M/s Venkateshwara & Co.

2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi appealed against the acquittal, but the application for special leave was filed two days late. The High Court condoned the delay, invoking s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and granted special leave. The High Court later convicted Mangu Ram and the firm, as there was no evidence that M/s Venkateshwara & Co. was a licensed manufacturer, nor was there a written warranty obtained.

The petitioners argued that the sixty-day time limit in s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was mandatory and excluded the applicability of s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case from the precedent set in Kaushalya Rani's case, noting that the Limitation Act, 1963, unlike the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, does not expressly exclude the applicability of s. 5. Therefore, s. 5 can be invoked to extend the period of limitation if sufficient cause is shown.

The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for special leave despite the expiration of the sixty-day limit, as the Municipal Corporation had sufficient cause for the delay. Consequently, the petitions for special leave filed by Mangu Ram and the firm were dismissed.

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