Strict statutory limitation under section 22A bars delayed references; the Limitation Act cannot extend time or condone delay.

Proceedings under section 22A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 had to comply strictly with the prescribed two-month period for making a reference and forming the board's decision. The Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to enlarge that special statutory time-limit, because the special law contained no express power to extend time or condone delay. The Company Law Board, acting under the Companies Act framework, was treated as a tribunal rather than a court for this purpose, so section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked. References filed beyond time were therefore not maintainable and stood dismissed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to references under section 22A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, so as to permit condonation of delay. (ii) Whether references filed and the board's decision made beyond the prescribed two-month period were maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to references under section 22A of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, so as to permit condonation of delay.

Analysis: The statutory scheme treated the period of two months under section 22A as part of a special law governing the making of the reference. The Limitation Act applies to proceedings before courts, and the Company Law Board, acting under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, was not a court merely because it exercised certain judicial powers. The special enactment did not expressly extend the period or confer power to condone delay. Accordingly, the general limitation provisions, including section 5, could not be invoked to enlarge the time prescribed by the special statute.

Conclusion: The Limitation Act, 1963 was held inapplicable, and no power existed to condone the delay.

Issue (ii): Whether references filed and the board's decision made beyond the prescribed two-month period were maintainable.

Analysis: The remaining references were filed after expiry of the statutory period, and the board's opinion rejecting transfer was also not formed within the time fixed by section 22A. Since the time-limit was mandatory and could not be extended, the references did not satisfy the statutory precondition for a valid reference under the special law.

Conclusion: The references were not maintainable and stood dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The decision finally declares that proceedings under section 22A must comply strictly with the prescribed two-month period, and delay cannot be cured by resort to the Limitation Act or the inherent powers of the Board.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a limitation period for a reference and does not expressly permit extension, the Limitation Act does not apply unless the statute clearly so provides, and a tribunal that is not a court cannot condone delay on general principles.

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