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Issues: Whether the petitioner could seek rectification before the GST officer in relation to the final order passed under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the notice said to have preceded that order.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to move an appropriate rectification application, which the GST officer was directed to examine independently.
Order under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - Service of notice on GST portal - Reconciliation of GST returns - Rectification application and independent verification by assessing officer - Judicial oversight of portal notice placement
Service of notice on GST portal - Judicial oversight of portal notice placement - Placement and service of the notice preceding the final order under the GST portal - HELD THAT: - The respondents filed a status report asserting that the notice antecedent to the final order under Section 73 was placed in the principal 'Notices and Orders' tab on the GST portal after corrective measures were taken, making it viewable. Having regard to that status report and the explanation about portal placement, the court did not set aside the final order on the ground of non-service through the portal but accepted the respondents' account of notice placement.
The court accepted the respondents' explanation regarding placement of the notice on the GST portal and did not invalidate the final order on the sole ground of alleged non-service.
Reconciliation of GST returns - Rectification application and independent verification by assessing officer - Procedure for addressing alleged reconciliation errors in the assessment based on portal returns - HELD THAT: - The petitioner had alleged that a perusal of the online GST portal would show no differences under CGST, SGST and IGST and that the net tax computed in the final order reflected a failure to reconcile returns. Rather than adjudicating the merits of that contention, the court permitted the petitioner to file an appropriate rectification application drawing the officer's attention to the portal details. The court directed that the assessing officer independently ascertain and examine the particulars brought to notice and, if the petitioner's stand is found correct, take appropriate action thereafter.
Petitioner permitted to move a rectification application; matter remitted to the assessing officer for independent verification of reconciliation and appropriate action if warranted.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by directing the petitioner to seek rectification before the GST officer; the officer is to independently examine the portal reconciliation issues and take appropriate action, the court having accepted the respondents' explanation regarding notice placement on the portal.
Issues: Whether the challenge to the cancellation of GST registration could be sustained, and whether liberty could be granted to apply for fresh registration under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The writ petition was filed against the cancellation order after evident delay. The Court noted that no provision of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred the petitioner from seeking registration afresh, and also referred to the respondent's circular governing the subject. The absence of a legal bar to a fresh application did not assist the challenge to the cancellation order itself.
Conclusion: The challenge to the cancellation order failed, and the writ petition was dismissed, while liberty was granted to apply afresh for registration under the Act.
Cancellation of GST registration - eligibility to apply for fresh GST registration - liberty to apply for registration afresh - laches - Circular No. 95/14/2019-GST
Cancellation of GST registration - eligibility to apply for fresh GST registration - Circular No. 95/14/2019-GST - The challenge to the order dated 26 April 2021 cancelling the writ petitioner's GST registration was dismissed, and the petitioner was permitted to apply for registration afresh. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that no provision of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 renders the petitioner ineligible to seek fresh registration. The Court noted the provisions made by the respondent in Circular No. 95/14/2019-GST and, notwithstanding observations as to laches, held that the petitioner remains entitled to apply for registration under the Act. Consequently the substantive challenge to the cancellation order was negatived and remedial liberty to apply afresh was accorded.
Writ petition dismissed; liberty granted to the petitioner to apply for GST registration afresh.
Final Conclusion: The petition challenging the cancellation order is dismissed; the petitioner is not rendered ineligible to seek fresh GST registration and is granted liberty to apply under the Act.
Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for voluntary cancellation of GST registration was sustainable when the returns had been filed and the rejection was based on non-appearance and non-submission of documents.
Analysis: The application for cancellation was rejected on the sole ground that the petitioner did not appear and did not submit documents/details. The respondents themselves conceded that returns had been filed. If there was any discrepancy in GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B, the proper course was to process the returns and, if warranted, undertake assessment proceedings. Such discrepancy could not by itself justify rejection of the cancellation request.
Conclusion: The rejection order was unsustainable and was quashed. The application for voluntary cancellation of GST registration was allowed, with liberty to the respondents to proceed with assessment in accordance with law.
Voluntary cancellation of GST registration - rejection of application for cancellation - filing of returns and reconciliation between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B - assessment proceedings despite grant of cancellation
Voluntary cancellation of GST registration - rejection of application for cancellation - filing of returns and reconciliation between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B - Validity of rejecting the petitioner's application for voluntary cancellation of GST registration solely on the ground of non-appearance and non-submission of documents/reconciliation - HELD THAT: - The court found that the impugned order rejected the cancellation application only because the petitioner allegedly failed to appear and to submit documents, including a reconciliation between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B. The respondents themselves conceded that returns up to the relevant date had been filed. The court held that any discrepancy between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B could be addressed by processing the returns and, if necessary, framing an assessment order; such discrepancies did not constitute a valid ground for outright rejection of a voluntary cancellation application. Accordingly, rejecting the cancellation application for the solitary reason of non-appearance/non-submission of documents-when returns stood filed-was unsustainable. [Paras 3, 5]
Impugned rejection of the cancellation application on the stated ground is quashed and held to be invalid.
Assessment proceedings despite grant of cancellation - filing of returns and reconciliation between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B - Permissibility of the department proceeding with assessment after allowing voluntary cancellation - HELD THAT: - While the writ petition was allowed and the cancellation application was permitted to stand allowed, the court expressly left open the respondents' statutory power to proceed with assessment proceedings to verify any discrepancies in the returns or reconciliation. The court observed that the department remains free to process returns and to take assessment proceedings to their logical conclusion in accordance with law. [Paras 6, 7]
Cancellation allowed; respondents permitted to proceed with assessment proceedings thereafter in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The order rejecting the application for voluntary cancellation of GST registration is quashed; the petitioner's cancellation application is allowed, subject to the respondents' liberty to initiate or continue assessment proceedings in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether an assessment order under the Goods and Services Tax regime is liable to be set aside for non-mention of a DIN number.
Analysis: The assessment order did not contain a DIN number. The Court applied the settled position that, in GST proceedings, a communication or order without a DIN number is not valid. Reliance was placed on the binding effect of the circular issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs and the existing judicial view that absence of DIN undermines the validity of the proceeding.
Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid for want of DIN and was therefore liable to be set aside.
Challenge to assessment order - said proceedings did not contain a DIN number - HELD THAT:- The question of the effect of non-inclusion of DIN number on proceedings, under the G.S.T. Act, came to be considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Goyal Vs. Union of India & Ors [2022 (8) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after noticing the provisions of the Act and the circular issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (herein referred to as “C.B.I.C.”), had held that an order, which does not contain a DIN number would be non-est and invalid.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Cluster Enterprises Vs. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner (ST)-2, Kadapa [2024 (7) TMI 1512 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT], on the basis of the circular, dated 23.12.2019, bearing No.128/47/2019-GST, issued by the C.B.I.C., had held that non-mention of a DIN number would mitigate against the validity of such proceedings.
Conclusion - The non-mention of a DIN number in the order, which was uploaded in the portal, requires the impugned order to be set aside.
The impugned proceedings set aside - petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the assessment order was liable to be set aside for non-consideration of the request for personal hearing and violation of the requirement of hearing under Section 75(4).
Analysis: The petitioner had sought a personal hearing in its reply to the show cause notice and also requested time to furnish additional documents. The impugned order was passed without considering that request. Since the respondent accepted that an opportunity of personal hearing could be granted, the absence of such hearing before passing the order was treated as a procedural lapse affecting fairness in the adjudicatory process.
Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the respondent to consider the petitioner's further documents and objections after affording a personal hearing.
Principles of natural justice - opportunity of personal hearing - Section 75(4) of the Act - set aside and remand for fresh consideration - assessment order
Principles of natural justice - opportunity of personal hearing - Section 75(4) of the Act - assessment order - set aside and remand for fresh consideration - Impugned assessment order set aside for non-consideration of the petitioner's request for personal hearing; matter remitted for fresh consideration after affording opportunity of personal hearing. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner responded to the show cause notice and, by reply dated 11.07.2024, sought time to furnish documents and expressly requested a personal hearing. The impugned order dated 24.08.2024 was passed without considering that request. The failure to consider the request for a personal hearing amounted to a breach of the principles of natural justice and was contrary to the mandate of Section 75(4) of the Act. In consequence, the court set aside the impugned assessment order and directed that the petitioner be permitted to submit documents, additional objections or reply and that the respondent proceed thereafter after affording the petitioner a personal hearing. The remand is for fresh consideration of the assessment after compliance with the above direction. [Paras 3, 5]
Impugned order dated 24.08.2024 is set aside; respondent to afford personal hearing and reconsider assessment for assessment year 2019-20 after allowing submission of documents and objections.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by setting aside the impugned assessment order and remitting the matter to the respondent for fresh adjudication after providing the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing and to furnish documents or additional replies; no order as to costs.
1. Whether the orders passed under Section 74 of the GST Act were validly challenged on the grounds of not considering the documents filed in support of the replies submittedRs.
2. Whether the impugned orders were passed without due consideration of the material on record, specifically the documents filed by the petitionerRs.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS:
Issue 1: Validity of Orders under Section 74 of the GST Act
- Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides for the issuance of orders under Section 74 for the purpose of determining tax liability based on discrepancies in returns filed by taxpayers.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Court considered the submissions made by the petitioner, who argued that the impugned orders were passed without taking into account the documents filed in support of their replies. The petitioner contended that the orders lacked jurisdiction as they pertained to supplies made outside the State.
- Key evidence and findings:
The petitioner had filed detailed replies along with supporting documents, including invoices demonstrating tax remittance in other States. The impugned orders were criticized for not considering this material.
- Application of law to facts:
The Court found merit in the petitioner's argument that the orders failed to consider the documentary evidence provided, leading to a lack of jurisdiction in the assessment of tax liability.
- Treatment of competing arguments:
The respondents indicated a willingness to re-examine the issue and requested the petitioner to resubmit all relevant documents for review.
- Conclusions:
The Court set aside the impugned orders and granted the petitioner the opportunity to treat them as Show Cause Notices, allowing for the submission of replies and documentary evidence within a specified timeframe.
Issue 2: Consideration of Material on Record
- Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The principle of natural justice requires authorities to consider all relevant material before making decisions that affect the rights of individuals.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Court noted the petitioner's argument that the impugned orders failed to take into account the voluminous documents provided, which included financial invoices from other States showing tax remittance.
- Key evidence and findings:
The Court observed that the impugned orders did not adequately address the material furnished by the petitioner, despite its extensive nature.
- Application of law to facts:
Based on the lack of consideration of the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, the Court concluded that the impugned orders suffered from a non-application of mind to the material on record.
- Treatment of competing arguments:
The respondents agreed to reconsider the issue and invited the petitioner to resubmit all documents for further review.
- Conclusions:
The Court set aside the impugned orders, allowing the petitioner to submit its replies and documentary evidence within a specified period, failing which the orders would stand restored.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS:
The Court's decision to set aside the impugned orders was based on the failure to consider the documents filed by the petitioner, leading to a lack of jurisdiction in the assessment process. The Court emphasized the importance of reviewing all relevant material before making determinations that impact the rights of taxpayers.
Challenge to assessment order - impugned orders have been passed without taking into account the documents filed in support of the replies submitted - violation of principles of natural justice - the respondents would submit that they would re-examine the issue and would also submit that the petitioner may once again produce the entire documents which they intend to rely upon - HELD THAT:- The impugned orders are set-aside. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to treat the impugned orders as Show Cause Notice and submit its reply along with documentary evidence within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the impugned orders stands restored.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether proceedings under section 130 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were sustainable against a registered dealer on the basis of stock discrepancy noticed during survey, or whether action ought to have been taken under sections 73 and 74 of the Act.
Analysis: The survey at the business premises allegedly revealed discrepancy in stock, and on that basis confiscation and penalty proceedings were initiated under section 130. The Court noted that the issue was no longer res integra and relied on its earlier decisions holding that where a registered dealer is found with a stock discrepancy during survey, the proper course is initiation of proceedings under sections 73 and 74 of the Act rather than resort to section 130. No contrary authority was shown to dislodge that view.
Conclusion: Proceedings under section 130 were held unsustainable, and the impugned orders were quashed in favour of the petitioner.
Imposition of tax and penalty u/s 130 of the GST Act - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the survey was conducted at the business premises of the petitioner on 29.05.2018, in which the alleged discrepancy in stock was found. On the said basis, the proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under section 130 of the GST Act.
The issue in hand is no more res integra. This Court in various cases has held that at the time of survey, if some discrepancy in stock is found against the registered dealer, then the proceedings under sections 73/74 of the GST Act ought to have been initiated, instead of section 130 of the GST Act. Reference may be had to S/s Dinesh Kumar Pradeep Kumar [2024 (8) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], M/s Maa Mahamaya Alloys Private Limited [2023 (3) TMI 1358 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and M/s Shree Om Steels [2024 (7) TMI 1205 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT].
The impugned order dated 02.04.2024 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Grade - 2, Kanpur as well as the impugned order dated 10.09.2018 read with order dated 05.08.2020 passed by the respondent no. 2 under section 130 of the GST Act cannot be sustained in the eyes of law - Petition allowed.
Challenge to search and seizure order - alleged discrepancies found during a survey - initiation of proceedings under sections 73/74 of the GST Act or u/s 130 of the GST Act - HELD THAT:- It is admitted that the survey was conducted at the factory premises of the petitioner on 13/14.03.2018, in which certain discrepancy with regard to raw material, semi/finished product, etc. was found, to which confiscation/proceedings under section 130 read with section 122 of the GST Act were initiated against the petitioner.
The issue in hand is no more res integra. This Court in various cases has held that at the time of survey, if some discrepancy in stock is found against the registered dealer, then the proceedings under sections 73/74 of the GST Act ought to have been initiated, instead of section 130 of the GST Act. Reference may be had to S/s Dinesh Kumar Pradeep Kumar [2024 (8) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], S/s J.H.V. Steels Limited [2024 (10) TMI 1450 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and M/s PP Polyplast Private Limited [2024 (8) TMI 144 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT].
Conclusion - At the time of survey, if some discrepancy in stock is found against the registered dealer, then the proceedings under sections 73/74 of the GST Act ought to have been initiated, instead of section 130 of the GST Act
The impugned order dated 16.04.2024 passed by the respondent no. 3 as well as the order dated 23.11.2019 passed by the respondent no. 4 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law - Petition allowed.
Outcome: The writ petition was allowed in light of the earlier coordinate Bench decision and the Supreme Court order.
Demand for service tax penalty and imposition of various penalties under the CGST Act - penalties related to a period when the CGST Act was not in force, and services provided were exempted under the Finance Act of 1994 - HELD THAT:- Having regard to the quantum of tax involved in the present case and M/S Kanak Automobiles Private Limited are concerned, in Kanak Automobiles [2024 (4) TMI 1223 - PATNA HIGH COURT] it is Rs. 86 Lakh whereas in the present case it is Rs. 6,33,879/-, therefore, it is intended to dispose of in the light of Kanak Automobile case read with Hon’ble Supreme Court [2025 (2) TMI 847 - SC ORDER].
Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the assessment order could be sustained when notice was required to be served in the modes prescribed under Section 169(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The order challenged in the writ petition was passed for the assessment year 2018-19. The Court applied the earlier batch decision holding that an assessee is entitled to service of notice in the modes contemplated under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 169(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. As the same principle governed the present matter, the impugned assessment order could not be sustained. Consequentially, the assessee was to file a reply to the show cause notice, be afforded a hearing, and the matter was to be decided afresh on merits in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside and the writ petition was allowed in favour of the assessee, with consequential lifting of the bank attachment, if any.
Challenge to assessment order - service of notice - HELD THAT:- In view of the order passed by this Court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.(MD) No.26481 of 2024 etc., batch dated 06.01.2025 [2025 (1) TMI 1021 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], wherein it has been held that the assessee is entitled to service of notice in the modes described under clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 169(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and since the said order applies to the present case, the impugned order dated 03.11.2023 for the assessment year 2018-19 is set aside.
This Writ Petition is allowed.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Treatment of Cash Deposits as Unexplained Income
Issue 2: Dismissal of Appeal for Non-Compliance with Section 249(4)(b)
Issue 3: Failure to Adjudicate on Merits
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Addition u/s 69A - Addition based on single concept of cash deposit in bank - CIT(A) has discussed non-compliance on the part of the assessee before the Ld. AO as the notices sent were not complied with but he has not adjudicated the appeal on merit - HELD THAT:-Section 250(6) of the Act casts a duty on the Ld. CIT(A) to pass an order in appeal which should state the points for determination and the decision as well as the reason for arriving at such decision. In the present case before us, the Ld. CIT(A) has not mentioned the reasons after examining the records while disposing of the appeal. CIT(A) has neither adjudicated upon various grounds of appeal nor has passed a reasoned order for arriving at the decision, as is required u/s 250(6) of the Act.
We further note that in Ajji Basha [2019 (12) TMI 320 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] it has been held that a speaking order on merits with reasons and findings is to be passed by Commissioner (Appeals) on basis of ground raised in assessee's appeal; he cannot dispose the assessee's appeal merely by holding that Assessing Officer's order is a self-speaking order which requires no interference.
It has also been held in the case of Premkumar Arjundas Luthra [2016 (5) TMI 290 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] that the law does not empower the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution as is evident from the provisions of the Act.
There is an option available to the assessee to file an application before the Ld. CIT(A) who may dispense with the requirement of payment of advance tax on the basis of facts. Apparently, no such application was filed by the assessee and, therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
Liability to pay the advance tax - Since the Ld. CIT(A) has not mentioned as to how much advance tax was payable by the assessee which has not been paid, and the assessee had the option of filing an application before the Ld. CIT(A), which however, was not filed and consequently the discretion available to the Ld. CIT(A) to exempt the assessee from the applicability of the rigours of section 249(4) could not be exercised by him and the appeal has also not been decided on merit, therefore, in the interest of justice, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) is set aside to be done afresh. The assessee may file an application for exemption from the requirement of payment of advance tax, which shall be decided by the CIT(A) in accordance with law and considering the totality of facts. Accordingly, the grounds taken by the assessee in his appeal are allowed for statistical purposes.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Condonation of Delay
Jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer
Validity of Notice under Section 148
Addition of Cash Deposits as Unexplained Income
Penalty under Sections 271(1)(b), 271(1)(c), and 271F
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal's decision underscores the necessity for tax authorities to adhere to procedural requirements and respect the rights of taxpayers, particularly in matters of jurisdiction and notice service.
Addition u/s 68 - assessee failed to explain the source of cash deposited in his bank account - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the bank statement of the assessee, it is seen that there are both deposits as well as corresponding withdrawals made by the assessee from the same bank account, during the impugned year under consideration.
While entire deposits/credits have been added as unexplained income of the assessee, corresponding credit for withdrawals has not been given to the assessee. Thus, on perusal of the bank statement of the assessee for the impugned year under consideration, in our considered view, the additions made by AO are not liable to be sustained, looking into the assessee’s particular set of facts. Decided in favour of assessee.
Penalty u/s 271(1)(b) - non-appearance in response to notice issued asking the assessee to cause appearance - HELD THAT:-Only a very short period of one day was granted by the AO to cause appearance before him, in the interest, penalty under Section 271(1)(b) of the Act for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- is liable to be deleted. It is a fit case where penalty under Section 271(1)(b) for causing non-appearance is liable to be deleted, looking into the assessee’s facts as highlighted above. Decided in favour of assessee.
The primary issues considered in this appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) were:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Cash Deposits during Demonetization Period
2. Imposition of Higher Tax Rate under Section 115BBE
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Explanation of cash deposits under Section 69A - Burden of proof on assessee to explain source of cash deposits - Demonstration of source by bank withdrawals corroborated by bank statements - Deletion of addition where source satisfactorily explained - Imposition of higher tax rate under Section 115BBE
Explanation of cash deposits under Section 69A - Burden of proof on assessee to explain source of cash deposits - Demonstration of source by bank withdrawals corroborated by bank statements - Deletion of addition where source satisfactorily explained - Addition of Rs. 10,46,500/- made under Section 69A treated as unexplained money was set aside - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the bank statements and documents on record and accepted the assessee's evidence showing earlier cash withdrawals from her bank accounts aggregating to Rs. 9,61,556/- together with old savings/earnings of Rs. 84,944/-, which together corresponded to the cash deposits made during the demonetisation period. The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged the primary onus of explaining the source of the deposits by producing bank statements and corroborative material (paper book pages 39-51). In view of the contemporaneous withdrawals established from the SBI and PNB statements, the Tribunal concluded that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the source of the cash and that the addition under Section 69A, founded on suspicion and surmise, was not justified. Consequently the impugned order upholding the addition was set aside. [Paras 4]
Addition of Rs. 10,46,500/- under Section 69A deleted and the impugned order set aside; appeal allowed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the Tribunal accepted the assessee's evidence of earlier bank withdrawals and savings as adequate explanation for the cash deposits during the demonetisation period, deleted the addition under Section 69A and set aside the orders of the lower authorities.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Limitation of Assessment Order under Section 153(2)
2. Applicability of Extended Time Limit under Section 153(4)
3. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c)
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Validity of reassessment order as barred by limitation - arguments advanced by the assessee that the since the extended time limit of 12 months is not available in the case of Non-Resident as per sec.153(4), AO ought to have complete the assessment as per the provisions of sec.153(2) which is one year from the end of the financial year in which notice u/sec.148 was served - HELD THAT:-Since in the case of the assessee who is a Non-Resident during the impugned A.Ys. 2013-2014 and 2014- 2015, the Assessing Officer has completed the assessment on 25.05.2022 beyond the period of one year from the end of the financial year in which notice issued u/sec.148 dated 29.03.2021, therefore, the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer cannot be sustainable in the eye of law.
As relying on SHRI MIR IBRAHIM ALI [2024 (12) TMI 193 - ITAT HYDERABAD]we quash the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer and allow the additional grounds raised by the assessee.
Penalty u/sec.271(1)(c) on account of concealment of particulars of income is to be deleted.
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are as follows:
(a) Whether the initiation and completion of the assessment proceedings under sections 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were illegal and without jurisdiction due to a lack of territorial jurisdiction.
(b) Whether the assessment proceedings violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the assessee a fair opportunity to be heard.
(c) Whether the addition of Rs. 8,94,545/- on account of professional or technical services was justified.
(d) Whether the interest charged under sections 234A, 234B, and 234C of the Act was correct.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a): Jurisdiction of Assessment Proceedings
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The jurisdiction of income tax authorities is governed by sections 120 and 124 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 124 specifies that the jurisdiction is based on the location of the assessee's residence or principal place of business. Precedents such as Jeeri Keerthana Reddy v. ITO and Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India emphasize the importance of correct jurisdiction.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that the jurisdiction for the assessee's case lay with the Income Tax Officer (ITO) Ward 70(3), Delhi, as the assessee had been residing and conducting business in Delhi. The assessment was incorrectly conducted by ACIT Circle-1, Jaipur, without exercising powers under sections 120 or 127 to transfer jurisdiction.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee provided evidence of residing in Delhi, including ITR acknowledgments and bank statements showing the Delhi address.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied sections 120 and 124, concluding that the assessment proceedings were conducted without proper jurisdiction, rendering them void.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal considered the Department's reliance on a Supreme Court judgment but found the jurisdictional error overriding.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal quashed the notice under section 148 and the subsequent proceedings due to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue (b): Violation of Natural Justice
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The principles of natural justice require that an assessee be given a fair opportunity to be heard. Precedents like Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise highlight the necessity of cross-examination rights.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the assessment was based on third-party information without providing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine or respond, violating natural justice principles.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The assessment relied on AIR information without further inquiry or verification.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found that the lack of opportunity to address the evidence used against the assessee invalidated the assessment proceedings.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal acknowledged the Department's contentions but prioritized the principles of natural justice.
- Conclusions: The violation of natural justice principles contributed to the quashing of the proceedings.
Issue (c): Addition of Rs. 8,94,545/-
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The addition was based on unexplained professional receipts and AIR information, requiring proper inquiry and verification.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that the addition was made without adequate inquiry or evidence, relying solely on AIR data.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee's declared income and TDS records contradicted the unexplained addition.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal deemed the addition unjustified due to lack of evidence and inquiry.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Department's reliance on AIR data without further investigation.
- Conclusions: The addition was not upheld due to insufficient basis.
Issue (d): Interest Charged under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: These sections pertain to interest for defaults in filing returns and payment of advance tax.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal did not specifically address this issue, as the proceedings were quashed on jurisdictional grounds.
- Key Evidence and Findings: Not applicable due to the quashing of proceedings.
- Application of Law to Facts: The interest issue was rendered moot by the quashing of the assessment.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: Not applicable.
- Conclusions: The interest charges were not adjudicated due to the primary jurisdictional finding.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- The Tribunal emphasized the necessity of proper jurisdiction for assessment proceedings, establishing that assessments conducted without jurisdiction are void.
- The principles of natural justice, including the right to a fair hearing and cross-examination, were reinforced as fundamental to valid assessment proceedings.
- The Tribunal highlighted that reliance on AIR information without further inquiry or evidence does not justify additions to income.
- The final determination was to quash the notice under section 148 and all subsequent proceedings due to lack of jurisdiction and violation of natural justice.
Reopening of assessment - assessee has challenged the notice u/s 148 on the ground of jurisdiction - notice under section 148 of the IT Act which has been issued by ACIT Circle-1, Jaipur is without jurisdiction
HELD THAT:- By virtue of section 124 of the IT Act, 1961 it comes under the territorial jurisdiction of ITO Ward 70(3), Delhi, therefore, the jurisdiction of the case of the assessee lies with ITO Ward 70(3), Delhi. In support of his contention, he has relied on the order of Jeeri Keerthana Reddy [2024 (1) TMI 1380 - ITAT MUMBAI]
A/R has also submitted that in the instant case the Income-tax Department did not exercise powers as conferred under section 120 or section 127 of the IT Act, 1961, therefore, the notice and the subsequent proceedings needs to be quashed.
A/R has demonstrated with adequate evidence to prove that the jurisdiction over the case of the assessee lies with ITO Ward 70(3) Delhi whereas notice under section 148 has been issued by ACIT Circle-1, Jaipur which is not correct in terms of the Income Tax Act. We find force in the contention of the ld. A/R. Therefore, notice under section 148 and consequent proceedings undertaken on the strength of such illegal notice are quashed. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
The core issues considered in the judgment are:
1. Whether the deletion of Rs. 43,90,00,000/- added as unsecured loans under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act by the Assessing Officer (AO) was justified.
2. Whether the assessee could establish the creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the transactions.
3. Whether the loans were merely accommodation entries and if the entire chain of flow of funds was genuine or involved complex layering indicating mala fide intentions.
4. The validity of the search warrant issued and the addition made without incriminating material, although this was not addressed by the Tribunal as it was deemed beyond their scope.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Deletion of Addition under Section 68
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 68 of the Income Tax Act deals with unexplained cash credits. The burden is on the assessee to prove the identity, creditworthiness of the creditors, and the genuineness of the transactions.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the AO did not adequately examine documentary evidence provided by the assessee, such as ledger accounts, balance confirmations, income tax returns, audited financial statements, and bank statements. The AO relied heavily on statements from directors of related companies and allegations of circular trading without substantial evidence against the assessee.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The CIT(A) noted that the assessments of the lending companies were completed under scrutiny, and their sources of funds were accepted by the AO. The loans were received and repaid through banking channels, and the lenders had sufficient funds and were assessed to tax.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the AO's addition under Section 68 was unjustified as the sources of funds were verified and accepted in the lenders' assessments, and the transactions were genuine.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue argued that the lenders were shell companies involved in bogus transactions. However, the Tribunal found that the AO had accepted the sources of funds in the lenders' assessments, contradicting the addition made in the assessee's case.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the addition under Section 68 was not warranted, as the assessee had discharged its burden of proof regarding the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions.
2. Creditworthiness and Genuineness of Transactions
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The assessee must demonstrate the creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the transactions to avoid additions under Section 68.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal emphasized the importance of documentary evidence and noted that the AO failed to consider the financial statements and confirmations provided by the lenders.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The financial statements of the lenders showed substantial reserves and surplus, indicating creditworthiness. The transactions were conducted through banking channels, supporting their genuineness.
- Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found that the lenders had sufficient funds and the transactions were genuine, as evidenced by the banking records and financial statements.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue's argument about the lenders being shell companies was countered by the Tribunal's observation that the AO had accepted the lenders' sources of funds in their assessments.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the assessee successfully demonstrated the creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the transactions.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 43,90,00,000/- under Section 68 was unjustified, as the assessee had adequately demonstrated the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions.
- The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition, noting that the AO had accepted the sources of funds in the lenders' assessments.
- Verbatim Quote: "In view of the facts and judicial pronouncements as discussed above, the addition of Rs. 43,90,00,000/- made by the AO u/s 68 of the IT Act is deleted."
- The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal and the assessee's cross-objection, affirming the CIT(A)'s findings and conclusions.
Addition u/s 68 - unsecured loan received by the assessee - assessee could not prove the repayment of the unsecured loans along with sources of repayment and reasons there for- CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THATR:- The entire allegation of the ld. AO seems to be based on finding that these entities were doing some circular trading and they had defrauded the bank by adopting modus operandi of rotation of funds from one entity to another and misusing the LC facility from these banks. Despite making such allegation in the respective assessment orders of these entities, he has applied the profit rate on the sales declared by these entities to assess their income.
Nowhere in their cases any deemed income has been assessed or any finding have been given that they are bogus entities not doing business. Once AO has accepted source of these loans in the case of these parties, then how can he made the addition u/s.68 in the hands of the assessee.
Nowhere in the various statements as referred by the ld. AO, there is any whisper about the assessee or any question was asked by the searched parties or the authorised officers that any such person or entity have given any kind of accommodation entry to the assessee or the loan given by these parties were bogus.
The entire allegation of the AO based on the statement recorded and finding of the search parties is that these groups were doing either bogus sales or purchases or circular trading to get LC from the bank. There might be movement of funds from one company to other and overdrawing the money from the banks through Letter of Credit without any credentials at the time of Bill Discounting or for any other purpose, but nowhere there is any finding of investigation wing or any material found or statement during the search, that some unaccounted money has been given by the assessee company to accommodate any loan entry or there is any cash trail.
Neither there is involvement of any kind of entry operator nor were these companies found to providing accommodation entry of loan by taking some temporary cash. Without such information or material, there cannot be any presumption that these companies had provided bogus entry of loan or the transaction is not genuine. Thus, the finding of the CIT(A) cannot be tinkered with. Accordingly, the additions made u/s.68 is deleted and the order of the ld. CIT (A) is confirmed.
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - defective notice u/s 274 -non specification of clear charge/Default - HC decided [2023 (8) TMI 1373 - DELHI HIGH COURT] Revenue does not dispute that none of the penalty notices issued to the respondent/assessee for the aforementioned AYs advert to the specific limb of Section 271(1)(c) which is triggered against him.
It is not clear whether the AO intended to levy a penalty on the respondent/assessee for concealment of particulars of his income, or furnishing inaccurate particulars.
HELD THAT:- There is gross delay of 371 days in filing this Special Leave Petition.
Delay in refiling is condoned.
Following the orders passed by this Court in [2024 (9) TMI 1698 - SC ORDER], [2024 (9) TMI 1698 - SC ORDER] and [2024 (7) TMI 975 - SC ORDER] in the case of the very same respondent-assessee, we dismiss the application seeking condonation of delay.
Consequently, the Special Leave Petition also stands dismissed.
Issues: Whether an order on a stay application under the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when it directs deposit of 20% of the outstanding demand without independently considering the stay request and without a reasoned order.
Analysis: The settled position requires the authority deciding a stay application to briefly set out the assessee's case, consider whether unconditional stay or partial deposit is warranted, and record short prima facie reasons. Recovery should not ordinarily proceed before the appeal period expires and disposal of the stay application, and coercive recovery must be supported by brief reasons where justified. A mechanical insistence on 20% pre-deposit as a condition precedent for hearing the stay application is not in conformity with these principles or the CBDT guidelines referred to in the judgment.
Conclusion: The impugned stay order was unsustainable and was set aside, with the matter remitted to the competent authority to decide the stay application afresh by passing a reasoned order.
Stay of demand - deposit of 20% of the outstanding amount was made - HELD THAT:- In the matter of M/s. Aarti [2018 (4) TMI 1284 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] application for stay of demand has not been considered in the manner it was required to be considered and dealt with. Deposit of 20% of the disputed demand has been made condition precedent for hearing the application for stay which is not contemplated either under the Act of 1961 or the CBDT guidelines dated 29-2-2016 modified by the office memorandum dated 31-7-2017.
It is only when the competent authority is of the opinion that the assessee has made out a case for grant of interim relief, stay can be granted subject to deposit of 20% of the disputed demand. Likewise, there is a further clause in the circular for reduction of 20% deposit if the petitioner makes out a case, it has also not been considered. In straightway, direction of deposit of 20% of the disputed demand has been made which is not the correct way of deciding the application for stay of the disputed demand.
Since similar question is involved in this matter, the impugned order is set-aside and the matter is remitted to the competent authority to consider it afresh in light of the guidelines as stated above and pass a reasoned order within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Issues: Whether additions under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were sustainable where shares were issued against a goodwill adjustment without any actual receipt of cash by the assessee company.
Analysis: The transaction involved a debit to the goodwill account and a corresponding credit to share capital for allotment of shares, with no cash or cheque receipt in the hands of the assessee. On these facts, the credit did not represent an unexplained cash credit within the statutory setting of section 68. The explanation offered for the book entry was accepted as satisfactory, and the absence of actual money receipt was treated as decisive against invocation of the provision.
Conclusion: Section 68 was not attracted, and the deletion of the addition was upheld in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 68 applies only where a sum is found credited in the books as a real monetary credit to the assessee, and a mere non-cash book entry, satisfactorily explained, does not constitute unexplained cash credit.
Validity of the additions made u/s 68 - whether ITAT has only considered cash credit to be taxable under the provisions of section 68, whereas the provision covers within its ambit ‘any sum credited in the Books? - whether order of Ld. ITAT is erroneous and untenable in law as it has failed to consider that the impugned transaction is a colorable devise to avoid tax liability and the facts clearly show that the assessee party has made the credit/ debit entries in contravention of provisions laid by the Act?
HELD THAT:- As undisputed that the shares had been issued without any monetary consideration. The respondent appears to have debited the goodwill account of the company and made a corresponding credit to the share capital account for the purposes of allotment of shares to Mr. Kaushik. It was in the aforesaid light that it had taken the position that it was merely a book entry and thus, would not have fallen within the ambit of Section 68.
the view as expressed by the CIT(A) and which came to be affirmed by the Tribunal does not merit any interference bearing in mind the undisputed fact that the transaction did not represent an actual receipt of any cash in the hands of the assessee company. In absence of any such consideration having entered the books, the provisions of Section 68 were clearly not attracted. The assessee had in any case satisfactorily explained the circumstances attached to the book entry in question. Decided in favour of assessee.
Issues: Whether the Revenue was justified in seeking disallowance of the entire sub-contract expense claimed to have been paid to M/s. Siddeshwari Infrastructure, or whether the addition was rightly restricted to 20% of the expenditure on the footing that only the profit element embedded in the transaction could be brought to tax.
Analysis: The assessment had treated the sub-contract payments as bogus, but the project work for which the sub-contract was awarded was not disputed as having been completed. The documentary material relied upon showed return of cash of Rs. 4.21 crores against cheque payments, which supported a partial disallowance but did not justify bringing the entire contract amount to tax. The restriction of the addition to 20% was found reasonable in the facts of the case, and the plea for adopting a lower percentage based on another matter was rejected because the present case contained specific evidence of cash return.
Conclusion: The addition was correctly confined to 20% of the sub-contract amount. The Revenue's challenge failed and the assessee obtained relief against the proposed enhancement.
Addition of bogus expense - CIT(A) confirmed the addition @ 20% of the bogus expense - contention of the assessee that identical addition in respect of sister concern of the assessee was restricted to the extent of 12.5% only - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered opinion that the Ld. CIT(A) had correctly appreciated the facts of the case and restricted the addition to the extent of 20% of the subcontract amount which was reasonable considering the fact that documentary evidence for a return of sub-contract amount in cash to the extent of 4.21 Crores only was found in this case. Accordingly, the order of the Ld. CIT(A) is upheld. The grounds taken by the Revenue are dismissed.
Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 towards jewellery found in a jointly held locker was sustainable when the assessee's statement and the daughter's affidavit stated that the jewellery belonged to the daughter.
Analysis: The locker was jointly held by the assessee and her daughter. At the time of search, the assessee stated that the jewellery belonged to her daughter, who was residing in the United Kingdom. The daughter also filed an affidavit stating that the seized jewellery belonged to her and had been received from her parents and relatives on family occasions. No material was brought on record to discredit the statement or the affidavit. Mere regular operation of the locker by the assessee did not, on these facts, justify a presumption that the jewellery exclusively belonged to the assessee.
Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was not justified and was deleted.
Addition u/s. 69A - unexplained jewellery found in locker - locker was in the joint name of the assessee and her daughter - At the time of search assessee had given a categorical statement that the jewellery in the said locker belonged to her daughter, who was now a resident of UK - HELD THAT:- Daughter of the assessee filed an Affidavit stating that the jewellery seized from the locker belonged to her and that the same was received from her parents and relatives at the time of her marriage, on the occasion of birth of her children and on other occasion etc.
Nothing has been brought on record to dispute the veracity of the statement of the assessee or the contents of the Affidavit filed by the daughter of the assessee. The only reason for the addition was that since the locker was being regularly operated by the assessee, the natural presumption would be that the jewellery found in said locker, belonged to the assessee only.
Looking into the instant facts, no such presumption can necessarily be drawn, looking into the fact that the locker in question was jointly held by the assessee and her daughter.
Daughter of the assessee was residing in UK and hence it was practically not possible for her to operate the locker and further, the daughter of the assessee also filed an Affidavit stating that the jewellery impounded from the locker belonged to her and her family members. Accordingly, looking into the assessee’s set of facts, in our considered view, the additions made by the AO are liable to be deleted. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained on the issue of disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D; (ii) Whether the compensation of Rs. 60,00,000 paid under the Memorandum of Understanding was an inadmissible expenditure warranting revision under Section 263.
Issue (i): Whether revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained on the issue of disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D.
Analysis: The issue had already been examined in assessment and the disallowance was deleted in appeal by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that no disallowance was warranted in the absence of exempt income in the manner urged by the Revenue, and further held that investment in a partnership firm and the resulting profit could not be the basis for the impugned disallowance in the present facts.
Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 on this issue was not sustainable and the finding was in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the compensation of Rs. 60,00,000 paid under the Memorandum of Understanding was an inadmissible expenditure warranting revision under Section 263.
Analysis: The payment was found to be a contractual compensation arising from cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding and not a penalty for violation of law. The Tribunal held that such expenditure was incurred for business purposes and that the Assessing Officer had also examined the matter during assessment, so the order could not be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.
Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 on this issue was not sustainable and the finding was in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The conditions for invoking revisionary jurisdiction were not satisfied on either issue, and the assessee succeeded in the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 cannot be invoked unless the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and a purely contractual business compensation not involving infraction of law is not disallowable on that basis.
Revision u/s 263 - issues not verified by AO during the course of assessment proceedings on Disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D and Payment of compensation being allegedly not allowable as deduction u/s 28 to 44DA - HELD THAT:- AO has made disallowance which stands deleted by the CIT(A). Since the issue has already been examined by the AO, adjudicated by the Ld. CIT(A), the same issue cannot be again taken up the PCIT u/s 263. Further, disallowance u/s 14A cannot be made for investments made in partnership firm and the profit earned thereof. Even on merits, we find no prejudice is caused to the Revenue and hence the order of the Ld. PCIT on this issue cannot be upheld.
Compensation paid - PCIT held that assessee had neither disallowed such expense nor the Assessing Officer had verified the expense as it is not allowable within the provisions of section 28 to 44DA - Compensation expenses paid in year under consideration is on account of contractual payment and not on account of any violation of any law and hence, no disallowance in this regard is warranted under the provisions of the Act.
Since no disallowance is warranted as enumerated above, the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act by Assessing Officer can neither be held as 'erroneous' nor 'prejudicial or fatal to the interest of revenue'. We find that the AO has also examined the issue during the assessment proceedings as found in the notice issued u/s 142(1). Therefore, twin pre-conditions to assume revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act are not satisfied in the issue on hand.
Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether the appellate authority's ex parte disposal was valid where hearing notices were issued to an e-mail address different from that furnished in Form No.35 and an impugned order was passed before the deadline for response expired.
2. Whether delay in filing Form No.10-IC for assessment year 2020-21 precludes application of concessional tax rate under section 115BAA, or whether such delay is condoned by administrative instruction (CBDT Circular No.6/2022) when prescribed conditions are satisfied.
3. Whether any other consequences (including on rectification orders and interest under section 244A) arise from the above findings.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 1: Validity of ex parte disposal where notices were sent to incorrect e-mail and order passed before expiry of response period
Legal framework: Principles of natural justice require service of notice in conformity with procedure and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed; appellate authority must comply with its own notice requirements and allow the time prescribed in the notice for response.
Precedent Treatment: No judicial precedents were cited or relied upon in the judgment; determination is made on principles of procedural fairness and record evidence of notice delivery.
Interpretation and reasoning: The record established that the appellate office issued two hearing notices (dated 22.11.2024 and 27.11.2024) to an e-mail ID different from that shown in Form No.35. The second notice fixed a response deadline of 03.12.2024, but the appellate authority passed the ex parte order on 03.12.2024 - i.e., before the expiry of the response period - and the notices were not sent to the e-mail reflected in the appellant's filed documents. These facts demonstrate both misdirection of communication and premature adjudication.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - procedural non-compliance (misdirected notice and premature passing of order) vitiates the ex parte disposal; this is essential to the decision to set aside the first appellate order. No separate obiter commentary on ancillary procedural doctrines.
Conclusion: The ex parte order of the first appellate authority is procedurally invalid on account of non-compliance with notice requirements (sending to incorrect e-mail) and issuance of the impugned order before the expiration of the time allowed for response; remittance or setting aside was warranted (the Tribunal set aside/allowed appeal on that basis).
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 2: Applicability of concessional rate under section 115BAA where Form No.10-IC was filed late and CBDT Circular No.6/2022 is invoked for condonation
Legal framework: Section 115BAA prescribes concessional taxation at 22% for eligible domestic companies subject to conditions; Rule 21AE and Form No.10-IC prescribe the procedural requirement of filing the declaration within the specified due date. Administrative guidance (CBDT Circular No.6/2022 dated 17.03.2022) addresses condonation of delay in filing Form No.10-IC for AY 2020-21 where specific conditions are satisfied.
Precedent Treatment: No judicial authority was cited to accept or reject the Circular; the Tribunal applied the Circular as a binding administrative pronouncement relevant to the facts before it.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Circular sets out three cumulative conditions for condonation: (i) return of income for AY 2020-21 filed on or before the due date under section 139(1); (ii) the company opted for taxation under section 115BAA in the ITR-6 (Filing Status); and (iii) Form No.10-IC filed electronically on or before 30.06.2022 (or three months from the end of the month in which the Circular is issued, whichever is later). The admitted facts showed that the assessee satisfied all three conditions: timely ITR filing, election shown in ITR-6, and Form 10-IC filed within the extended period. In these circumstances the Tribunal found the delay condoned by the Circular and concluded that the conditions for section 115BAA were effectively met.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where the specified conditions in CBDT Circular No.6/2022 are satisfied, delay in filing Form No.10-IC for AY 2020-21 is condoned and the concessional tax regime under section 115BAA at 22% applies. This formed the operative basis for directing taxation at 22% instead of higher rates applied earlier.
Conclusion: The assessee, having met the three conditions in the Circular, was entitled to be taxed at the concessional rate of 22% under section 115BAA; prior intimation and appellate treatment taxing at higher rates were set aside to the extent inconsistent with this entitlement.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 3: Consequences on rectification, demand and interest (including section 244A)
Legal framework: Rectification or revision and calculation of refunds/demands flow from correct application of substantive tax provisions; interest under section 244A pertains to delay in refund and is assessable in light of the correct tax computation.
Precedent Treatment: No separate authorities were cited regarding rectification or interest; the Tribunal's determination on tax rate necessarily impacts any rectification or demand that arose from the incorrect tax computation.
Interpretation and reasoning: The appellant contended that rectification orders taxing at higher rates and resulting demands/refund reductions were void for want of opportunity and incorrect application of law. The Tribunal's finding that the appellant was entitled to taxation at 22% implies that the earlier intimation and related rectification/demand must be adjusted to reflect the correct rate. The appeal succeeded on merits; the judgment does not elaborate a separate adjudication on the quantum of interest under section 244A, but the direction to apply section 115BAA necessarily affects refund/demand calculations and attendant interest claims.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - correction of tax rate to 22% requires corresponding rectification of demands/refunds; treatment of interest under section 244A is consequential and was not independently decided beyond noting that the appellant had raised the issue and that the substantive tax computation was altered. The point on interest remains consequential rather than a separately adjudicated ratio.
Conclusion: Orders assessing tax at higher rates and resulting demands/refund adjustments are to be rectified in accordance with the Tribunal's finding that section 115BAA at 22% applies; any interest or refund consequences follow from this determination and must be given effect to in implementation of the decision.
Ex-parte order - non-compliance to the hearing notices issued - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) proceeded to pass impugned order on 03.12.2024 ex-parte, even before the time for furnishing response by the assessee has not expired. Moreover, we find notices of hearing sent from Office of the First Appellate Authority was not sent to e-mail ID shown in Form No.35. Therefore, there was non-compliance to the hearing notices issued from the Office of First Appellate Authority, which had resulted in ex-parte order.
Denial of concessional rate of tax at 22% as per provisions of section 115BAA - delay in filing Form 10-IC - HELD THAT:- CBDT in its Circular No.6 of 2022 dated 17.03.2022 had stated that delay in filing Form No.10-IC, as per Rule 21AE of the Rules for the previous year relevant to AY 2020-21 is condoned in cases where following conditions are satisfied:-
i) The return of income for AY 2020-21 has been filed on or before the due date specified u/s. 139(1) of the Act;
ii) The assessee company has opted for taxation u/s/115BAA of the Act in (e) of ‘Filing Status’ in Part A-‘GEN’ of the Form of Return of Income ITR-6; and
iii) Form 10-IC is filed electronically on or before 30.06.2022 or 3 months from the end of the month in which this Circular is issued, whichever is later.”
As assessee had satisfied all the aforesaid three conditions mentioned in the Board’s Circular No.6 of 2022 dated 17.03.2022. In view of the assessee satisfying all the three conditions mentioned above, delay in filing Form 10-IC stands condoned and accordingly, the assessee would be entitled to be taxed at concessional rate of tax at 22% as per provisions of section 115BAA - Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
Issues: Whether penalty under section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable on the amount disclosed by the assessee.
Analysis: The penalty could not be sustained merely on the objection that the show-cause notice did not specify the exact limb, because the notice was not invalid on that ground. However, for section 271AAB to apply, the income must answer the statutory description of "undisclosed income" arising from search material or related entries. The assessee's disclosure was found to be voluntary and not shown to be linked to any incriminating material, money, bullion, jewellery, valuable article, or relevant entry found in the course of search. The revenue also failed to correlate the disclosed amount with the seized material.
Conclusion: The amount disclosed did not constitute undisclosed income for the purpose of section 271AAB, and the penalty was not leviable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Penalty order u/s 271AAB - Disclosure made in search proceedings - DR held that in case there was no search, no disclosure would have been made and a similar mention is also made in the assessment order - AR re-emphasized the fact that the assessee had voluntarily disclosed the income and the income was not represented by any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or any entry in the books of account or other transactions found in the course of search - HELD THAT:- As gone through the statement of Poonam Mohta recorded on 08.05.2015, produced in the course of proceeding before us and a perusal of the same shows that though certain valuables were found in the locker of the assessee however, the assessee had not made any disclosure in the statement recorded while the locker no. 932A was subjected to search and seizure on 08.05.2020.
Hence, as the disclosure did not relate to the finding of the search and was made suo motu and though the Ld. AO has referred to certain seized documents in the penalty order, but he has not corelated how the disclosure of Rs. 50 lakhs had any reference to the seized documents; therefore, the disclosure could not be treated as undisclosed income for the purpose of imposition of penalty u/s 271AAB and the penalty imposed is liable to be cancelled. Hence, Ground No. 1 is allowed and the penalty is hereby cancelled.
Addition made on account of short deduction of TDS - payments were made to M/s Steel Authority for supply of railways tracks in terms of contracts or for purchase of goods - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- We are in agreement of the finding of the Ld. CIT(A) that no liability for deduction of tax arises in respect of the contract related to supply of the material. As there is no provision of the Act that mandates for deduction of tax on the payment made for supply of material during the relevant year, we hold accordingly.
However, in respect of the short deduction of deduction and interest, it is the case of the assessee that short deduction was due to exclusion of the service tax component as per the CBDT Circular.
This fact is required to be verified at the end of the assessing authority. Therefore, the impugned order on the short deduction of tax is set aside and the issue is restored to the AO who would verify from the accounts of the assessee whether the short deduction was due to the exclusion of the service tax component and if so, same shall be decided in the light of the CBDT Circular No. 01/2014 dated 13.01.2014 (F.No 275/59/20124T(B). All the grounds of appeal of the Revenue are disposed off in the terms of the above.
Issues: Whether the detention of the wrist watch and the consequent refusal of release were sustainable in law in the absence of a valid show cause notice and hearing, and whether a standard-form waiver could amount to a conscious and informed waiver under the customs law framework.
Analysis: The detention was challenged on the ground that no proper show cause notice was issued and no personal hearing was afforded. The Court noted that the Department relied on a printed undertaking said to waive show cause notice and hearing, but the Department had the petitioner's email address and mobile number and could have served a proper notice within the prescribed time. The Court applied the principle that waiver under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 must be conscious and informed, and that a printed standard form does not by itself amount to a valid oral show cause notice or a valid waiver of hearing. In the absence of issuance of notice and hearing, the detention could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The detention was held to be contrary to law and the goods were directed to be released to the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi: A printed standard-form waiver does not constitute a conscious and informed waiver of the statutory right to show cause notice and personal hearing under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, and detention without such notice and hearing is unsustainable.
Seeking unconditional release of the wrist watch detained - non-issuance of a show cause notice and personal hearing to the petitioner - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Though the Petitioner ought to have disclosed the fact that he had submitted the documents in response to email dated 20th February, 2024, in a belated manner, however, the fact that show cause notice was not issued in this case cannot be ignored by the Court.
Following the decision in Amit Kumar [2025 (2) TMI 385 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the detention of the subject goods is itself liable to be set aside due to non-issuance of show cause notice, and the goods are accordingly directed to be released to the Petitioner within a period of two weeks.
Conclusion - Detention is liable to be set aside due to non-issuance of show cause notice.
Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the show cause notice and the consequential order in original were liable to be quashed on account of inordinate delay in adjudication and in light of the earlier batch judgment quashing the notice qua the principal noticee.
Analysis: The petition arose from the same show cause notice that had already been set aside in connected proceedings concerning the principal importer. The record showed prolonged pendency, repeated call-book transfers, and repeated adjournments over several years before adjudication. In view of the earlier judgment quashing the notice on the ground of unexplained delay, the consequential order passed against the co-noticee could not survive independently.
Conclusion: The show cause notice and the order in original were quashed. The issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.
Seeking to quash the impugned Order - misdeclaration of export goods - Narrow Woven Fabrics - HELD THAT:- Since, both the show cause notice and the final order that arise from the said show cause notice have already been quashed by the Court qua the main company i.e., M/s J.R. International, the Order In Original qua the Petitioner would also be liable to be quashed.
In fact, this Court has recently in Shri Balaji Enterprises v. Additional Director General New Delhi & Ors. [2024 (12) TMI 1208 - DELHI HIGH COURT] also followed a similar rationale as the Coordinate Bench of this Court.
The SCN along with Order In Original emanating therefrom are quashed - Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the seized foreign currency could be directed to be released in view of the petitioner's willingness to pay the redemption fine and penalty, when the departmental appeal against the order-in-original was pending.
Analysis: The currency had been confiscated with an option of redemption on payment of fine and penalty. The Department informed the Court that it had already preferred an appeal against the order-in-original. In view of the pending appeal, release of the currency could not be granted at that stage. The appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal expeditiously, within four months.
Outcome: The prayer for release of the currency was declined at that stage and the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the departmental appeal within four months.
Seeking release of the currency which was seized by the Respondent/Department from the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- Since the clear instructions are that the Department has challenged the Order-in-Original dated 29th March, 2024, the Commissioner (Appeals) must now adjudicate the appeal in accordance with the law. Until such adjudication, the prayer for the release of the currency cannot be granted - In terms of Section 128A(4A), the Commissioner (Appeals) is to decide every appeal where it is possible to do so within a period of six months from the date when it has been filed. Accordingly, the Commissioner (Appeals) in the present case shall decide the appeal as per the provisions of the Act within a period of four months.
Petition disposed off.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Failure to Exercise Due Diligence by the CHA
Involvement in or Abetment of Fraud
Justification of Penalties Imposed
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Imposition of penalties u/s 114(i), 114(iii), and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 - Siphoning off duty drawback from the exchequer by export of inferior quality of readymade garments at highly overvalued price - HELD THAT:- There is no denial of the Revenue that appellant obtained all the requisite documents vis-à-vis the identity and the place of existence by verifying said KYC documents with the respective departments.
It is also observed that all the consignments were allowed to be exported after scrutiny of the documents which were filed along with shipping bills. Even the physical examination of the goods was conducted without any objection been raised at the time of clearance of the export consignment neither with respect to the quality nor the value of the exported garments. There is also no denial to the fact that with respect to the impugned exports the appellant filed eight shipping bills on behalf of M/s. Kenstar Overseas and six shipping bills on behalf of M/s. Alpha Impex in the month of May-June 2009 - Apparently and admittedly the impugned show cause notice was issued on 19.05.2015 i.e. six year after the impugned export consignments got cleared by the appellant.
There are no denial of Shri Vinod Kumar Mulani, the beneficial owner of the exports, who is the alleged mastermind behind the fictitious firms fraudulently exporting the inferior quality of garments to receive ineligible duty drawback, that the appellant was authorized to clear the impugned export consignments.
This Tribunal in the case of M/s. Mauli Worldwide Logistics Vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi (Airport and General) [2022 (7) TMI 368 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], has also held that the fact that appellant had carried out due diligence is consistent with the fact that the KYC documents were obtained by him as CHA and were submitted by him before the Commissioner. Same is the fact of the present case. Hence the decision is squarely applicable in the present case also.
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Kunal Travels [2017 (3) TMI 1494 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that the CHA is not an inspector to weigh the genuineness of the transaction. It is a processing agent of documents with respect of clearance of goods through customs house - all CHA need not to sit as an examiner or supervisor to such authorities issuing the documents to the importer/exporter as the case may be. Even the CHALR Regulations do not expect the CHA to physically examine the genuineness vis-à-vis the identity of his client and his existence at the address mentioned on the documents which are otherwise being verified by CHA as genuine. The onus of CHA therefore cannot be extended to verify that the officers issuing those documents/certify/registration whether or not have correctly issued the same.
There is no evidence produced by the department to prove the allegations of lack due diligence on part of the CHA nor of abatement in impugned illegal exports. There is not even any evidence on record to prove that the appellant had derived any benefit out of alleged violation by the exporters or out of availment of ineligible drawback - There is no corroboration to that effect despite the department had done a meticulous enquiry with the banks of the exporter firms but no single documentary evidence could have been produced showing any remittance to the appellant out of the amounts received by those firms in the name of duty drawbacks.
Conclusion - In absence of any evidence to support the allegations of the show cause notice against the appellant, the penalty against the appellant has wrongly been imposed.
Appeal allowed.
The core legal question considered was whether the Revenue had correctly re-assessed and enhanced the value of imported goods without issuing a speaking order, based on the fact that the differential duty was voluntarily paid by the appellant.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The legal framework revolves around the Customs Act, 1962, particularly Section 14 regarding valuation, Section 17 concerning assessment, and the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007. The precedents include judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts, notably Eicher Tractors Ltd. and Century Metal Recycling (P) Ltd., which emphasize the requirement for a reasonable doubt and procedural adherence in valuation matters.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The Tribunal analyzed the statutory scheme of valuation and assessment under the Customs Act. It emphasized that the transaction value declared by the importer should be the basis of assessment unless rejected for valid reasons as per the Customs Valuation Rules. The Tribunal highlighted that a proper officer must form a reasonable doubt based on objective criteria before rejecting the declared value and must communicate these reasons to the importer.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The Tribunal noted that in the present case, no verification, examination, or testing of goods was conducted by the proper officer to substantiate the reasonable doubt about the declared transaction value. The rejection of the declared value was based solely on NIDB data, without following the procedural requirements under Rule 12 of the Valuation Rules.
Application of Law to Facts:
The Tribunal applied the legal principles from the Customs Act and relevant case law to the facts, determining that the absence of a speaking order and reliance solely on NIDB data without proper verification or examination was contrary to the statutory requirements. The voluntary payment of differential duty by the appellant did not constitute an acceptance of the reassessed value, as the procedural safeguards were not followed.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The Tribunal considered the appellant's argument that the decision in Hanuman Prasad & Sons had been overturned by the Delhi High Court, which necessitated setting aside the order under challenge. The Revenue's argument that the appellant's voluntary payment constituted acceptance of the reassessment was rejected, as the procedural requirements for reassessment were not met.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the rejection of the declared transaction value and the confirmation of differential duty were violative of Section 17(4) of the Customs Act and Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeals were allowed.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
The Tribunal cited the Delhi High Court's judgment, emphasizing that the proper officer must document reasons for doubting the declared value, and the importer must be given an opportunity to respond. The absence of such documentation and opportunity renders the reassessment process arbitrary.
Core Principles Established:
The Tribunal reaffirmed that the transaction value should be the basis for assessment unless rejected for cogent reasons. It underscored the necessity of following procedural safeguards outlined in the Customs Act and Valuation Rules before rejecting a declared value.
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The Tribunal determined that the procedural lapses in the reassessment process, including the lack of a speaking order and reliance solely on NIDB data, invalidated the rejection of the declared transaction value. Consequently, the differential duty confirmed by the lower authority was set aside, and the appeals were allowed in favor of the appellant.
Valuation of imported goods - redetermination of duty - enhancement of value - Whether the Revenue has rightly re-assessed and enhanced the value of the imported goods without passing any speaking order but based on the fact that the differential duty has voluntarily been paid by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- Once the value is declared in the Bill of Entry filed in terms of Section 46 of Customs Act 1962, the proper officer has to assess the duty and the assessment has to be made in terms of Section 17 of the Customs Act, 1962. The joint reading of 5 sub-sections in the said provision reflects that the importer/exporter initially follow a process of self-assessment of declaration of the transaction value [Section 17(1)]. The proper office is entitled to examine veracity of self declaration that is made [Section 17(2)]. For the purpose, the proper officer is required to call upon the importer or the exporter, as the case may be, to produce further document or information based whereupon the correct duty leviable on the imported/exported goods should be ascertained [Section 17(3)].
In addition to enquiry, as required under Rule 12 of Valuation Rules the enquiry prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Customs Act is required to be conducted by the proper officer to arrive at the reassessed value. It is seen from a perusal of Section 17(4) of the Customs Act that the proper officer can re-assess the duty leviable, after verification, examination or testing of the goods or otherwise if it is found that the self-assessment was not done correctly - where the proper officer is not satisfied and has reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the value so declared. It is deemed that the transactional value of such imported goods cannot be determined under the provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the 2007 Rules. Clause (iii) of Explanation to Rule 12 states that the proper officer can on “certain reasons” raise doubts about the truth or accuracy of declared value.
The transaction value declared by the importer should form the basis of assessment unless the same is rejected for the reasons set out in Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules. The Customs Valuation Rules outlines the step-by-step methodology to be adopted for re-determination of the assessable value in certain cases. The primary requirement for re-determination of the value is that the transaction value should be rejected for cogent reasons prescribed in the Customs Valuation Rules. If the transaction value is rejected, then the Customs Valuation Rules prescribes the basis for arriving at the assessable value.
Conclusion - i) Where the importer confirms his acceptance in writing about the re-assessment arrived at after following the procedure of Section 17(4), it is only in that situation, that the proper officer would stand relieved of the obligation of passing his speaking order in respect of such assessment. The mere waiver will not get covered under the admission as termed by statute in Section 17(5) of the Customs Act. ii) Apparently and admittedly no enquiry as is required under Rule 12 of Valuation Rules has been conducted by the department prior rejecting the said value. Nor any exercise was undertaken as is required under Section 4 of Section 17 of the Customs Act. It is only the NIDB data which was relied upon by the department to reject the value declared in Bills of Entry and to re-assess the value of the goods at a higher price.
Confirmation of differential duty is, therefore, held violative of Section 17(4) of Customs Act and of Rule 12 of Customs Valuation Rules and hence is liable to be set aside - appeal allowed.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Investigation into TCSPL
Issue 2: Connection of ACE Group to TCSPL
Issue 3: Recall/Modification of the Interim Order
Issue 4: Role of Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
Issue 5: Legitimacy of the IRP Report
Issue 6: Jurisdiction of NCLT and Monitoring Committee
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Public Interest Litigation or not - alleged role, irregularities, and misconduct on the part of the IRP - Siphoning of funds by the ex-promoters and directors of Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. - whether the submissions on the part of the learned counsels for the parties should at all be considered by this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction under section 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950? - HELD THAT:- Unhesitatingly, this Court finds no ground to recall the order dated 02.02.2024. The issues relating to the genuineness of the IRP report dated 09.08.2023, which has been espoused on behalf of the petitioner, respondent No. 11/Orris and respondent No. 4/Greenopolis Welfare Confederation on one side, and contested by applicants/respondents No. 12 and 13, along with respondent No. 5/Greenopolis Welfare Association on the other side, are complex set of facts which need to be addressed by the NCLT in view of the directions of the Supreme Court.
There is no gainsaying that the NCLT is seized of the matter with regard to the CIRP proceedings pertaining to respondent No. 3/TCSPL, which will invariably delve into all the relevant aspects of the matter. At the cost of repetition, a Monitoring Committee has already been constituted by the NCLT, which will naturally examine the complex factual issues and facts raised by the parties, including the successive reports by the three IRPs appointed including the present one, besides the revival of respondent No. 3/ TCSPL so as to provide some relief to the petitioner and homebuyers.
The bottom line is that the petitioner is espousing her personal cause and, in doing so, has also espoused the cause of the similarly placed investors/claimants/homebuyers, who form a distinct class and whose long-promised dream of owning residential flats remains unfulfilled, as construction has been stalled for over thirteen years now - The modus operandi adopted by them in defrauding the homebuyers has been exposed even in the above referred directions by the Allahabad High Court, the foot prints of which are evidently visible in the instant matter too.
This Court is not by-passing the jurisdiction of the NCLT to determine the fate of the respondent no. 3/TCSPL, which is involved in CIRP, nor is it usurping any power under Section 63 of the IBC. However, it is undeniable that the investigation by respondents No. 1 and 2 is progressing at a snail's pace qua respondent No. 3/TCSPL and its ex-promoters & directors, marked by tardiness and a lack of urgency, which is unacceptable in law and prejudicial to the interests of the homebuyers.
Section 212(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that the Central Government has the power to order investigation in respect of any company which it deems necessary and also to order special investigations in respect of other concerns related to corporate law. The Central Government may appoint any authority, officer or agency to conduct the investigations and to report its findings to the Central Government with the primary objective of investigating frauds and offences relating to a company under section 447 of the Act. The entire setting of the present matter, compels this Court to direct the Central Government to entrust the investigation to the SFIO as regards the role of the ex-promoters and directors of respondent no. 3/TCSPL is concerned - in the instant matter, the entire facts and circumstances presented go beyond mere assumptions, surmises or conjectures. The stark fact is that the Greenopolis project has been abandoned by the respondent Nos. 6-10/ex-promoters and directors after siphoning of funds generated directly through respondent no. 3/TCSPL and the petitioner as well as those who are similarly placed investors/claimants/homebuyers are the victims at their hands, which is an undisputed proposition.
Conclusion - i) The investigation into the affairs of TCSPL and its ex-promoters is necessary to protect the interests of the homebuyers and ascertain the extent of the fraudulent activities. ii) The ACE Group is not to be investigated by the SFIO, but the Registrar of Companies will continue to examine their transactions with TCSPL. iii) The interim order remains in effect, with modifications to exclude certain parties from the SFIO investigation. iv) The NCLT will continue to handle the CIRP, with the Monitoring Committee overseeing the process.
Application disposed off.
Issues: Whether the funds infused by the appellant under the memorandum of agreement constituted a financial debt so as to make the appellant a financial creditor entitled to maintain the Section 7 application.
Analysis: The definition of financial debt under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code requires disbursal against consideration for the time value of money, and the inclusive part of the definition extends to transactions having the commercial effect of borrowing. The agreement showed actual disbursal of funds and supply of raw material for reviving the corporate debtor's operations, with the amounts being fully refundable and the appellant entitled to commission and lien over assets and shares until repayment. The absence of an express interest clause did not exclude the transaction from being a financial debt, since interest-free funding can still qualify where the overall transaction carries the commercial effect of borrowing. On a holistic reading, the arrangement was not a mere business understanding but a financing transaction with repayment obligation.
Conclusion: The infusion of funds amounted to financial debt and the appellant was a financial creditor. The rejection of the Section 7 application on that ground was erroneous and the appellant succeeded on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi: A transaction that involves disbursal of funds for reviving a corporate debtor's business, with repayment obligations and attendant commercial benefits to the lender, can constitute financial debt even without an express interest clause if it has the commercial effect of borrowing.
Seeking dismissal of Section 7 application filed by the Appellant seeking initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (CIRP) of the Respondent-Corporate Debtor - credit facility provided by the Appellant to the Respondent was in the nature of a financial debt falling within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the IBC or not.
Whether the infusion of funds by the Appellant in the Corporate Debtor was in the nature of financial debt and, if so, whether the Appellant, being a financial creditor, was entitled to file the Section 7 application? - HELD THAT:- For a debt to be treated as financial debt there has to be an element of disbursal of money and the disbursal must be against the consideration for time value of money. The concept of time value of money has been further explained to also include a transaction which does not necessarily culminate into interest being paid in respect of money that has been borrowed.
The nature of underlying transaction is therefore a determinative factor in deciding whether infusion of funds can be classified as financial debt or not. To find out whether any element of commercial borrowing for time value of money is noticeable in the transactions which have taken place in the present facts of the case, it is required to study the various relevant clauses of the MoA since it is the MoA which constitutes the underlying edifice of the transactions.
Whether money disbursed by the Appellant to the Corporate Debtor to operationalize its business can be treated as a financial debt? - HELD THAT:- In the present facts of the case, there is sufficient material on record to prove that there was disbursal of funds by the Appellant to the Corporate Debtor in their account. The bank transaction details have been placed at page 248-284 of Appeal Paper Book (APB) to substantiate their contention that money was actually disbursed to the Corporate Debtor, which was in dire financial straits, towards working capital to make the Corporate Debtor operational - an abstract of commission on sales received by the Appellant from the Corporate Debtor for Rs 2.95 Cr. along with tax invoices have been placed from pages 366 to 375 of APB. It has also been indicated that an amount of Rs 11.54 lakhs was still due from the Corporate Debtor towards commission. This leaves no doubts that there was fund infusion into the Corporate Debtor by the Appellant.
Whether this disbursal was made by the Appellant against consideration for time value of money? - HELD THAT:- It is an undisputed fact that payment of interest against disbursal was not specifically mentioned in the clauses. Be that as it may, the IBC does not provide for any prescriptive requirement for the Financial Creditor to place on record formal written agreements/documents between the parties to establish that the disbursal made was in the form of loan with interest. It would be misconceived to hold that the fund infusion did not qualify to be a financial debt merely because loan component was not explicitly mentioned in the MoA. It is a well settled proposition of law that interest on loan is not the only binding criterion for determining time value of money. The question whether a credit facility without charging interest can be considered to be a financial debt in terms of Section 5(8) of the IBC is no longer res integra and has already been decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Orator judgment [2021 (8) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT] to hold that the definition of “financial debt” in Section 5(8) IBC does not expressly exclude an interest free loan. Viewed against this backdrop, the contention of the Respondent that the disbursal of the fund was bereft of loan component and hence not in the nature of a financial debt does not have legs to stand on.
Whether the disbursal made by the Appellant in the present context reflected consideration for time value of money? - HELD THAT:- Time value of money is not only a regular or timely return received for the duration for which the amount is disbursed as an amount in addition to the principal but also covers any other form of benefit or value accruing to the creditor as a return for providing money for a long duration. It is required to see if the Appellant had envisioned enhancement of economic prospect in return for the funds disbursed and if so then the sum advanced would qualify to entail time value of money and acquire the colour and character of commercial borrowing.
The disbursals clearly display commercial effect of borrowing. In our considered opinion the Adjudicating Authority committed an error in holding the transaction to be a business arrangement and non-suiting of the Appellant on the ground of not being a financial creditor. The Appellant has been wrongfully ousted by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the Appellant was not a financial creditor and the infusion of fund was not in the nature of financial debt. There are no hesitation to observe that this is a case of financial debt and the Appellant is clearly a financial creditor in terms of statutory provisions of IBC.
The Appellant has brought on record the Section 7 application filed by them. In Part-IV of the Section 7 application, the amount claimed to be in default as well as date of default has been clearly depicted therein. Part-IV also contains the pleadings and submissions made pertaining to debt and default. In Form-1 filed by the Appellant under Section 7 of IBC read with Rule 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, the principal amount of loan advanced as ‘Financial Assistance’ by the Appellant is shown as Rs.39,84,72,111/- and the amount claimed in default to be Rs.42,47,32,067/- including interest - The Adjudicating Authority is obliged to determine whether default has occurred and whether the debt which was due and payable has remained unpaid. Clearly enough, the rival contentions of the two parties with respect to default in repayment of debt has not been considered and adjudicated upon by the Adjudicating Authority.
Conclusion - The infusion of funds by the Appellant constituted a financial debt under the IBC, and the Appellant was a financial creditor entitled to file a Section 7 application. The absence of an interest clause does not preclude a transaction from being a financial debt if it has the commercial effect of borrowing.
The matter remanded to the Adjudicating Authority to exercise its satisfaction as to whether financial debt has crossed the threshold limits and has become due and payable and basis these findings decide to accept or refuse admission of the Section 7 application of the Appellant - appeal allowed by way of remand.
Issues: Whether the appellant, accused under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, was entitled to bail pending trial in view of prolonged incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time.
Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody for about 1 year and 2 months, while the case involved 225 witnesses and only one had been examined. The Court applied the principle that where continued detention under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 would result in unreasonable delay in trial and infringement of the right to speedy trial, constitutional courts may exercise their jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding the statutory restrictions under Section 45(1)(ii) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Court found the earlier decision in V. Senthil Balaji applicable on the facts.
Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to be enlarged on bail pending trial.
Ratio Decidendi: Prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time, can justify grant of bail by constitutional courts on the ground of protection of the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory bail restrictions.
Money Laundering - offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - appellant had been in custody for over a year with the trial not likely to conclude within a reasonable time - there are 225 witnesses cited, out of which only 1 has been examined - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in the decision of this Court in the case of V.Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement [2024 (9) TMI 1497 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that 'the appellant has been incarcerated for 15 months or more for the offence punishable under the PMLA. In the facts of the case, the trial of the scheduled offences and, consequently, the PMLA offence is not likely to be completed in three to four years or even more. If the appellant's detention is continued, it will amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India of speedy trial.'
Attention is invited to a decision of a coordinate Bench in the case of Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad [2025 (2) TMI 563 - SUPREME COURT]. After having perused the judgment, it is found that this was a case where the decisions of this Court in the case of Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb [2021 (2) TMI 1212 - SUPREME COURT] and in the case of V.Senthil Balaji were not applicable on facts. Perhaps that is the reason why these decisions were not placed before the coordinate Bench.
The appellant shall be produced before the Special Court within a maximum period of one week from today. The Special Court shall enlarge the appellant on bail on appropriate terms and conditions including the condition of regularly and punctually attending the Special Court and cooperating with the Special Court for early disposal of the case.
Conclusion - The principles laid down in previous cases were not applicable in that specific case, leading to the cancellation of bail. The appellant is directed to be produced before the Special Court within a week for bail to be granted on appropriate terms and conditions, including surrendering any passport and cooperating with the court for the early disposal of the case.
Appeal allowed.
The primary issue considered was whether the applicant fulfills the twin conditions of Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) for the grant of bail. The Court examined whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the offense of money laundering and whether he is not likely to commit any offense while on bail.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework primarily involves Section 45 of the PMLA, which stipulates conditions for granting bail in money laundering cases. The section requires that the Public Prosecutor be given an opportunity to oppose bail and that the court be satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and not likely to commit an offense while on bail. The Court referenced several Supreme Court decisions, including Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & others Vs. Union of India, and Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Aditya Tripathi, which emphasize the seriousness of money laundering offenses and the rigorous application of Section 45.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Court interpreted Section 45 of the PMLA as imposing stringent conditions for bail due to the serious nature of money laundering offenses, which have significant implications for financial systems and national integrity. The Court noted that economic offenses constitute a separate class of offenses, warranting a cautious approach in granting bail.
Key Evidence and Findings
The evidence against the applicant included his involvement in a coal syndicate that extorted illegal levies on coal transportation, generating proceeds of crime amounting to approximately Rs. 540 crores. The applicant was implicated in coordinating the collection and distribution of illegal cash, maintaining records, and facilitating the acquisition of properties with the proceeds of crime. The Court found that the applicant was actively involved in the syndicate and had not satisfactorily disproven the prosecution's allegations.
Application of Law to Facts
The Court applied Section 45 of the PMLA to the facts, concluding that the applicant did not meet the conditions for bail. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated reasonable grounds for believing he was not guilty of money laundering. The evidence suggested his active participation in the syndicate and handling of proceeds of crime, which precluded the possibility of bail under the stringent conditions of Section 45.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The applicant's counsel argued that the prosecution under the PMLA could not be sustained without a live predicate offense and cited instances where co-accused were granted bail. However, the Court found these arguments unpersuasive, emphasizing the distinct and ongoing nature of the investigation under the PMLA and the applicant's failure to disprove the allegations against him. The Court also dismissed the argument that the applicant's prolonged incarceration warranted bail, noting the absence of evidence attributing trial delays to the prosecution.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA for bail. The evidence indicated his involvement in the syndicate and handling of proceeds of crime, and he failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds for believing he was not guilty.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held that the applicant did not meet the stringent conditions for bail under Section 45 of the PMLA, emphasizing the seriousness of money laundering offenses and the need for a rigorous application of the law. The Court stated: "Considering the ECIR and other material placed on record, which prima facie shows involvement of the applicant in crime in question and also considering the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the applicant is unable to fulfill the twin conditions for grant of bail as provided under Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002."
The Court's final determination was to reject the bail application, underscoring the applicant's failure to disprove the prosecution's case and the ongoing nature of the investigation under the PMLA. The Court reiterated that its observations would not influence the trial, which would proceed based on the evidence and material presented.
Money Laundering - Proceeds of crime - Seeking grant of Regular bail - alleged illegal extortion on Coal Transportation - Sections 3 & 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, 2002) - fulfilment of twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA or not - HELD THAT:- From perusal of the ECIR, it is prima facie vivid that present applicant with connivance of Saumya Chaurasia, Sameer Vishnoi and other senior bureaucrats and politicians hatched a conspiracy of illegal extortion of Rs. 25/- per tonne on Coal which was transported from SECL mines & other places and the same was being carried out with the active connivance of State Mining Officials, District Officials, by using a wide network of agents which were stationed in the coal belt by maintaining a close liaison with the administration. This coal syndicate had extorted illegal levy of Rs. 540 crores approximately from Coal businessmen/ transporters and other sectors from July, 2020 to June, 2022 - The proceeds of crime generated by this syndicate have been utilized for political funding, making bribes to Government Officials, purchasing of properties including coal washeries by the co-accused persons, Smt. Saumya Chaurasia in the name of their benamidars and members of syndicate & their family members. The ECIR further prima facie reveals that the present applicant has played specific role in commission of offence.
The investigation revealed that the applicant was actively involved in formation of syndicate, arranged meetings with coal businessmen, coal transporters etc., collected illegal cash from businessmen, distribution of illegal cash to different persons on direction of Suryakant Tiwari - The investigation conducted under PMLA, 2002 revealed that the applicant has received cash as salary out of the illegal extortion money as in his statement under Section 50 of PMLA, 2002 has stated that apart from salary he also used to receive bonus in cash from Suryakant Tiwari at regular intervals. Hence, the applicant is in possession of proceeds of crime which have been utilized by him in purchasing immovable properties on his name and on the name of his wife Smt. Talvinder Chandrakar. Thus, he was involved himself in the acquisition of proceeds of crime.
The applicant is unable to fulfill twin conditions for grant of bail as per Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 and also considering the submission that the applicant has not prima facie reversed the burden of proof and dislodged the prosecution case which is mandatory requirement to get bail. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Aditya Tripathi [2023 (5) TMI 527 - SUPREME COURT] has held that 'the High Court has neither considered the rigour of Section 45 of the PML Act, 2002 nor has considered the seriousness of the offences alleged against accused for the scheduled offences under the PML Act, 2002 and the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the investigation by the Enforcement Directorate for the scheduled offences under the PML Act, 2002 is still going on and therefore, the impugned orders passed by the High Court enlarging respective respondent No. 1 on bail are unsustainable.'
Conclusion - Considering the ECIR and other material placed on record, which prima facie shows involvement of the applicant in crime in question and also considering the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the applicant is unable to fulfill the twin conditions for grant of bail as provided under Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002. Thus, the Point is answered against the applicant.
The bail application filed under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is liable to be and is hereby rejected.
The Tribunal considered the following core legal issues:
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Short payment of Service Tax under reverse charge mechanism and irregular availment of Cenvat credit
The appellant argued against the imposition of penalties, having already paid the Service Tax and interest before the SCN was issued. The relevant legal framework is found in Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, which allows taxpayers to pay the due tax and interest before the issuance of an SCN, potentially avoiding penalties unless fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement is involved.
The Tribunal noted that the Adjudicating Authority's decision to impose penalties was based on the appellant's alleged suppression of facts. However, the Tribunal found these claims to be general observations without substantive evidence of intentional suppression or misstatement. The Tribunal emphasized that the appellant had paid the due amounts promptly upon being notified by the audit, indicating no fraudulent intent.
The Tribunal concluded that the conditions for invoking the extended period and imposing penalties were not met. Consequently, the penalties imposed by the Adjudicating Authority were set aside, as the appellant had complied with Section 73(3) by paying the tax and interest before the SCN was issued.
Issue 2: Short payment of Service Tax under Business Support Service by wrongly claiming deduction under Pure Agent clause
The appellant claimed that reimbursements received from M/s BSG Services India Pvt Ltd should not be included in the gross value for Service Tax purposes, citing Rule 5(2) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The Adjudicating Authority had denied this claim, asserting that the appellant failed to meet the conditions for deduction as a pure agent.
The Tribunal examined the legal framework under Rule 5, which mandates that reimbursable expenses should be included in the taxable value, except when specific conditions are met. However, the Tribunal highlighted the Supreme Court's ruling in Union of India Vs Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt Ltd, which declared Rule 5 ultra vires for the period before May 14, 2015. This judgment established that reimbursable expenses should not be included in the taxable value for that period.
Given the Supreme Court's decision and the lack of evidence from the Revenue to counter the appellant's claim of reimbursement, the Tribunal concluded that the demand for Service Tax on reimbursable expenses was unsustainable. As a result, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order on this ground.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal's significant holdings include:
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the penalties and the demand for Service Tax on reimbursable expenses, based on the legal interpretations and precedents discussed.
Confirmation of demand - imposition of penalty under section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 - short-payment of Service Tax under Reverse Charge Mechanism (RCM) against import of certain services - irregular availment of Cenvat credit of input services - levy of penalty.
Levy of penalty - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the moment audit pointed out, they have paid the Service Tax along with interest. Therefore, the department was aware that they have already paid the Service Tax and interest as it was even recorded in the SCN. Further, on going through various grounds taken including revenue neutrality, it would be obvious that there were certain interpretational issues, which the appellant would have had while considering the payment of Service Tax or otherwise - in the absence of any cogent and positive evidence by the department about deliberate and intentional suppression or misstatement, the ground for invoking extended period cannot be sustained and on the same ground, the penalty can also be not imposed. Further, since these conditions are not established, therefore, the benefit under Section 73(3) cannot be denied and once the amount has been paid along with interest, there was no need to issue SCN. Therefore, on this count, the Order of the Commissioner imposing penalty, in the facts of the case, cannot sustain and accordingly, the penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Authority is set aside.
Short payment of Service Tax under Business Support Service by wrongly claiming deduction under Pure Agent clause - HELD THAT:- During the material time, Rule 5 provided for inclusion of reimbursable activities as part of service provided. As per Rule 5(1), as it existed during the material time, whether any expenditure or costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing taxable service, all such expenditure or costs were to be treated as consideration for taxable service provided or to be provided and shall be included in the value for the purpose of charging Service Tax on the said service. Therefore, irrespective of the fact whether the expenditure or costs are incurred on reimbursable basis or otherwise, it was required to be included in the gross value in terms of Rule 5(1). However, Rule 5(2), which was subject to the provisions of Rule 5(1), certain expenditure and costs incurred by the service provider as pure agent of the recipient of service was required to be excluded from the value of taxable service, subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. The Adjudicating Authority has examined these conditions and came to the conclusion that the appellants have not fulfilled all the conditions enumerated under Rule 5(2) to justify the claim of deduction as pure agent.
The issue regarding inclusion of reimbursable expenditure or costs in the gross value of consideration received for providing taxable service or otherwise is no longer res integra in view of the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt Ltd [2018 (3) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT]. Hon’ble Supreme Court at Para 21, inter alia, observed that Rule 5 brings within its sweep the expenses which are incurred while rendering the services and are reimbursed i.e., for which the service recipient has made payment to the assessee and as per these Rules, these reimbursable expenses also forms part of the gross amount charged.
Conclusion - The reimbursable expenses should not be included in the taxable value. Penalty imposed on the appellants for short payment of Service Tax and Cenvat credit demand set aside, as there was no evidence of willful misstatement or suppression.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether supply of vehicles for transportation of doctors, paramedics and health workers engaged in the National Health Mission was exempt as services provided to Government by way of an activity in relation to public health under Entry No. 25(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST.
Analysis: The vehicles were supplied on orders of the Chief Medical Officer for implementation of public health schemes. The exemption entry covers services provided to Government, a local authority or a governmental authority by way of carrying out any activity in relation to public health. The scope of the entry was broadened by Notification No. 6/2014-ST, and the circular on the same subject clarified that exemption remains available to services provided to Government by way of public health. The Tribunal relied on the wide meaning of the expression "any activity" and held that providing vehicles for personnel performing public health functions is part of the service rendered to Government in relation to public health. The Tribunal also noted that service categorisation under Section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 had become redundant after 01.07.2012.
Conclusion: The service was exempt and not liable to Service Tax; the demand was unsustainable.
Exemption from service tax - services provided to the government for public health purposes - Entry No.25(a) of Mega Exemption Notification No.25/2012-ST - HELD THAT:- The Appellants have provided vehicles for transportation of Doctors, Paramedics and health workers for carrying out their day to day work in the National Health Mission. Therefore, the provision of vehicles to personnel engaged in execution of National Health Mission etc. by the Appellant is to be construed as any service rendered to Government in relation to public health.
The services provided by the Appellants, involving the transportation of health professionals for the National Health Mission, fell within the exemption under Notification No.25/2012-ST.
The Original Authority was correct in holding that the services rendered by the Appellants are not taxable - The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
The core legal questions considered in the judgment are:
a) Whether services consumed entirely abroad are taxable under section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994.
b) Who is the service recipient in the facts and circumstances of the case: (i) the appellant, (ii) the liaison office of the appellant, or (iii) USA-based clients of the appellant.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
1. Taxability of Services Consumed Abroad under Section 66A
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994, and Rule 3 of the Taxation of Services (provided from outside India and received in India) Rules, 2006 (TSPOI Rules). Precedents include judgments from the Allahabad High Court in Glyph International Ltd and the Bombay High Court in Indian National Shipowners Association, which upheld the constitutional validity of section 66A.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal held that section 66A is a deeming provision that allows for the taxation of services received from abroad by making the recipient liable under the reverse charge mechanism (RCM). It was determined that the services were received by the appellant and not consumed in India, which does not exempt them from tax liability under section 66A.
- Key evidence and findings: The appellant's agreements with manpower supply agencies in the USA and the payment process through their overseas account were scrutinized. The Tribunal found that the services were received by the appellant, not their liaison office, and thus taxable under section 66A.
- Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied section 66A to determine that the appellant, as the recipient of the services, is liable for service tax even though the services were consumed outside India.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant's reliance on revenue neutrality and the argument that services must be consumed in India to attract tax were rejected. The Tribunal emphasized the legal fiction created by section 66A, which does not require consumption in India for taxability.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that services received by the appellant from abroad are taxable under section 66A, irrespective of their consumption outside India.
2. Determination of Service Recipient
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 66A and its explanation regarding the treatment of establishments in taxable and non-taxable territories as distinct persons.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that the appellant, not the liaison office or the USA-based clients, is the recipient of the services. The liaison office was deemed a coordinating entity without legal standing as a separate recipient.
- Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal examined contracts and financial transactions, determining that the appellant was responsible for payments and service agreements, thereby identifying them as the service recipient.
- Application of law to facts: The Tribunal applied the legal fiction in section 66A, considering the appellant as the recipient due to their contractual obligations and financial transactions.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant's argument that the liaison office or clients were the recipients was dismissed based on contractual and financial evidence.
- Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the appellant is the recipient of services under section 66A, making them liable for service tax.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The Tribunal stated, "The mere fact that the basic conditions that the service recipient should be located in India, service provider is located outside India and the services are received by the recipient would bring it within the ambit of section 66A."
- Core principles established: Section 66A creates a legal fiction allowing the taxation of services received from abroad by an Indian entity, regardless of where the services are consumed. The recipient's location in India is sufficient for taxability.
- Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal upheld the demand for service tax from the appellant under 'Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Service,' 'Business Auxiliary Service,' and 'Business Support Service,' rejecting the appellant's claims of revenue neutrality and non-consumption in India.
Taxability u/s 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 - Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency service - services consumed entirely abroad - service recipient - appellant or liaison office of the appellant or USA based clients of the appellant - Extended period of limitaton - penalty - HELD THAT:- The appellants are a company incorporated in India and having registered office in India and are also having liaison office at Pittsburgh, USA and other places in USA. The appellants are engaged in the business of export of ITSS, on which they have not been paying service tax, as such, because the export of service is exempt. The appellants have entered into contract service agreements for providing ITSS with various clients like American Solutions Inc., M/s Wilington, M/s Inalytix and M/s Financial Oxygen, etc., whereas, for providing such services directly at the offices of the clients, the appellants have also entered into professional services sub-contract agreements with service providers like Plutus Solutions Inc., Rpasoditech Inc., SK Tech Inc., Princeton Infotech and Virtue Group, all located in USA and the manpower provided by these contractors were deployed only at client’s site in USA.
Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Glyph International Ltd Vs UOI [2011 (12) TMI 201 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] clearly held that insertion of section 66A w.e.f. 18.04.2006 is legal and proper by holding that no demand can be made in terms of the said provision for the period prior to that date by way of certain rules and notifications issued under different sections like 68(2) or by way of insertion of explanation under section 65 etc., therefore, the validity of section 66A post 18.04.2006 is not in dispute.
Whether the plain reading of the provisions under section 66A read with Rule 3(1)(iii) of TSPOI Rules, 2006, requires that not only services should be received in India but should also be consumed in India for it to become covered by the deeming provision for the purpose of charging service tax on RCM or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute about legality of section 66A for the period post its introduction, as has been held by Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Indian National Shipowners Association Vs UOI [2008 (12) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] as well as by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Glyph International Ltd Vs UOI. The issue before the Hon’ble High Courts was whether recipient of service in India is liable to service tax from abroad before 18.04.2006 or only after the said date after enactment of section 66A. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that service tax can be charged only after the enactment of section 66A, which was upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereas, charging of service tax on similar service for the period prior to the enactment of section 66A was set aside. In the case of Glyph International Ltd Vs UOI (supra), the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad, inter alia, held that section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 creates legal fiction to deem import of service so that the provisions of Chapter V can thereon be applied.
Demand of service tax on the consideration received from BSNL - HELD THAT:- In the present facts of the case, it is not alleged that they were engaged in either maintenance or repair service or WCS and the only ground was that they have provided BAS to BSNL on which service tax has not been discharged - in view of inclusive part of the definition, the taxable service of processing of transaction is also covered within the ambit of BSS. It is found that the view of the Adjudicating Authority is correct as it is not a mere printing activity rather it involves developing of software, deploying of man and machines, whereby, certain processing is done to generate a bill and if they would not have done this, then it would have to be done by BSNL themselves. Therefore, it is in the nature of BSS and not BAS or WCS, as being claimed by the appellant.
The impugned orders upholding the demand of Service Tax from the appellant in respect of non-payment of Service Tax under ‘Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Service’, non-payment of Service Tax under ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ on referral fee and commission paid to the service provider located outside India i.e., USA and non-payment of Service Tax under ‘Business Support Service’ provided to M/s BSNL, do not suffer from any infirmity and therefore, we do not find any reasons to set aside the impugned orders.
Extended period of limitation - Penalty - HELD THAT:- On going through these details, he observed that the liaison office system was in vogue for the appellant since 2001-02 and they have been claiming expenditure in their Annual Returns of the expenses incurred in connection with the operations of such liaison offices, which was, however, disallowed by the Income Tax department. This aspect further substantiates that liaison office was only an extended arm of Indian company, not having its own books of account, income/expenses or profit/loss. He has also relied on the chronology of sequences from start of audit till the issue of SCN, which clearly showed that last of the documents were submitted by the appellant only on 01.10.2010. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority has taken into consideration all aspects and has dealt with extensively to come to the conclusion that in the given factual matrix, the invocation of extended period as well as imposition of penalty is maintainable.
Conclusion - i) The mere fact that the basic conditions that the service recipient should be located in India, service provider is located outside India and the services are received by the recipient would bring it within the ambit of section 66A. ii) Section 66A creates a legal fiction allowing the taxation of services received from abroad by an Indian entity, regardless of where the services are consumed. The recipient's location in India is sufficient for taxability. iii) The invocation of extended period as well as imposition of penalty is maintainable.
There are no infirmity in the impugned orders - appeal dismissed.
The core legal issues considered in the judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(A) Renting of Immovable Property Service (RIPS):
(B) Site Formation & Clearance Service (SFCS):
(C) Commercial or Industrial Construction Service (CICS):
(D) Rental Advances:
(E) Non-payment of Service Tax:
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Clubbing of vacant land into the value of services - Renting of Immovable Property Service (RIPS) - Non-payment of Service Tax - Rental Advances - Site Formation & Clearance Service - Commercial of Industrial Construction Service - Extended period of limitation.
Whether in the facts of the case the entire area for which separate agreements have been entered into by the appellants can be considered as land appurtenant to the warehouses or these are to be considered as standalone vacant lands, which cannot be part of the services under the category of RIPS?
Renting of Immovable Property Service - HELD THAT:- In terms of the agreement, which has been relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority, it is obvious that the dominant estate in this case would be the covered shed/warehouse and the open land/yard would be appurtenant to this covered shed/warehouse. It is obvious from the wordings of the agreement, especially, Annexure-2 to the agreement for covered warehouses that it has got no utility without the facilities like turning radius suitable for 40 feet trailers, land being not low lying and free from flooding, inundation, fencing all around the premises up to 4 feet height, entrance and exit gates on the main road side, etc. Therefore, the area under covered warehouses can be accessed and optionally utilized only with these facilities when the vacant land is also used in conjunction with the closed warehouse. Interestingly, the agreement is for covered warehouse approximately measuring 20,000 Sq Meter subject to certain conditions - a conjoint reading of the terms and conditions of these two agreements would show that the vacant land for which separate agreement has been entered into is nothing but land appurtenant thereto to the covered area/shed/warehouse. They are closely interlinked and interdependent. Thus, by relying on the definition of RIPS under section 65(105)(zzzz), the vacant land has to be considered as land appurtenant to the warehouses. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order confirming the demand on this count.
Demand on account of vacant land at A9 Industrial Area Kapparada, Kancherapalam, Visakhapatnam to M/s Avnash Automobiles Pvt Ltd - HELD THAT:- The appellants have a case because if there was no building at the time of leasing out the vacant land and if it was given prior to 01.07.2010, then there would not be any demand. The fact that they have constructed a building before hand, which was also let out to M/s Avnash Automobiles Pvt Ltd is also not clear. Therefore, this factual aspect needs to be examined by the Adjudicating Authority subject to appellant submitting the evidence to the effect that there was neither a building on the vacant land at the time of leasing out nor the provision for excluding vacant land from the purview of taxation was applicable at the time of leasing out. The fact that there were some other building for which no lease has been granted by the appellant to M/s Avnash Automobiles is obvious as the agreement is only for vacant land and there is no mention of any other agreement whereby the closed building, etc., was also given on lease. Therefore, merely because a land is appurtenant to any building, it will not get covered within the scope of service if building/shed has not been rented out. It is the other way round that where a building has been rented out, which also has land appurtenant thereto, then that land will also be included for the purpose of valuation of building. Therefore, this matter also needs to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for redetermination of Service Tax liability.
Letting out of property located at S.No.51/1 B, IDA, Block-A, Mindi, Visakhapatnam to M/s Avnash Automobiles - HELD THAT:- There are much force in the ground that there is no strong evidence on record to suggest that just because certain buildings were existing, the entire land would be considered as land appurtenant to the building, especially, when the agreement is only with respect to vacant land and there is no other cogent evidence by the department to prove that the clients of the appellants were using both building and the land though showing only land in their agreement. Therefore, in view of the same, the demand would not sustain on this ground and it will be only a vacant land, which is not includable for the purpose of charging Service Tax under RIPS.
Exemption from Service Tax in respect of vacant land let out to M/s ATR Cars Pvt Ltd. - HELD THAT:- The Adjudicating Authority has clearly held that the appellants have let out only the vacant land appurtenant to the building and not the building and therefore, liable for exclusion from the definition of ‘immovable property’ under section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994. Merely because he was unable to exclude the income arising out of this property, no relief was given, which is not correct. The appellants are at liberty to show them the breakup of rents received from M/s ATR Cars and the Service Tax liability which has been included in the total liability needs to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the demand. Therefore, this also needs to be remanded back.
Non-payment of Service Tax during the period May, 2009 to Feb, 2010 - HELD THAT:- There is no doubt about the classification or the valuation and the only dispute is as regards amount payable and paid. As per the appellant, the entire Service Tax liability was discharged except for the interest liability on the delayed payment but the same was not accepted in view of the fact that appellant has not included rent received for the open land and that certain documents were also not submitted. Since the issue as regards classification and Service Tax leviability is not disputed, the only dispute is whether the total amount of Service Tax is paid with interest or there is some short recovery - Since it would require recalculation of amount as well as verification of certain documents, etc., and therefore, to this extent, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculating the total demand of Service Tax along with interest after allowing abatement for tax and interest already paid.
Rental advances - HELD THAT:- The demand has been confirmed on the ground that the said amounts cannot be treated as security deposit, inasmuch as the said amounts were actually rental advances which were adjusted on the monthly pro rata basis as agreed upon in the agreement between the appellant and the tenant. The Adjudicating Authority has also considered that there is a possibility that in respect of some of these pro rata payments, the Service Tax would have been paid at the time of payment of rent. However, the said submission of the appellant could not be verified as no supporting documents were available. Therefore, the entire demand has been upheld. The amount cannot be considered as security deposit, inasmuch as it has been applied continuously for discharging of rent, which is an admitted position and therefore, Service Tax would be leviable on the said amount. However, as the appellants are submitting that some of these amounts have already suffered Service Tax, this needs to be verified. Accordingly, this issue is also required to be remanded back for working out the net Service Tax payable.
Site Formation & Clearance Service - HELD THAT:- The services of muck cleaning and disposal is rightly classifiable under the category of SFCS. The appellants have not refuted the amount of Service Tax demanded by the department, which they have paid under Works Contract Service (WCS) and also certain portion under SFCS. Therefore, as far as the classification is concerned, there is no dispute that it is in the nature of SFCS. However, there is dispute as regards some of the amounts already paid under the category of WCS as well as under the category of SFCS. These amounts need to be adjusted against the total amount demanded from the appellant under this category. Therefore, this issue is also required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculation.
Commercial of Industrial Construction Service - HELD THAT:- The Adjudicating Authority has not considered the abatement claimed by the appellant for calculating the total Service Tax liability while paying certain Tax liability under this category. The appellants could not put forth any evidence to claim having fulfilled the conditions for availing the benefit under Notification No.01/2006-ST dt.01.03.2006 and therefore, the same was denied by the Adjudicating Authority. Here, it is again felt that proper opportunities were not given to the appellant to adduce evidence in support of their claim for abatement in terms of Notification No.01/2006-ST. Therefore, this issue is also remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculation of Service Tax liability.
Time limitation - suppression of facts or not - HELD THAT:- The appellants have not canvassed any concrete reasons as to why the extended period should not be invoked in the factual matrix of this appeal. In fact, they have although been claiming that the demand itself is not maintainable on merit. They have also taken a plea from time to time that certain amount of service tax has already been paid by them, though not as per the demand made by the department. Therefore, having regards to submissions from both sides and the facts of the case, we find no infirmity in the order of the adjudicating authority holding that extended period is invocable in this case.
Conclusion - i) The vacant land leased by the appellant was appurtenant to the warehouses and subject to service tax under RIPS. ii) For SFCS and CICS, recalculation of tax liability is required, considering abatements and the nature of contracts. iii) The rental advances are part of the taxable value and required verification of payments to avoid double taxation. iv) The invocation of the extended period for demand upheld due to the appellant's failure to register and pay service tax timely.
Appeal allowed partly by way of remand.
Cenvat credit in respect of input services used for exporting output services - denial on various grounds including their output service not being a taxable service as also on account of input services not having any nexus with the output service.
Whether in the absence of sufficient documents or description in the export invoice, can the service be treated as non-taxable or exempt service as such? - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, there is an agreement in terms of which many kinds of services are required to be provided to their parent company. However, there has not been any attempt to classify those services under the category of one or more taxable services, after going through the details of the said services. Therefore, apart from the services being claimed under BSS or ITSS, there could be possibility that some of these activities may not at all be in the nature of service or they would probably fall under some other service head. We also find that there is a clear provision under Rule 4A to give, inter alia, specific description of the services irrespective of whether it is meant for consumption within the country or abroad. Since they have used only abbreviated/short terms in their export invoices, the Adjudicating Authority was correct that it would not be possible for them to classify the same and since the appellant failed to convince the department that their export services are taxable, the next question would be whether the credits would also be not admissible in view of the fact that the services were exempted services, without resorting to proving any nexus or otherwise.
A great deal of services are covered within the category of agreements and covered within the schedule to the agreements. Schedule-A covers operational services: development, with generic description as development. The definition itself says that ‘to provide services and developmental support’ and gives certain examples. Merely by going through these services, one cannot arrive at proper classification during the pre-negative list regime where each and every activity has to be classified under specific heading of taxable services.
This is not the finalization of classification as proposed/submitted by the appellant, rather only an observation by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the entire matter was remanded back to the Original Authority for reexamination and to be decided on merit.
If they are treated as taxable service, can the credit be allowed if there is no nexus between the input service and the output service? - HELD THAT:- Since it is already held that the export service is non-taxable/exempt service, they have not gone into the issue of ineligibility on account of nexus between input and output services. It is seen the nature of services in respect of which the credit has been taken and find that most of these services would be eligible, in view of settled legal position. However, since this issue has not at all been discussed by the Adjudicating Authority even when the same was one of the grounds for denying the credit in the SCN, we feel that to that extent the impugned orders are non-speaking. More so, when some of these services may be having nexus, while some of them may not at all be having nexus with the output service.
Conclusion - The appeals are allowed by way of remand with direction that the Adjudicating Authority will go through the submissions both on the grounds of proper classification as well as the nexus before arriving at the final demand in case of inputs not having been considered eligible either on account of nexus or on account of concerned export service not being taxable service.
Appeals are allowed by way of remand.
The core legal issue in this case is whether the appellant is entitled to a refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, read with Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, and Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, by virtue of Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. The appellant's claim for a refund of unutilized Cenvat Credit was rejected by the lower authorities, and the appeal challenges the correctness of these decisions.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The appellant's claim is based on the provisions of Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, which deals with transitional provisions for refunds. Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, provides for the refund of Cenvat Credit when inputs are used in relation to export. Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, governs the procedure for claiming refunds under the existing law. The appellant relies on various judicial decisions to support their claim for a refund.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal examined the applicability of Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, which provides for the disposal of refund applications according to the existing law. The Tribunal noted that the appellant did not transition the Cenvat Credit by filing TRANS-1, despite having sufficient time to do so. Instead, the appellant filed a refund claim, which was not permissible under the transitional provisions of the CGST Act.
The Tribunal further analyzed the judgments cited by both parties. The appellant's reliance on Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, was found to be misplaced, as this rule applies to cases involving the export of goods or services, which was not the situation in the appellant's case. The Tribunal found the decision of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of M/s Rungta Mines Limited to be directly applicable, as it addressed the issue of cash refunds for Cenvat Credit available on the appointed day of GST implementation.
Key Evidence and Findings
The Tribunal found that the appellant had not utilized the available time to file TRANS-1 for transitioning the Cenvat Credit. The appellant's reliance on various judicial decisions was deemed irrelevant, as those cases involved different factual scenarios, primarily concerning refunds on the closure of business units or exports, which were not applicable to the present case.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the legal principles established in the M/s Rungta Mines Limited case, which clarified that Section 142(3) of the CGST Act does not create a new right to refund but preserves existing rights under the old law. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not have a right to a cash refund under the existing law, as they failed to transition the credit and did not meet the conditions for a refund under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Tribunal considered the appellant's arguments regarding the entitlement to a refund due to the inability to utilize the credit after the implementation of GST. However, it found these arguments unpersuasive, as the appellant had not fulfilled the procedural requirements for transitioning the credit. The Tribunal also addressed the respondent's reliance on the Jharkhand High Court's decision, which it found to be directly applicable and supportive of the rejection of the refund claim.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not entitled to a refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, as they had not transitioned the Cenvat Credit and did not meet the conditions for a refund under the existing law. The appeal was dismissed, and the impugned order was upheld.
SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal preserved the legal reasoning from the Jharkhand High Court's decision in M/s Rungta Mines Limited, emphasizing that Section 142(3) of the CGST Act does not create new rights but preserves existing rights under the old law. It highlighted that a refund in cash is only permissible if the claimant had a right to such a refund under the existing law, which the appellant did not.
The Tribunal established the core principle that the transitional provisions of the CGST Act do not confer new rights to refunds but maintain existing rights, subject to compliance with procedural requirements. The final determination was that the appellant's failure to transition the Cenvat Credit and the lack of export activity precluded them from claiming a refund under the applicable legal framework.
Refund of unutilized Cenvat Credit u/s 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017, read with Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, and Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, by virtue of Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - Rejection on the ground that there exists no provision of refund of the balance Cenvat Credit in the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- The decision of the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in the case of M/s Rungta Mines Limited [2022 (2) TMI 934 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT] is exactly on the issue which is involved in the present case. The Hon’ble High Court after analyzing all the decisions cited before it, has come to the conclusion that under the existing law, cash refund cannot be granted of Cenvat Credit which is available on the appointed day i.e. 01.07.2017.
Conclusion - The appellant's failure to transition the Cenvat Credit and the lack of export activity precluded them from claiming a refund under the applicable legal framework.
Appeal dismissed.
Issues: Whether the service tax demand, interest and penalty for transportation services provided to a unit in a Special Economic Zone could stand despite the exemption under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 and the binding effect of an earlier tribunal decision.
Analysis: The Tribunal held that an adjudicating authority cannot disregard an earlier decision on identical facts on the ground that it was not pursued further in appeal. It reiterated that judicial discipline requires subordinate authorities to follow binding appellate decisions. It also found that section 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 gives that enactment overriding effect, and that the exemption under section 26 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 must prevail over an inconsistent notification issued earlier under the Finance Act regime. Since the impugned demand had been confirmed by relying on an outdated notification and the matter required reconsideration in the light of the SEZ exemption and settled law, the order could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The demand order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the original authority for fresh adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The appellant obtained relief by way of remand, and the tax demand was left for reconsideration by the original authority under the correct statutory framework.
Ratio Decidendi: An exemption under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 prevails over an inconsistent earlier notification, and subordinate authorities must follow binding appellate precedent in identical matters.
Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - rent-a-cab service - period April 2006 to March 2009 - HELD THAT:- It is found that the stand of the adjudicating authority that the decision of the Tribunal on non taxability in identical circumstances was not valid precedent from non-acceptance of the decision on merit is erroneous. That the reviewing authorities did not consider the said decision as fit to contest in appeal either owing to the threshold prescribed by the Central Government under the Litigation Policy or for any other reason and does not detract from the applicability of such an order.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in re Kamalakshi Finance Corporation Ltd [1991 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT] has eloquently determined the mandate of judicial discipline and extraction of a contends of a circular of Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC) does not condone the demonstrated lack of judicial discipline. Nor can such circular purport to guide adjudication in a particular direction. It is also seen that the rejection was based upon a N/N. 4/2004 dated 31st March 2004 which preceded the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005. Section 51 of Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 renders the provisions of that law to prevail over any other statute in the event of conflict.
Conclusion - As the adjudicating authority has relied upon an outdated notification the final outcome not tenable warranting a fresh appreciation of proposals in the show cause notice in the context of settled law as well as exemption afforded by Special Economic Zones Act, 2005.
The matter remanded back to the original authority for a fresh adjudication within the framework of law - appeal allowed by way of remand.
Invocation of extended period of limitation - appellant's turnover of services for the financial year 2015-16 was accurately reported or not - HELD THAT:- The plea is that settled law, in re Dinesh Chandra R Agarwal [2023 (11) TMI 1080 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] and in re GD Goenka Pvt Ltd [2023 (8) TMI 995 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] that were adjudicated in identical or in near identical circumstances, precludes resort to extended period of limitation under section 73 of Finance Act, 1994 merely from such discrepancy. At this stage, it is not required to examine the applicability of these two decisions as the adjudicating authority has correctly pointed out that no steps were taken by appellant to rectify the statutory filings, which, according to their submissions in response to the show cause notice, was genesis of the dispute.
While neither adjudicating authority nor the Tribunal is concerned with the correctness of the records filed before other tax authorities, the inferences that may be drawn from the two records, neither of which were defended except by furnishing of details of sale of goods either independently or along with the services that is beyond the purview of Finance Act, 1994, is the foundation for rectification of one of the returns on the one hand or deficiency in one or the other on the other hand. Empowerment to invoke section 73 of Finance Act, 1994 extends from the obligation in section 70, read with section 68, of Finance Act, 1994 and not much different from the scope of normal assessment under section 72 of Finance Act, 1994 which enables obtaining of additional documents and evidence for re-determination of sum payable by an assessee.
Conclusion - It was incumbent upon the adjudicating authority to examine the details of the goods said to have been supplied either by way of sale or in the course of supply of service, that constitutes ‘trading’ and, thereby, excluded from the purview of taxability in Finance Act, 1994. Failure to undertake such exercise affects the credibility of the impugned order warranting remand back to the original authority for a fresh decision after taking note of the documents evidencing supply of goods which are not liable to be included in the value of taxable service for the disputed period.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
Denial of entitlement to refund of CENVAT credit accumulated - procurement of ‘inputs’ and ‘input service’ for undertaking ‘development of pharmaceutical stable coleman hydrochloride tablets’ under agreement with foreign entity that were claimed to have been exported - Failure to address the issue properly by appellate authority - Violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The first appellate authority had not appreciated the issue in dispute before it which is essential in determining applicability of rule 4 of Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012. Instead, the first appellate authority ruled on the taxability devolving on the appellant as ‘intermediary’, under rule 9 of Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, which was neither proposed in show cause notice nor proposed in appeal of jurisdictional Commissioner of Service Tax. In the light of the elaboration on ‘intellectual property rights’, there are no reasoning as to the manner in which such rights had been created in India. A right relating to ‘intellectual property’ is not, as expressed by the first appellate authority, a provision for incentivizing innovation but is very much for securing property in the manner peculiar to each national jurisdiction. It is not policy but a prescription in law and the vestment of such right must meet the test of law.
A right that is not registered in India cannot be deemed to have come into existence in the territory of India. The finding of the first appellate authority is, thus, mis-directed. The consequence in terms of allowing the appeal of jurisdictional Commissioner of Service Tax as well as rejection of the appeal of assessee lacks validity.
Conclusion - The impugned order is set aside and the matter remanded back to the first appellate authority for adjudging the validity of the grounds preferred by the respective appellants in accordance with the law as set out in Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 and judicial pronouncements now in place.
Appeals are allowed by way of remand.
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Denial of Cross-Examination under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act:
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order has been passed without properly appreciating the facts - denial of cross-examination of witnesses by the Adjudicating Authority - violation of Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- The identical issue has been decided by the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jindal Drugs Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (6) TMI 956 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] as well as by this Tribunal in the case of M/s Lauls Ltd. [2023 (7) TMI 1113 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] and M/s Tibrewala Industries (P) Limited [2023 (7) TMI 1112 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] wherein it was held that the cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were relied upon by the Revenue to make out a case against the assessee has to be allowed and by following the ratio of the said decisions, the impugned order is not sustainable and therefore, the same is set aside and the cases remanded back to the Adjudicating Authority for a fresh decision after affording opportunity of cross-examination of the material witnesses and by following the procedure as prescribed in Section 9D of the Central Excise Act.
Conclusion - Both the appeals are allowed by way of remand to the Original Authority, who will comply with the requirement of Section 9D of the Central Excise Act by affording an opportunity of cross-examination and thereafter will pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit of inputs, input services and capital goods used in captive mines and availed at the manufacturing unit was admissible. (ii) Whether credit passed through ISD documents by the captive mines was valid and whether the corresponding demand, interest and penalties were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit of inputs, input services and capital goods used in captive mines and availed at the manufacturing unit was admissible.
Analysis: The credit dispute was treated as covered by earlier decisions of the Tribunal in the assessee's own cases on similar facts. The mines and the manufacturing unit were treated as part of one legal entity engaged in manufacture of dutiable final products. The services used at the captive mines were held to have a direct nexus with the manufacture of steel and were within the scope of input services. The reasoning also accepted that credit was not confined only to services physically received within the factory, so long as they were used in or in relation to manufacture.
Conclusion: The credit of inputs, input services and capital goods was held admissible and the disallowance was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether credit passed through ISD documents by the captive mines was valid and whether the corresponding demand, interest and penalties were sustainable.
Analysis: The Tribunal applied its earlier view that captive mines could validly function as an input service distributor for the assessee's manufacturing unit. On that basis, distribution of credit by the mines was held to be in accordance with law and the contrary view in the impugned order was rejected. Since the credit itself was accepted as lawful, the related demand of duty or service tax, interest and penalties did not survive.
Conclusion: The ISD credit was held valid and the connected demand, interest and penalties were held unsustainable in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeals succeeded and the Revenue's appeal failed, resulting in complete relief from the impugned denial of credit and consequential fiscal liabilities.
Ratio Decidendi: Credit on services used by captive mines is admissible where the mines and manufacturing unit belong to one legal entity and the services bear a direct nexus with manufacture; such credit may also be validly distributed through ISD documents when permitted by the rules.
Irregular availment of CENVAT Credit - credit of inputs, input services and capital goods used in captive mine of the appellant, Bolani Mines has been correctly availed by the appellant at its Durgapur Steel Plant and correctly utilised in or in relation to manufacture of dutiable final products therein or not? - CENVAT Credit availed and utilised by the appellant against the ISD documents issued by the Bolani Mines was legal and valid - Bolani Mines can be termed as Input Service Distributor under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules.
HELD THAT:- The issues involved is no more res integra, as this Tribunal has already decided these issues in favour of the appellant in their own cases, with respect to the companies located at other places and for different periods - The credit disallowed along with interest and the penalties imposed in the impugned order are not sustainable.
Conclusion - The distribution of credit by captive mines as ISD was in accordance with the law, and the credits disallowed in the impugned order were not sustainable.
The appeals filed by the appellants /SAIL are allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether Section 3C of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961, imposing a cess on cinema admissions for the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund, is within the legislative competence of the State and traceable to the constitutional entries relied upon. (ii) Whether the levy can be sustained as a fee with a sufficient correlation between the impost and the welfare purpose, notwithstanding the absence of a direct individual benefit to the cinema viewer. (iii) Whether the impugned cess is invalid on the ground of repugnancy to the Cine-Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981, or for violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether Section 3C of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961, imposing a cess on cinema admissions for the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund, is within the legislative competence of the State and traceable to the constitutional entries relied upon.
Analysis: The challenge was examined on the basis of the true nature of the levy. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the cess was treated as a levy on entertainment and not as an independent impost disconnected from cinema admissions. The levy was imposed on cinema viewers through the ticketing mechanism and was therefore held relatable to Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Court also accepted that Entry 66 of List II could support the levy as a fee in respect of a matter falling within the State List. The post-GST amendment to Entry 62 did not alter the State's power in relation to entertainment tax levied and collected by local bodies.
Conclusion: The levy was held to be within the legislative competence of the State and traceable to Entry 62, and alternatively supported by Entry 66, of List II.
Issue (ii): Whether the levy can be sustained as a fee with a sufficient correlation between the impost and the welfare purpose, notwithstanding the absence of a direct individual benefit to the cinema viewer.
Analysis: The Court held that a cess is a special kind of tax and that the nomenclature is not decisive. It was sufficient that the levy had a broad and reasonable correlation with the purpose for which the fund was created. The welfare fund was constituted for cultural activists engaged in diverse artistic fields, and support to such artistic activity was held to enhance the overall artistic environment, including the quality of cinema. A direct quid pro quo to each contributor was not required. On that basis, the levy was treated as sufficiently connected to the entertainment enjoyed by cinema viewers.
Conclusion: The cess was upheld as a valid levy with adequate correlation to the welfare purpose and was not invalid for want of direct quid pro quo.
Issue (iii): Whether the impugned cess is invalid on the ground of repugnancy to the Cine-Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981, or for violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The Central enactment was found to operate in a different field, covering a limited class of cine-workers and a distinct welfare structure. The State levy, by contrast, was directed at entertainment and merely used the proceeds for a separate welfare fund. Applying pith and substance, the Court found no real repugnancy or overriding inconsistency. The constitutional challenge under Articles 14 and 19 also failed because the levy was not shown to burden theatre owners directly, and no material was produced to establish arbitrariness or impairment of business rights.
Conclusion: The challenge based on repugnancy and violation of Articles 14 and 19 was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The impugned cess was upheld as a constitutionally valid entertainment-related levy, and the challenge to Section 3C failed in its entirety.
Ratio Decidendi: In determining legislative competence and the validity of a cess, the true character of the levy must be ascertained by pith and substance, and a broad, reasonable correlation between the impost and the public purpose is sufficient; a direct individual quid pro quo is not necessary.
Constitutional validity of Section 3C of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961 - Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 - levy of cess on cinema tickets to fund the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund - HELD THAT:- The Cess levied under Section 3C of the Act of 1961 and collected is for the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund, established under the Act of 2010. This Cess shall not exceed Rs. 3/- per cinema admission where the ticket price is more than Rs. 25/-. The local authority has to collect the Cess along with the tax on cinema admission and, after deducting the collection charges at a rate specified by the Government, has to transfer the proceeds to the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board. The Cess is levied on the cinema viewers and not on the theatre owners. The impugned provision seeks to levy a cess on the ticket purchased by cinema viewers for the purpose of entertainment, and, therefore, it is clearly relatable to entertainment under Entry 62 of List II, VII Schedule to the Constitution of India.
In the case of M/s. Vijayalakshmi Rice Mill [2006 (8) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, had an occasion to consider the term "Cess". In this case, a cess under the Andhra Pradesh Rural Development Act, 1986, which was in addition to the purchase of sales tax, was the subject matter of challenge. The contention was that the enactment does not fall in any of the entries in List II or List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the said impost was a fee or a tax. In that context, the Supreme Court elaborated on the term "Cess" and held that ordinarily, Cess is also a tax but is a special kind of tax.
The Cess can also mean a tax levied for a special purpose or as an increment to the existing tax and, in given circumstances, a fee. In the case at hand, entertainment tax is already levied under the Act of 1961 and the Cess under Section 3C is an additional levy. Thus, the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants that under Entry 62 of List II of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, only tax can be levied, and Cess cannot be levied is without merit. The Cess is another term for the tax that is levied, which is a special kind of tax. The levy of impugned Cess is traceable to Entry 62 of List II, VII Schedule to the Constitution of India.
If the levy of the impugned Cess on entertainment improves the quality of entertainment, then a broad correlation will be established. We find a correlation between the Cess on entertainment levied on the cinema viewers as a fee and the utilisation of the Fund for the welfare of cultural activists. That is because the levy on cinema viewers contributes to the welfare of cultural artists in the State and the overall development of cultural and artistic ethos. When cultural activities relatable to art are supported and valued, it fosters a culture that appreciates art. This then creates a positive cycle of creativity and appreciation. When society encourages and supports artists, the overall artistic ethos strengthens, leading to quality artistic output - the impugned Cess can be traced to the legislative power of the State Government to Entries 62 and 66 of List II, Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, and the levy of this Cess is relatable to the benefits received by the cinema viewers on whom the Cess is levied.
Challenge to levy of impugned Cess on the grounds of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The Cess impugned is to be collected by the local authority. The proceeds of the Cess have to be remitted by the local authority to the account of the Kerala Cultural Activists' Welfare Fund Board. There is no role for the theatre owners, and the levy does not fall on them. No data has been provided to demonstrate how this levy amount per ticket has affected the functioning of the theatre owners' business. This argument is not supported by adequate pleadings and cannot be accepted.
Conclusion - i) The constitutionality of Section 3C upheld, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62 of List II. ii) The cess was a valid tax on entertainment, serving a specific purpose of funding the welfare of cultural activists.
There is no merit in the challenge. There is no error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge - Appeal dismissed.
TaxTMI