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1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Relaxation under Section 110(1)(d) of the CGST Act
Issue 2: Legality and Enforceability of the GST Council's Decision
Issue 3: Implications of the Relaxation on the Appointment Process
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to procedural requirements when implementing statutory relaxations and highlights the GST Council's pivotal role in shaping GST-related appointments.
Relaxation of the eligibility criteria for the appointment of a Technical Member (State) in the State Bench of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (GSTAT) in Himachal Pradesh - HELD THAT:- Interim order to continue till the next date.
List on 27.02.2025.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily addresses the following issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality and Validity of Notifications
Issue 2: Compliance with GST Council Recommendations
Issue 3: Applicability of Supreme Court's Suo Motu Orders
Issue 4: Arbitrary Nature and Article 14 Violations
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the court upheld the validity of most notifications extending limitation periods under Section 168A, emphasizing the applicability of the Supreme Court's orders and the necessity of GST Council recommendations. Notification No. 56/2023 was invalidated due to procedural deficiencies. The court directed petitioners to pursue statutory appeals, considering the Supreme Court's orders on limitation.
Legality, validity and propriety of notification Nos. 13/2022, dated 05.07.2022, 9 and 56/2023, dated 31.03.2023 and 28.12.2023, respectively - Extension of maximum period of limitation prescribed under Section 73 (10) of the GST Act - repeated extensions given in purported exercise of Section 168A of the GST Act are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or not - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of Section 168A makes it clear that it gives power to the Government to the extend time limit in ‘special circumstances’. The provision begins with a non-obstante clause and provides that on the recommendation of the Council, the time limit ‘specified in’ or ‘prescribed’ or ‘notified’ under this Act can be extended. It is noteworthy that the time limit can be extended ‘in respect of actions’ which cannot be completed or complied with due to ‘force majeure’. Sub-section (2) of Section 168A enables the Government to issue notification with retrospective effect. The ‘explanation’ defines the expression ‘force majeure’. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that COVID-19 Pandemic falls within the ambit of ‘force majeure’.
The contention of the petitioners is that the letter of the Home Department to Chief Secretaries issued on 22.03.2022 shows that COVID-19 Pandemic came to an end on 23.02.2022 and therefore restrictions imposed under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 were decided to be lifted. Thus, when impugned notifications were issued, the Pandemic was no more there and therefore ‘force majeure’ conditions are not satisfied. The argument on the first blush appears to be attractive, but, lost much of its shine when minutely examined in the light of language employed in Section 168A of the GST Act. Section 168A in no uncertain terms makes it clear that the time limit can be extended ‘in respect of actions’ which could not be completed or complied with, due to force majeure.
The purpose behind using the phrase ‘on the recommendation of Council’ is to equip the Government with the expert opinion of an expert constitutional body i.e., GST Council. This enables the Government to take an informed decision based on such opinion of Council. Since all the States have participation in the Council, the recommendation of Council will certainly be in consonance with doctrine of cooperative federalism. The decision of Government on such recommendation in the shape of notification will certainly has serious impact on taxpayers. Section 73 (10) prescribes period of three years from due date for issuing order and Section 75 (10) is pregnant with a deeming clause that if order is not passed within three years as per Section 73 (10) the proceeding shall be deemed to be concluded. Hence, notification extending time limit issued under Section 168A can impact the tax payer for the purpose of conclusion of proceedings as per conjoint reading of Section 73 (10) and 75 (10) of the GST Act.
Conclusion - The validity of most notifications extending limitation periods under Section 168A upheld. The words 'in respect of actions' are very wide and bring within its ambit the previous actions of COVID-19 period, which could not be completed or complied with, due to force majeure.
These Writ Petitions are accordingly disposed of by reserving liberty to the petitioners to avail the remedy of statutory appeal.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to be granted fresh login credentials and a further opportunity to file the statutory appeal under the goods and services tax regime.
Analysis: The writ petition was disposed of on the basis that the respondents themselves acknowledged that the petitioner could seek a new login ID and password on the GST portal if he was willing to file the appeal. In view of that stand, and considering the grievance that the appeal could not be uploaded because of technical difficulty, the Court permitted the petitioner to apply afresh for issuance of login ID and password within 15 days. After such credentials are granted, the petitioner was permitted to prefer the appeal within 15 days, and the respondents were directed to consider any such appeal in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The petitioner was granted limited relief to reapply for login credentials and thereafter file the appeal, so the matter was disposed of in favour of the petitioner to that extent.
Amnesty for delayed filing of appeals - issuance of login credentials on GST Portal - extension of time for filing appeal by permitting fresh filing window - consideration of appeal in accordance with law
Issuance of login credentials on GST Portal - extension of time for filing appeal by permitting fresh filing window - amnesty for delayed filing of appeals - consideration of appeal in accordance with law - Petitioner permitted to apply afresh for login ID and password and to file appeal within a limited additional period; respondents to consider the appeal in accordance with law - HELD THAT: - The petitioner alleged non-communication of the assessment order, relied on an amnesty scheme for delayed appeals, and encountered technical difficulty after being provided credentials. Respondents, while denying allegations, expressly stated that the petitioner may claim a new login and password on the GST Portal if he is willing to file the appeal. The Court, noting the respondents' concession in their response, granted the petitioner leave to apply afresh to the respondents within 15 days for issuance of login ID and password. Once credentials are granted, the petitioner is permitted to prefer an appeal within 15 days of such grant. The respondents are directed to consider any such appeal in accordance with law. The Court warned that failure by the petitioner to avail the prescribed course would leave the respondents free to proceed as per law and directed payment of costs to the respondents' account.
Petitioner allowed to seek fresh credentials within 15 days and to file appeal within 15 days thereafter; respondents to consider the appeal in accordance with law; costs payable to respondents.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by permitting the petitioner to apply afresh for GST Portal credentials within 15 days and, upon grant, to file an appeal within 15 days, which the respondents shall consider in accordance with law; costs awarded to the respondents.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration could be denied for want of a co-owner's consent letter when the premises stood supported by proof of ownership in the registered owner's name.
Analysis: The registration documents prescribed proof of principal place of business. For own premises, the relevant requirement was a document supporting ownership. The property was supported by an electricity bill in the name of the registered owner, and the dispute did not displace the finding that the premises fell within the category of own premises. On that footing, the absence of a separate consent letter did not defeat the registration. The authorities had therefore rightly refused cancellation.
Conclusion: The challenge to the GST registration was rejected and no interference was warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the principal place of business is shown to be the applicant's own premises by acceptable proof of ownership, a separate consent letter is not necessary merely because another person is a co-owner.
Interpretation of proof requirements in Form REG-01 for GST registration - Ownership document as sufficient proof for principal place of business - Requirement of consent letter for shared premises - Cancellation of GST registration - Judicial review under Article 226
Interpretation of proof requirements in Form REG-01 for GST registration - Ownership document as sufficient proof for principal place of business - Requirement of consent letter for shared premises - Cancellation of GST registration - Whether GST registration granted to respondent no.5 could be cancelled for want of consent from the co-owner of the premises. - HELD THAT: - The appellate authority applied the documentary requirements contained in Form REG-01 governing proof of Principal Place of Business and noted distinct categories: (a) own premises, (b) rented/leased premises, and (c) premises not covered by (a) or (b) where a consent letter together with proof of ownership of the consenter is required. The court accepted the appellate authority's construction that where the applicant is the registered owner, clause (a) governs and requires a document in support of ownership; it does not stipulate that the owner must be the sole owner. The electricity bill in the name of the registered owner therefore qualified as a supporting ownership document under clause (a). Consequently, the absence of a separate consent letter from the co-owner was not legally fatal to the registration, and the authorities were justified in rejecting the petitioner's application for cancellation on that ground. [Paras 5, 6, 8, 9]
The challenge to the rejection of the petitioner's application for cancellation of GST registration is dismissed; the authorities correctly applied Form REG-01 and found ownership proof (electricity bill) sufficient, obviating the need for a consent letter.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition under Article 226 challenging denial of cancellation of GST registration is dismissed as the authorities correctly construed Form REG-01 to treat an ownership document in the name of the registrant as sufficient proof of principal place of business, negating the requirement of a separate consent letter.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Recredit under CGST Act, 2017
Issue 2: Applicability of Prior Court Order
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
“The respondent is directed to allow the petitioner to take recredit of the amount paid by the petitioner on reverse charge basis belatedly on 30.12.2017 as the Input Tax Credit in its Electronic Credit Ledger.”
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
Recredit of input tax credit - reverse charge mechanism - application under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - direction to re-credit to electronic credit ledger - precedential effect of High Court order
Recredit of input tax credit - reverse charge mechanism - application under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act, 2017 - direction to re-credit to electronic credit ledger - Validity of the respondent's refusal to permit recredit of tax paid under reverse charge and entitlement of the petitioner to take such amount as Input Tax Credit in the electronic credit ledger. - HELD THAT: - This Court relied upon its earlier common order in W.P. Nos. 528, 1092 and 1160 of 2019 dated 22.02.2022, which set aside impugned orders and remitted matters for reconsideration with directions that claims need not be considered for cash refund but could be considered for permitting carry forward of accrued credit to the electronic credit ledger. The respondent, while disposing applications pursuant to that order, rejected the petitioner's request to re-credit the tax paid on reverse charge basis on the ground that Section 142(3) would not assist the petitioner. The High Court found that the Jharkhand High Court decision cited by the respondent was not applicable in view of this Court's earlier directions. Applying the determinative effect of the earlier order, the Court concluded that the petitioner is entitled to recredit of the tax paid on reverse charge and directed the respondent to permit the petitioner to take the amount as Input Tax Credit in its electronic credit ledger. [Paras 6, 8, 9, 10]
Writ petition allowed; respondent directed to permit recredit of the amount paid by the petitioner on reverse charge basis belatedly on 30.12.2017 as Input Tax Credit in the electronic credit ledger.
Final Conclusion: The High Court allowed the petition and directed the revenue authority to permit recredit of the tax paid on reverse charge as input tax credit in the petitioner's electronic credit ledger in accordance with the Court's prior order dated 22.02.2022.
Issues: Whether the show cause notice demanding service tax on the termination payment could survive after the arbitral award, which formed its foundation, was set aside.
Analysis: The notice proceeded on the premise that the compensation awarded under the arbitral award represented consideration for a taxable service, namely agreeing to tolerate an act. The Court noted that the challenge to the tax notice had been narrowed to this limited issue and that the award had originally supplied the factual basis for the proposed levy. Once the award itself was later set aside in curative proceedings, the very foundation on which the notice rested disappeared. In that situation, the demand could not be sustained independently of the award.
Conclusion: The show cause notice could not survive and was liable to be quashed.
Challenge to Notice dated 11.08.2022 - SCN without jurisdiction - ultra vires the provisions of Sections 66B read with 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 or not - violation of fundamental rights and protections secured to the Petitioners under Article 14, 265 and 300A of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- From a perusal of the recital which appears therein, it would appear that the respondents had taken the position that the compensation which had come to be awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal in favour of the writ petitioner would be exigible to tax under the 1994 Act.
The arbitral proceedings culminated in an Award dated 11 May 2017 which came to be rendered in favour of the writ petitioner and against the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation. The validity of that Award came to be assailed in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and which came to be dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 06 March 2018. However, the appeal under Section 37, which came to be preferred by DMRC, thereafter came to be partly allowed by a Division Bench of this Court in DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. VERSUS DELHI AIRPORT METRO EXPRESS PRIVATE LIMITED [2019 (1) TMI 2058 - DELHI HIGH COURT].
Conclusion - The very foundation of the SCN and which had proceeded on the basis of the compensation which had come to be awarded to the writ petitioner under that Award, no longer survives.
Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal as time barred without determining the date of communication of the order and without granting an opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: The limitation under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 runs from the date of communication of the order, not merely from the date of the order. The appellate order counted limitation from the date of the order and recorded no finding on when the order was communicated to the petitioner. The appeal was also dismissed without affording a hearing.
Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal was unsustainable. The impugned orders were set aside and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law after granting an opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained relief by way of remand, and the appeal will be reconsidered on merits by the appellate authority.
Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, limitation commences from communication of the order, and an appeal cannot be rejected as time barred without addressing that date and providing a hearing.
Condonation of delay of eight days in filing the appeal - Seeking quashing of order dated 06.08.2024 passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing the appeal as time barred - Appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal without providing an opportunity of hearing - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- From perusal of the Appellate order it is forthcoming that the limitation was counted from the date of the order. There is no finding recorded with regard to the date of communication of order to the petitioner. As per Section 107(1) of the CGST Act the limitation shall start running from communication of the order. The impugned orders are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal in accordance with law after providing an opportunity of hearing.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
Issues: Whether the CGST authorities could withhold the sanctioned CGST refund amount despite an existing refund sanction order and payment advice, and whether the petitioner was entitled to interest for delayed disbursement.
Analysis: The refund had already been sanctioned in Form GST RFD-06, and payment advice had been issued by the State respondents. In these circumstances, the CGST authorities were not entitled to retain or withhold the amount directed to be refunded under the sanction order. The entitlement to delayed payment interest also arose, and the amount was required to be computed and disbursed along with the refund, with particulars of computation furnished to the petitioner.
Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded. The CGST authorities were directed to issue the payment advice, compute and pay interest on delayed refund, and complete disbursement within six weeks.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a refund has been sanctioned under the GST regime, the concerned tax authority cannot withhold the sanctioned amount and must ensure timely disbursement together with applicable interest for delayed payment.
Refund sanction order - payment advice - interest on delayed refund - CGST authorities' duty to disburse refund - Form GST RFD-06
Refund sanction order - payment advice - interest on delayed refund - CGST authorities' duty to disburse refund - Direction to the CGST authorities to issue payment advice, compute and disburse the sanctioned refund and interest in accordance with the refund sanction order dated 25th September, 2019. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that a refund sanction order in Form GST RFD-06 was issued on 25th September, 2019 and that payment advice by the State respondents had been issued for SGST, while the CGST component remained unpaid. Relying on the existence of the sanction order, the Court held that the CGST authorities cannot retain the amount directed to be refunded and must take immediate steps to issue payment advice in favour of the petitioner. The respondent no.2 (CGST authority) was further directed to compute applicable interest for delayed payment, provide the petitioner with the particulars of the computation along with the payment advice, and complete the entire process within six weeks from communication of the order. These directions flow from the obligation to effect payment once a refund is sanctioned and to compensate for delay by payment of interest. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
Respondent no.2 directed to forthwith issue payment advice, compute and disburse the sanctioned refund and interest, and supply computation particulars to the petitioner within six weeks.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed with directions that the CGST authority shall issue payment advice, compute and pay the sanctioned refund and interest as per the refund sanction order dated 25th September, 2019, within six weeks; no costs.
Issues: Whether the delay in seeking revocation of cancellation of GST registration under the Odisha Goods and Services Tax law could be condoned and the application for revocation considered on deposit of tax dues and compliance with formalities.
Analysis: The relief was granted by following the coordinate Bench decision relied upon by the petitioner. The delay in invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 was condoned, and the direction was made conditional on deposit of all taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and other dues, along with compliance with the requisite formalities. The matter was treated as fit for relief in the interest of revenue.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the petitioner was granted the requested relief, with the revocation application to be considered in accordance with law upon compliance with the stated conditions.
Challenge to SCN - Cancellation of GST registration of petitioner - client is ready and willing to pay the tax, interest, late fee, penalty and any other sum required to be paid - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in the case of M/s. Mohanty Enterprises [2022 (11) TMI 1521 - ORISSA HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'In that view of the matter, the delay in Petitioner’s invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules (OGST Rules) is condoned and it is directed that subject to the Petitioner depositing all the taxes, interest, late fee, penalty etc., due and complying with other formalities, the Petitioner’s application for revocation will be considered in accordance with law.'.
Petition disposed off.
Outcome: The writ application was disposed of in view of the recommendations of the 53rd GST Council Meeting, with liberty to pursue the remedy before the appropriate forum.
Constitutional validity of time-limit for availment of Input Tax Credit - Retrospective validation of returns and rule-making power - Validity of declaration of GSTR-3B as return - Vested right to Input Tax Credit - Writ of certiorari to quash assessment and appellate orders - Weight of recommendations of the Goods and Services Tax Council
Constitutional validity of time-limit for availment of Input Tax Credit - Vested right to Input Tax Credit - Challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 and related entitlement to avail Input Tax Credit was not adjudicated on merits and was disposed of in view of the GST Council recommendation. - HELD THAT: - The petition sought a declaration that the statutory restriction imposing a time limit for availment of Input Tax Credit was ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A and violative of the basic structure. The High Court recorded that the questions raised have been taken note of by the 53rd GST Council meeting which made recommendations relevant to the claim. In consequence, the Court gave due weight to the GST Council's recommendation and did not proceed to decide the constitutional challenge on its merits, leaving the parties free to pursue appropriate remedies before the competent forum. No final adjudication on the constitutionality or on whether any vested right exists was made by the Court.
Matter disposed of in view of the GST Council recommendation; constitutional challenge not decided on merits and left open for pursuit before the appropriate forum.
Retrospective validation of returns and rule-making power - Validity of declaration of GSTR-3B as return - Challenge to the amendment under Rule 61(5) and the retrospective declaration of GSTR-3B as a valid return was not adjudicated on merits and was disposed of in view of the GST Council recommendation. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner contested the amendment that declared GSTR-3B to be a valid return with retrospective effect and prayed for its quashing as violative of fundamental rights and vested entitlements. The Court noted the recommendation of the GST Council at its 53rd meeting and, on that basis, declined to entertain a substantive determination of the validity of the amendment or its retrospective effect. The Court therefore refrained from resolving the legal question and permitted the petitioner to seek relief by available legal remedies before the appropriate forum.
Disposed in view of GST Council recommendation; challenge to the amendment and retrospective validation not decided on merits and left open for further proceedings.
Writ of certiorari to quash assessment and appellate orders - Prayer for quashing the ex-parte order-in-original and the order-in-appeal (relating to reversal of Input Tax Credit, interest and penalty) was not adjudicated on merits and was disposed of in view of the GST Council recommendation. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner sought writ relief to set aside the ex-parte assessment order and the confirming appellate order directing reversal of input tax credit with interest and penalty. The High Court recorded the GST Council's recommendation and, relying on that development, disposed of the writ petition without considering or pronouncing upon the correctness of the impugned tax orders. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue any remaining matters before the appropriate forum, thereby leaving the substantive challenge to the assessment and appellate orders open for fresh consideration elsewhere.
Writ petitions disposed in view of GST Council recommendation; impugned assessment and appellate orders not quashed and substantive challenges left open for consideration by the appropriate forum.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court in view of the recommendations of the 53rd GST Council meeting dated 22.06.2024; no substantive adjudication was made on the constitutional challenges, the retrospective validation of GSTR-3B, or the impugned tax orders, and the petitioners were granted liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before the competent forum.
Issues: Whether the first appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the hard copy was not filed and that the amount under dispute was not mentioned in Form GST APL-01; and whether the appeal, in view of payment of the entire penalty, ought to have been entertained and restored.
Analysis: The waiver of hard copy filing by Government notification dated 26.12.2022 removed the basis for rejection on that ground. The omission to mention the amount under dispute in the appeal form was held to be a procedural irregularity, especially when the appeal related to an order under Section 129(3) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the petitioner had already paid the entire penalty, thereby satisfying the pre-deposit requirement contemplated by Section 107(6) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal on technical grounds was unsustainable, and the appeal was directed to be entertained and restored to the first appellate authority for consideration on merits after hearing the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The impugned dismissal was set aside and the appellate proceedings were revived for a merits-based adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: An appeal under the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act cannot be rejected on technical procedural defects where the substantive pre-deposit requirement stands satisfied and the defect does not affect adjudication on merits.
Dismissal of appeal filed against a penalty imposed, on detention under Section 129 of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the finding of attempt to evade tax - HELD THAT:- In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner has paid the entire penalty. In such circumstances, though there is a procedural irregularity in Annexure-9/A having not shown the amount under dispute, it is opined that the appeal has to be entertained.
Annexure-9 set aside only on the technical reasons - the appeal will stand restored before the first Appellate Authority which shall consider the same on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Validity of Reopening of assessment - case of the petitioner is not selected for scrutiny for the year under consideration - scope of amended provisions of the Income Tax Act - delay filling SLP - As decided by HC [2024 (4) TMI 1214 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] on same material only because the year under consideration being A.Y. 2018-19 no scrutiny assessment is undertaken by AO and this being a new regime of reassessment after 1st April, 2021, no different treatment can be given for reopening only because the scope is enlarged by the amended provisions for reopening - when the earlier assessment years which are subjected to reopening for which the notice is already quashed on the same material, there cannot be a reopening for the year under consideration - HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 123 days in filing the Special Leave Petition which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner.
Even otherwise, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of Income Tax Officer at Baddi
Issue 2: Validity of Best Judgment Assessments
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards in tax assessments, particularly concerning jurisdictional transfers. The decision highlights the necessity of providing taxpayers with a fair opportunity to contest jurisdictional changes and mandates the recording of reasons for such transfers, ensuring transparency and accountability in tax administration.
Power to transfer cases under Section 127 - Reasonable opportunity of being heard - Recording of reasons for transfer - Best judgment assessment under Section 144 - Jurisdictional transfer and validity of assessment
Power to transfer cases under Section 127 - Reasonable opportunity of being heard - Recording of reasons for transfer - Validity of transfer of the assessee's case without complying with the requirements of Section 127 of the Act - HELD THAT: - Section 127 mandates that before transferring a case the authority must, wherever possible, give the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and must record reasons for the transfer. These twin conditions are mandatory. The respondents did not comply with this procedure when the assessing officer and records were changed in the present matter. The contention that Section 127 was not attracted because respondent No.5 alone had authority to issue notices is unsustainable: respondents cannot first challenge jurisdiction and then, without following the statutory transfer process, treat the matter as within another officer's jurisdiction. Failure to record and communicate reasons and to afford the assessee an opportunity renders the transfer order one made without application of mind and in violation of the statutory mandate and principles of natural justice. [Paras 21, 22, 23, 24]
Transfer effected without compliance with Section 127 is invalid.
Best judgment assessment under Section 144 - Jurisdictional transfer and validity of assessment - Validity of best judgment assessments framed without first deciding the preliminary issue of jurisdiction and without a valid transfer under Section 127 - HELD THAT: - The assessing officer finalized best judgment assessments without first resolving the preliminary jurisdictional question and without complying with Section 127. Because the transfer of records and change of assessing officer occurred without the mandatory procedure, the assessments framed pursuant to that change are vitiated. The Court observed that a valuable right of the assessee is involved when objections to jurisdiction and transfer are raised, and those objections cannot be adjudicated without affording hearing and reasons. Consequently, the impugned best judgment assessment orders were quashed. The respondents remain free to initiate fresh proceedings either by following Section 127 or by proceeding through the original assessing officer. [Paras 19, 26, 27]
Impugned best judgment assessments quashed; fresh proceedings may be initiated after lawful transfer or by the original assessing officer.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition and appeal are allowed to the extent that the best judgment assessment orders for the impugned assessment years are quashed and set aside; respondents may initiate fresh proceedings only after complying with Section 127 or by proceeding through the original assessing officer.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment addresses several core legal questions related to the admissibility of deductions for leave encashment under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The issues considered include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue i) to viii): Leave Encashment as Deductible Expense
Issue ix) and xi): Tribunal's Justifications
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Contribution made by a corporate employer towards fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees disallowed as deduction from profit and loss account under the Act - HELD THAT:- The amount of contribution made by the assessee towards the fund for payment of leave encashment to its employees qualifies to be deductible as expenses, subject, however, to the conditions imposed under Section 43-B of the Act.
The proviso to Section 43-B of the Act deals with any sum which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under sub-Section (1) of Section 139 of the Act, in respect of the previous year in which, the liability to pay such sum was incurred and instance of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return.
The argument raised on behalf of the assessee deserves to be rejected for the reason that the proviso to Section 43-B relates only to that liability as was incurred by actual payment of the sum in the previous accounting year, which in the instant case is 2001-02. Thus, exception carved out by the aforesaid proviso only derives the limitation from end of accounting year to the date of submission of return as per Section 139 (1).
As per Section 43-B only that sum payable by the assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employees shall be allowed as deduction where firstly the liability to pay such sum was incurred by the assessee according to method of accounting regularly employed by him and secondly the sum was actually paid by the employer in the previous accounting year.
Whether the assessee in the instant case had incurred the liability to pay a sum to its employees for the previous year in which such sum is actually paid? - In Excide Industry Ltd [2020 (4) TMI 792 - SUPREME COURT] had the occasion to adjudicate the constitutional validity of Section 43-B (f) of the Act and one of the grounds of such challenge was that the proviso had been incorporated to undo the effect of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhart Earth Movers [2000 (8) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] While rejecting the challenge on said ground it has been held that the judgment in Bharat Earth Movers was rendered keeping in view the then applicable statutory regime. Adhering to the constitutional validity of Section 43-B (f), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the said provision will apply prospectively meaning thereby that the period prior to period of enactment of Section 43-B (f), would be governed by the law laid down in Bharat Earth Movers. In view of such exposition, the assessee cannot derive any benefit from the verdict in Bhart Earth Movers, as he has to independently tackle the obstacles raised by incorporation of Section 43-B (f) w.e.f. 1.4.2002.
It will also be gainful to reproduce Excide Industries Ltd case [2020 (4) TMI 792 - SUPREME COURT] to support our view that the liability incurred by the assessee did not qualify the requirement of Section 43-B(f) of the Act and hence were rightly disallowed by the revenue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The primary legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Notice under Section 148
Issue 2: Entitlement to Deduction under Section 10B
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to procedural safeguards in tax reassessment and the necessity of examining new evidence within the framework of ongoing appeals. The decision also reiterates the protection offered by the third proviso to Section 147 against reassessment of matters already under judicial consideration.
Reopening of assessment - denial of claim u/s 10B - allegations of under-invoicing exports as well as illegality in carrying the mining activities by the petitioner - HELD THAT:- We find that the claim u/s 10B was restored to the file of the CIT(A) by an order of the Tribunal [2015 (9) TMI 1437 - ITAT PANAJI] CIT(A) was directed to examine the same in the light of the letter dated 17.07.2014 from respondent no. 1. In our opinion, as the proceedings are still pending on the file of the CIT(A), we find force in the submission of present petitioners as squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Sesa Sterlite Limited [2024 (9) TMI 1061 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]We, therefore, have no hesitation in allowing these petitions in view of the third proviso to Section 147 of the Act. Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment involves the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition of Long Term Capital Gain
Issue 2: Addition under Section 68
Issue 3: Addition under Section 69
Issue 4: Relief of Rs. 1,32,90,000 under Section 69
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Addition of Long Term Capital Gain Without allowing deduction for indexed cost and exemption u/s 54B - HELD THAT:- As decided in order passed by CIT(A) in the hands of the co-owner A.O. has added total sale consideration without giving effect of the indexed cost of acquisition of the said property. The appellant has submitted the sale deed, valuation report, proof of agricultural activity. In view of the above documents and the remand furnished by the AO, it is held that the appellant is entitled to get benefit of the indexed cost of acquisition while computing the capital gain arose with regard to sale of the aforementioned property - Decided in favour of assessee.
Addition u/s 68 - investment in purchase of immovable property unexplained - HELD THAT:- As assessee has furnished various details in support of the loan the name of the parties, their address, their return of income, confirmation of the parties, extract of the relevant passbook to show the creditworthiness of the parties etc. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the assessee has been able to discharge the onus regarding the source from Shri Devraj Harshadrai Patel and Ms. Reshmaben Vikrambhai Patel and accordingly addition is not liable to be sustained in the hands of the assessee u/s 68 of the Act.
Addition u/s 69 - unexplained investment - HELD THAT:- The assessee has been able to duly explain the source of investment in the aforesaid property and accordingly, we are of the view that the balance investment of Rs. 32.96 lakhs has been that explained by the assessee - addition is not liable to be sustained as unexplained investment in the hands of the assessee u/s 69 since the assessee has duly explained source of investment in purchase of immovable property, as having been sourced out of sale of immovable property, during the impugned year under consideration.
Unexplained sundry creditors - HELD THAT:- We observe that the assessee had furnished various details of parties viz. their names, addresses, PAN numbers, copy of confirmation, banks statement, ITR-V of all the parties and the relevant bank statement. Accordingly, in light of the elaborate supporting documents produced by the assessee, we find no infirmity in the order of CIT(A) in granting relief to the assessee by holding that the assessee has been able to prove the genuineness and creditworthiness of the lenders. Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the order of Ld. CIT(A) so as to call for any interference.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition of Rs. 50,50,505 to Income
Issue 2: Non-Service of Order under Section 154
Issue 3: Opportunity to be Heard
Issue 4: Levy of Interest under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Delay of 503 days in filing the appeal before the CIT (A) - cause of delay as the order passed by the CPC u/s 143(1) as well as u/s 154 were not received by the assessee, despite repeated efforts and only on 14/10/2023 the said order passed u/s 154 was supplied to the assessee - HELD THAT:- Prima facie, it appears that the CPC has made addition on account of the amount of Rs. 50.00 lakhs received by the assessee against which TDS u/s 194C was deducted.
In the subsequent year, the said amount was refunded by the assessee to the payer which is duly reflected in the bank account statement of the assessee. Therefore, if the assessee’s case is not examined on merit, it would result in gross injustice for assessing the income which was not earned by the assessee.
Accordingly, when the reasons explained by the assessee are not disputed by the Department that the impugned orders of the CPC passed u/s 143(1) as well as u/s 154 of the I.T. Act, 1961 were not served on the assessee physically and the assessee has explained that he could not even receive these orders digitally, then we find that the assessee has explained a sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the learned CIT (A). Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, we condone the delay of 503 days in filing the appeal before the learned CIT (A).
Matter is hereby remanded to the record of the AO to verify the fact regarding the receipt of the said amount as well as refund of the same by the assessee. Appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
Issues: Whether the reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when the original assessment under section 143(3) had been completed on full disclosure of primary facts and no new tangible material was brought on record, or whether the reopening was vitiated by mere change of opinion.
Analysis: The original assessment records showed that the assessee had furnished the relevant accounts, audit report and deduction details, including the claim under section 80IA, and the Assessing Officer had applied his mind to those materials. In the reassessment, no fresh material was shown to justify a different view on the same set of facts. Reopening an assessment in such circumstances would amount to a review of the earlier completed assessment, which is not permitted under section 147 where the earlier order under section 143(3) was made after consideration of the material placed on record.
Conclusion: The reopening was invalid, being based only on a change of opinion, and the reassessment was liable to be quashed.
Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment under section 147 cannot be sustained where the original assessment under section 143(3) was completed after full and true disclosure of material facts and no new tangible material exists to justify reopening; mere change of opinion is not a valid basis for reassessment.
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - mere change of opinion - deduction claimed u/s 80IA - HELD THAT:- AO re-computed the income under the normal provision of the Act. During the original assessment the assessing company has produced the relevant documents and filed the details of deduction claimed u/s 80IA.
Perusal of the original assessment order reveals that the assessee company has disclosed all the material facts fully and truly at the time of the original assessment proceedings and the Assessing officer was well aware about the primary facts and the deduction claimed u/s 80IA of the Act. In the re-assessment proceedings no new material was provided by the assessee, the re-assessment cannot be re-opened merely because subsequently the assessing officer changes his opinion.
Because the assessee company has furnished full and truly particulars at the time of original assessment and the assessing officer applied his mind to the material and accepted the view canvassed by the assessee, then mere change of opinion the assessment cannot be re-opened - Re-opening of assessment of the assessee company is bad in law and liable to be quashed. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment involves the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Dismissal of Appeal for Non-Compliance
Issue 2: Validity of Reassessment Proceedings
Issue 3: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
Issue 4: Addition of Unexplained Investment
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - addition u/s 69 - assessee did not comply to the notices issued - HELD THAT:- In the appellant proceedings before CIT(A), three opportunities of hearing were provided which remained unattended. Due to non-prosecution of appeal and failure to support the grounds of appeal by corroborative submissions, the appeal was dismissed. Before us, the appellant was provided four opportunities of hearing.
The assessee did not respond to the calls and reminders of his Counsel. He also did not respond to the notices issued by us nor any written submission was made. Thus, we find that assessee has no material to support the grounds raised by him; otherwise, there was no reason for the silence of the assessee before the AO, CIT(A) and the Tribunal. In absence of explanation regarding nature and source of investment, the addition u/s 69 of the Act by the AO, which has been confirmed by CIT(A), does not require any interference. Hence, the grounds are dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Reassessment Proceedings
Issue 2: Addition of Rs. 17,50,000 as Unexplained Investment
Issue 3: Addition of Rs. 2,10,000 as Interest Income
Issue 4: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of procedural fairness in tax assessments and the need for substantial evidence to support any financial implications against an assessee.
Reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 147 - violation of the principles of natural justice due to the lack of opportunity for cross-examination - unexplained investment u/s 69 - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the materials that were relied on by the assessing officer to make addition in the hands of the assessee were not provided to the assessee and the statements of the persons that was recorded were not subjected to cross objection to the assessee. Subsequently for assessee obtains a retraction statement of those individuals who were subjected to search, will not lead to the presumption that assessee was already aware of the statement recorded. Rejection of deeply is totally untenable. It is a bounden duty of the assessing authority to provide the materials that has been used against assessee to make addition in the hands of such assessee.
There is nothing other than the statement recorded of the partner and the accountant of methods evergreen Enterprises in the possession of the revenue to justify the addition made in the hands of the assessee it is also noted that no further enquiries has been carried out by the AO to unearth any other circumstantial evidence is to support the statements that was relied upon to make addition in the hands of the assessee.
It is no doubt a settled rule that the CIT(A) or the assessing officer is not bound by the technical rules of the Law of Evidence and that, it is open to them to collect materials, record statements etc, to facilitate an assessment even through private enquiry. But if the assessing officer desires to use such materials/statements against the assessee, the assessee must be informed of the material and must be given adequate opportunity to explain the same.
Reassessment order passed in the present facts of the case is in violation of principles of natural justice, and deserves to be quashed. Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Penalty under Section 271(1)(c)
Issue 2: Disallowance of Additional Depreciation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - disallowance of additional depreciation claimed by the assessee on plant and machinery and leasehold improvements - AO noted that assessee claimed depreciation on cost of machinery after September, 2005 (i.e., in second half of the year) and claimed additional depreciation @20% on machinery - HELD THAT:- We find that both the disallowances were made on the basis of details furnished by assessee. Admittedly all details were available on record. Merely the assessee could not substantiate its claim would not lead to a conclusion that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Even otherwise, it is a debatable issue and no penalty is leviable on debatable issue.
Apex Court in the case of Reliance Petro Products Ltd [2010 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT] held that the words used u/s 271(1)(c) are plain and simple, and unless the case of the assessee is strictly covered by words in this provision, no penalty can be invoked. By any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing in accurate particulars.
Merely because the assessee claimed deduction of interest expenditure has not been accepted by the revenue, penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted. If the contention of the revenue is accepted, the assessee would be liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c) in every case where the claim made by the assessee is not accepted by the AO for any reason. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Penalty under Section 271(1)(c)
Issue 2: Bona Fide Belief of No Tax Liability
Issue 3: Responsibility for Tax Computation and Remittance
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the taxpayer's obligation to accurately report income and clarifies the limited role of TDS in absolving tax liability. The decision to remand the case indicates the need for further examination of the penalty's appropriateness, considering all arguments and developments. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the assessee was directed to substantiate its case before the CIT(A).
Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) - chargeability of Short-Term Capital Gains (STCG) on sales of shares of an entity - HELD THAT:- The assessee has earned Long Term Capital Gains as well as Short Term Capital Gains (STCG) on these transactions. Initially, an assessment was framed wherein STCG was computed at Rs. 52.10 Crores raising tax demand of Rs. 479.08 Lacs.
The order was rectified and the STCG were recomputed and corresponding tax demand was reduced to Rs. 283.75 Lacs in rectification order passed u/s 154 on 31-03-2016. The matter reached up-to Tribunal wherein the matter was restored back to the file of AO for re-computation of capital gains since there was error in the computation of STCG. Pursuant to the same, another assessment order was passed on 31-12-2018 wherein STCG has been re-computed at Rs. 40.33 Crores and finally, tax demand of Rs. 1.45 Crores has been raised against the assessee which has thus attained finality. The primary liability to compute correct taxes was on assessee and the assessee could not absolve himself by shifting this burden to the remitter banker.
Even otherwise if this argument was to be accepted, it would be pertinent to note that the assessee has never reflected aforesaid transactions in Income Tax Returns. Even assuming that the banker had deducted due taxes, still the assessee was obligated to reflect this income in the return of income. Having not done so, the argument thus raised by Ld. AR could not be accepted. We order so.
Though it has been submitted that the assessee has settled the final tax liability and paid due taxes forthwith as finally determined by Ld. AO, no evidence thereof has been adduced before us to support the same - CIT(A) has deleted the penalty merely by extracting observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steels Ltd [1969 (8) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT] - The arguments as well as case laws being put before us by revenue as well as by AR have nowhere been considered by first appellate authority. No finding has been rendered on the alternative submissions made by the assessee.
We deem it fit to set aside the impugned order and restore the issue of levy of penalty back to the file of Ld. CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
Issues: Whether education cess is leviable on tax computed at the rates prescribed under the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
Analysis: The assessee's income was divided between income earned in India and income taxed at special treaty rates on foreign income. The dispute was confined to whether education cess could be added over and above the tax rates prescribed under the treaty. Article 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the India-USA DTAA treats surcharge and surtax as included in the tax covered by the treaty rate. On that basis, the prescribed treaty rates were held to include the burden of surcharge and, by extension, education cess. The Tribunal also followed earlier coordinate bench decisions which had taken the same view and noted that no contrary authority was shown.
Conclusion: Education cess is not separately leviable on tax computed at DTAA rates, and the assessee succeeded on this issue.
Education cess applicability to DTAA between India and the USA - assessee is citizen of USA and residing permanently in India - assessee submitted that the rates as specified in DTAA include surcharge and surtax and education cess would be applicable only for income earned in India - CIT(A) has denied the claim on the ground that the assessee has claimed relief u/s 90 - HELD THAT:- Tax rates are computed first and thereafter, applicable relief is granted to the assessee. As per Article 2(1)(b)(i) & (ii) of India-USA DTAA, surcharge and surtax are included in the maximum rates as specified under Articles 10 and 11 of DTAA.
Therefore, when Article-2 states that surcharge is included in Income Tax and the Tax Rate as prescribed under Article 10 / 11 shall be deemed to include tax surcharge and since cess is nothing but an additional surcharge, the prescribed tax rates under DTAA shall be deemed to include the cess also.
In the decision of The BOC Group Ltd. [2016 (1) TMI 414 - ITAT KOLKATA]it was held that surcharge and education cess is not leviable when the tax rates are prescribed under DTAA. Similar is the decision of M/s M. Far Hotels Ltd. [2013 (4) TMI 339 - ITAT COCHIN] and Motiani [2013 (12) TMI 1105 - ITAT MUMBAI] No contrary decision has been shown to us. Accordingly, we hold that the tax rates as prescribed under DTAA would embed education cess as well. The CPC is directed to re-compute the tax liability of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Penalty under Section 271B
Issue 2: Existence of Reasonable Cause under Section 273B
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the Tribunal's judgment underscores the importance of considering the reasonable cause in penalty proceedings and highlights the judicial discretion involved in such determinations. The appeal was allowed, and the penalty under Section 271B was annulled.
Penalty u/s 271B - non compliance to provision of Sec. 44AB - assessee claims that due to honest and bonafide belief and under the impression that they are not required to file return of Income u/s 139 of the Act along with the tax audit report couldn’t filed the ROI & audit report within the due date.
HELD THAT:- Assessee submitted that even the internal auditors from the co-operative department also not appraised the management about the matter. It is only after getting the notice u/s 142(1) assessee sought opinion from a professional who advised them to get their accounts audited and file return of income at the earliest. Acting upon immediately, they appointed a CA firm to carry out the tax audit and file their return of income which were ultimately filed on 13/03/2018.
Reading of the relevant provisions of 273B r.w.s. 271B and r/w Section 44AB we are of the considered opinion that assessee demonstrated that there was a reasonable cause for the said failure as per the provisions contained in section 273B of the Act.
We are also of the opinion that an honest belief founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the person concerned, to come to the conclusion that the same was the right thing to do. Our above view finds support from the various decisions cited by the assessee.
From the conduct, behavior and attitude of the assessee, it is clear that as soon as notice u/s 142(1) was served on the assessee, the assessee sought opinion from a professional who advised them to get their accounts audited and file return of income at the earliest. Immediately on advice, they appointed a CA firm to carry out the tax audit and file their return of income which was ultimately filed on 13/03/2018.
As the assessee society’s total income after deduction u/s 80P of the Act was NIL and hence, they on an honest and bonafide belief and under the impression that they are not required to file return of Income u/s 139 of the Act along with the tax audit report cannot be said to be without a reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 273B. Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Notices and Assessments under BMA Act, 2015
Issue 2: Penalties under Sections 41 and 43 of the BMA Act, 2015
Issue 3: Classification of NRF as Undisclosed Foreign Asset
Issue 4: Taxability of Reinvested Dividend Income
Issue 5: Applicability of Section 81 for Procedural Errors
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the appeals of the revenue were dismissed, and the assessments and penalties under the BMA Act, 2015 for the assessment years 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2016-17 were quashed.
Imposition of tax and penalty under Black Money Act - Effective date of implementation of Black Money Act, 2015 - AY 2014-15 & AY 2015-16 - HELD THAT:- The first previous year under the provisions of Black Money Act, 2015 would be FY 2015-16 and the corresponding AY will be AY 2016-17. Therefore, the AO could not have assessed the income of the assessee for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16. Similarly, there would not have any jurisdiction to impose penalty for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 before coming into force the Black Money Act, 2015.
Assessee was not supposed to comply the provisions of Black Money Act, 2015, before it has come into force and, therefore, the assessee cannot be held liable for non-compliance of any provisions of the Black Money Act, 2015 in relation to AY 2014-15 and 2015- 16 and penalty levied u/s. 41 & 43 of the Black Money Act, 2015 and would also be not sustainable for AY 2014-15 and AY 2015-16. Therefore, there is no force in the appeals of the revenue relating to action of the Ld. CIT(A) in deleting the tax imposed u/s. 10 of the Black Money Act, 2015 and penalty levied u/s. 41 & 43 of the Black Money Act, 2015 for AYs 2014-15 and 2015- 16.
Non-Retirement Fund (NRF) held by the assessee - dividend income reinvested in the NRF - AY: 2016-17 - AO calculated the equivalent currency in Indian value of the undisclosed foreign income at Rs. 1,95,537/- and imposed tax @ 30% - HELD THAT:- Undisclosed foreign income and asset are to be assessed by the AO under the Black Money Act, 2015 in the year in which it has come to the knowledge of the AO. Admittedly, there was no undisclosed asset of the assessee in the foreign country. Regarding the dividend income earned on the NRF fund, the plea of the Ld. AR of the assessee is that the same would not fall in the definition of income as the assessee had invested in a fund, wherein, the dividend, if any, earned on such fund would automatically form part of the fund and was not separately taxable.
The assessment year 2016-17 was the first year when the Black Money Act, 2015 came into force. The foreign income earned by the assessee was taxable, otherwise, in that country.. The tax on the said dividend income was withheld as per the USA Tax Law as such dividend income formed part of the investment/fund itself. The Ld. Counsel in this respect has explained that the Black Money Act, 2015 had come into force for the first time in AY 2016-17 only and that the provisions of the Black Money Act, 2015 were not so clear and it was not ascertainable as to whether the dividend earned by the assessee on the fund, which had become part of the investment fund, itself, was required to be disclosed in the return of income filed u/s. 139 of the Act.
As per the provisions of section 3 of the Act, the undisclosed asset was to be taxed in the year in which the information regarding the same comes to the knowledge of the AO which of course came to his knowledge in November, 2018, relevant to AY 2019-20. No infirmity in the order of the Ld. CIT(A) in deleting the impugned addition made by the AO. This appeal of the revenue is accordingly, dismissed.
Penalty imposed u/s. 41 of the Black Money Act, 2015 on the addition made u/s. 10(3) of the Black Money Act, 2015 on account of foreign income assessed deleted as we have upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A) in quashing the assessment and, therefore, by deleting the addition made by the AO u/s. 10 of the Black Money Act, 2015.
Penalty levied u/s. 43 of the Black Money Act, 2015 - the assessee’s foreign assets and foreign income during the year, which the assessee had not disclosed in the income tax return filed u/s. 139(1) of the Act, were of the value, which was more than Rs. 5,00,000/- - CIT(A) deleted penalty observing that the AO has not properly dealt with the issue and the order passed by the AO u/s. 10(3) of the Act did not indicate on which basis the decision has been reached that the assessee had undisclosed foreign income/asset - HELD THAT:- Provisions of section 43 do not suggest that the aforesaid penalty is mandatory, rather, as per the provisions, “AO may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty, a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs”. It has been held time and again that the word ‘may’ also include ‘may not’.
Since this was the first year of the implementation of the Black Money Act, there was no undisclosed assets of the assessee, the assets in question have been earned by the assessee from known sources of income (salary) and due taxes paid thereupon as per USA Tax Laws and not taxes were payable by the assessee on such assets in India and further that the provisions of Black Money Act, 2015 were new and it was very difficult even for tax Practitioners, what to say of the ordinary assessees, who are not conversant with such complicated provisions to differentiate between the assets and undisclosed assets. Hence, the procedural lapse occurred on the part of the assessee was not intentional rather the assessee has been caught unawares of such lapse. Under the circumstances, in our view, the Ld. CIT(A), considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case was justified in deleting the impugned penalty.
Appeals of the revenue are hereby dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Reliance on Third-Party Statements/Documents
Issue 2: Use of Suo-Moto Disclosure
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the tribunal's judgment underscores the importance of adhering to principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in tax assessments, particularly concerning reliance on third-party evidence and disclosures made for settlement purposes.
Unexplained money u/s 69A - reliance on third party statement - Whether the statement/document made by/received from third party can be relied on making the addition, without giving an opportunity to contradict the same and/or the opportunity to cross examine the person who gave the statement/document? - HELD THAT:- The statement/document made by/received from third party cannot be relied on making the addition, without giving an opportunity to contradict the same and/or the opportunity to cross examine the person who gave the statement/document. Thus, the question no. 1 is answered accordingly.
Suo-moto disclosure made before the Settlement Commission made base for making the addition - As decided in Smt. Renu Sehgal [2019 (8) TMI 990 - ITAT JAIPUR] has ultimately held that addition made merely on the basis of suo-moto disclosure made by the Assessee before the ITSC, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Therefore on the aforesaid analyzations and discussions, we are of the considered view that the suo-moto disclosure made before the Settlement Commission without corroborative material/evidence cannot be made base for making the addition. Hence the question no.2 is answered accordingly.
In the present case admittedly except a letter filed before the DCIT, Central Circle-6(4)/Settlement Commission; there is no other corroborative material/documents for making and sustaining the addition in hand. Even otherwise, no opportunity was given by the AO or the Commissioner to the Assessee to cross examine the person who gave the statement/made disclosure/issued the letter as relied on for making the addition. Hence, the addition in hand is unsustainable, hence the same is deleted. Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Writ of Mandamus for Release of Containers
Issue 2: Restraint on Charging Fees
Issue 3: Entitlement to Other Reliefs
Issue 4: Award of Costs
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Release of empty containers of Petitioner within a time frame to be fixed by this Hon’ble Court - charging ground rent, storage, handling or related charges from the Petitioners while releasing the empty containers to the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- It appears that the petitioner is only an intermediary of procuring containers and giving the same on lease to the consignees and it is for the consignees to get the material released and in absence thereof the Custom Authority may take appropriate action in accordance with law. The petitioner is not at loss as the petitioner is entitled to recover the dues of higher charges and other charges which may be payable for using the containers by the consignees in accordance with law. The prayers made in this petition cannot be granted while exercising extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Petition dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Apparent Error in the Tribunal's Final Order
Issue 2: Justification for Setting Aside the Reduction of Fine and Penalty
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Seeking rectification of mistake - Re-determination of value of polyester carpets - confiscation - redemption fine - penalty - HELD THAT:- The original authority (Joint Commissioner ) confiscated both the carpets and threading bars and allowed their redemption on payment of Rs. 30,00,000/- under section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 [The Act]. He also imposed penalty of Rs.7,00,000/- under section 114(iii) of the Act.
In the impugned order, the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the confiscation of carpets but set aside the confiscation of the threading bars. He reduced redemption fine to Rs. 1,00,000/- and penalty under section 114 (iii) also to Rs.1,00,000/-. In the Final Order, this Tribunal reversed the reduction of redemption fine and penalty with respect to carpets but did not specify by how much these have been enhanced. It is not possible to infer it from the order of the original authority because he did not give a breakup of how much was the redemption fine for the carpets and how much was for threading bars. Similarly, he did not indicate how much was the fine under section 114(iii) for the carpets and how much was for threading bars.
It is found that the market value of the carpets as per the order in original was Rs.99,38,300/-. As per section 125 the redemption fine cannot exceed the market value of the goods but no minimum amount of fine is prescribed. Similarly section 114 (iii) provides for imposition of penalty not exceeding the value of the goods as declared by the exporter or the value as determined under this Act whichever is greater. No minimum penalty has been prescribed.
Conclusion - Errors apparent on the record must be rectified to ensure clarity and compliance with legal standards. It also establishes that fines and penalties should be proportionate to the market value of the goods and within the statutory limits.
Appeal allowed in part.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this case is the correct classification of Metal Core Printed Circuit Boards (MCPCBs) imported by the Respondent under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Specifically, the issue is whether these MCPCBs should be classified under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 85340000 as standard Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) or under CTH 94054090 as parts of LED lamps, which carry different duty implications.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The classification of goods under the Customs Tariff Act is guided by the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) and relevant notifications issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC). The pertinent notifications in this case include Notification No. 24/2005 and Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate), which provide guidance on the classification of electronic components and lighting fixtures.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The Tribunal considered the nature and use of MCPCBs, noting their distinct characteristics from standard PCBs. The primary distinction lies in their metal base, which is designed for heat dissipation, making them suitable for use in LED lights. Despite the Department's argument that MCPCBs should be classified under CTH 9405 as parts of LED lamps, the Tribunal emphasized the necessity of adhering to established precedents that classify MCPCBs under CTH 8534.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The Tribunal reviewed previous orders and decisions, including those in the cases of Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals Ltd and Halonix Technologies Pvt Ltd, which consistently classified MCPCBs under CTH 8534. These precedents were pivotal in the Tribunal's decision-making process, reinforcing the classification of MCPCBs as standard PCBs.
Application of Law to Facts:
The Tribunal applied the principles of classification under the Customs Tariff Act, considering the intrinsic nature and technical specifications of MCPCBs. The Tribunal found that the characteristics of MCPCBs align more closely with those of PCBs, as defined under CTH 8534, rather than parts of LED lamps under CTH 9405.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The Department argued for classification under CTH 9405, citing the specific use of MCPCBs in LED lamps and relevant notifications. However, the Tribunal noted that the notifications cited by the Department pertained to inter-State supply of goods and did not override the classification responsibilities under the Customs Act. The Tribunal also highlighted the lack of substantial reasoning from the appellate authority to support the Department's classification.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the classification of MCPCBs under CTH 8534 is consistent with established legal precedents and the technical characteristics of the goods. Consequently, the appeal by the Department was dismissed, and the order-in-appeal dated 13.05.2022 was restored, affirming the classification under CTH 8534.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
"The issue arising out of the present dispute is no more res integra in view of various orders passed by this Tribunal on identical set of facts."
Core Principles Established:
The Tribunal reaffirmed the principle that classification of goods under the Customs Tariff Act must be based on the intrinsic nature and technical specifications of the goods, supported by established legal precedents. Notifications related to inter-State supply cannot supplant the classification responsibilities under the Customs Act.
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The Tribunal determined that MCPCBs should be classified under CTH 8534, consistent with prior decisions and the technical characteristics of the goods. The appeal by the Department was dismissed, and the order-in-appeal was restored.
Classification of imported goods - Metal Core Printed Circuit Boards (MCPCBs) - whether these MCPCBs should be classified under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 85340000 as standard Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) or under CTH 94054090 as parts of LED lamps, which carry different duty implications? - HELD THAT:- Department has relied heavily on the IGST Notification 1/2007-I.T(rate) dated 28.06.2017 to decide the classification of the MCPCB cannot be accepted as the same was for the specific purpose of inter-State supply of goods. This cannot supplant the responsibility of the assessing officer under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 to determine the classification of goods.
The issue arising out of the present dispute is no more res integra in view of various orders passed by this Tribunal on identical set of facts. Since the Tribunal has taken the view that the product in question i.e., MCPCB should be classifiable under Tariff Item 8534 0000, different view cannot be taken to sustain classification of the same goods under Tariff Item 9405 9900, as claimed by the Revenue.
Conclusion - MCPCBs should be classified under CTH 8534.
There are no merits in the impugned appeal - appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification and Concessional Duty Benefit
Issue 2: Invocation of Extended Period
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of clear evidence when invoking extended periods for duty demands and highlights the necessity for precise classification under customs notifications. The court's decision to focus on the limitation issue rather than the merits of classification reflects a strategic judicial approach to resolving the dispute efficiently.
Classification of imported goods - Composite Long Rod Insulators - to be classified under Chapter Tariff Heading 85469090 of Customs Tariff? - benefit of the concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 12/2012-Cus. - extended period of limitation.
HELD THAT:- This matter can be disposed of on limitation without entering into the issue on merit.
The appellant have filed the bill of entry on 9-2-2017 and declared the goods correctly as per the document i.e. Composite Long Rod Insulators, therefore, there is no mis-declaration. The issue was only of interpretation of the words ‘composite’ and ‘polymer’, the word ‘composite’ was used whether the goods imported falls under the description i.e. Polymer Long Rod Insulators as appearing in the Notification. Therefore, the issue involved is clearly an interpretation of the entry provided under the Notification - The appellant have very strong prima facie case on merit also as decided by the adjudicating authority. There is no change of circumstances from date of filing of bill of entry till the issue of show cause notice, therefore, nothing prevented the department to issue show cause notice within the normal period from the date of filing of bill of entry i.e. 9-2-2017. Therefore, there is no reason for invoking the extended period upto three years, when there is no change in the facts of the case.
In the similar type of facts in various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken a view that the extended period cannot be invoked - Relaince can be placed in Northern Plastic Ltd. v. Commissioner [1998 (7) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that 'the appellant had not misdeclared the imported goods either by making a wrong declaration as regards the classification of the goods or by claiming benefit of the exemption notifications which have been found not applicable to the imported goods. We are also of the view that the declarations in the Bill of Entry were not made with any dishonest intention of evading payment of customs and countervailing duty.'
Conclusion - The extended period for demand under the Customs Act requires clear evidence of suppression or intent to evade duty, not merely an interpretative dispute. The show cause notice issued after almost three years is clearly barred by limitation.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the imported Telematics Control Unit (TCU) is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 8517 62 90 or as parts and accessories of motor vehicles under Heading 8708; (ii) Whether the goods are eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty under Notification No. 69/2011-Customs dated 29-7-2011, subject to origin from Japan.
Issue (i): Whether the imported Telematics Control Unit (TCU) is classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 8517 62 90 or as parts and accessories of motor vehicles under Heading 8708.
Analysis: Classification had to be determined under the General Rules of Interpretation, read with the tariff heading descriptions, Section XVI notes and Section XVII notes. The TCU was found to be an electronic device whose essential function was transmission, reception and conversion of data through wireless/network connectivity. Heading 8517 specifically covers apparatus for transmission or reception of voice, images or other data, including communication apparatus in a wired or wireless network. The relevant HSN notes supported this understanding. Chapter XVII was held inapplicable because electrical machinery and equipment of Chapter 85 are excluded from the definition of parts and accessories of vehicles by Note 2(f) to Section XVII, and the goods were also more specifically covered elsewhere in the tariff.
Conclusion: The TCU is classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and not under Heading 8708.
Issue (ii): Whether the goods are eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty under Notification No. 69/2011-Customs dated 29-7-2011, subject to origin from Japan.
Analysis: The notification grants nil Basic Customs Duty to goods falling under Heading 8517 when imported from Japan, subject to satisfaction of the prescribed origin requirements under the applicable origin rules. Once the goods were held classifiable under Heading 8517, the notification became applicable on fulfillment of the origin condition.
Conclusion: The applicant is eligible for concessional Basic Customs Duty under Notification No. 69/2011-Customs, subject to the goods originating from Japan.
Final Conclusion: The ruling accepts the applicant's classification and exemption claims, confirming that the imported TCU falls within Heading 8517 62 90 and qualifies for the notified customs duty benefit if the origin requirement is satisfied.
Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are specifically classifiable under Chapter 85 as electrical machinery or equipment, they cannot be treated as motor vehicle parts and accessories under Chapter 87; the more specific tariff entry and the exclusionary section notes prevail over the general or end-use based claim.
Classification of imported goods - Telematics Control Unit (TCU) - to be classified under the Customs Tariff Heading 8517 62 90 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or not - eleigibility to avail concessional rate of Basic Customs Duty under Sl. No. 666 of the N/N. 69/2011-Customs, dated 29-7-2011.
Classification of goods - HELD THAT:- Classification of goods covered under the Customs Tariff is done as per the General Rules of Interpretation (‘GRI’). GRI 1 to 5 lay down the principles determining classification of goods under a specific Heading whereas GRI 6 is applicable if the objective is to determine the classification of goods in the Sub-headings of a Heading. The Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Tribunal in the matter of Saurashtra Chemical, Porbandar v. Collector of Customs [1985 (8) TMI 183 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB] had held that the tariffs must be interpreted in the light of relevant Section and Chapter Notes which are statutorily binding like the Headings themselves.
It appears that CTH 8517 covers such apparatus which is used in transmission and reception of data and wherein the data is transmitted by way of electromagnetic waves in a wireless network. As discussed in Annexure 1 of this application, where the subject good provides for transmission and reception of data in the RF form in the wireless network, by application of the GRI Rule 1 and considering the HSN explanatory notes, the subject good appears to merit classification under CTH 8517 at four-digit level.
It is apparent that all the electrical machinery or equipment covered under Chapter 85 are not regarded as “parts or accessories” of motor vehicles classifiable under Chapter 87, as they stand excluded from the purview of Section XVII.
Applicability of the benefit of the notification - HELD THAT:- The benefit provided under the notification is subject to the condition that the goods being imported from Japan should be originating in Japan and the provisions laid down in Customs Tariff (Determination of Origin of Goods under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of India and Japan) Rules, 2011 are complied with. So long as the imported goods are rightly classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and are originating in Japan, the Applicant is eligible to avail concessional duty benefit @ 0% BCD.
Conclusion - The subject goods i.e. ‘Telematics Control Unit (TCU)’ is rightly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH’) 8517and more specifically under 8517 62 90 - The applicant is eligible to avail concessional rate of Basic Customs Duty on import of the subject goods as per SI. No. 666 of Notification No 69/2011 - Customs, dated 29-7-2011.
Issues: (i) Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963; (ii) Whether the last payment made by the corporate debtor on 26.08.2019 entitled the operational creditor to a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Issue (i): Whether the application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: The application was founded on invoices raised between January 2018 and August 2018. For an application under Section 9, limitation is governed by Article 137, and time begins to run when the right to apply accrues. The record showed that payments were made from time to time and the last payment was received on 26.08.2019. The exclusion of the COVID period under the Supreme Court's extension orders also meant that the filing date had to be tested against the extended limitation window.
Conclusion: The application was not barred by limitation.
Issue (ii): Whether the last payment made by the corporate debtor on 26.08.2019 entitled the operational creditor to a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: Section 19 requires that payment on account of a debt be made before expiry of the prescribed period and that acknowledgment of the payment appear in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the payer. The last payment was made within three years of the invoices becoming due, and the corporate debtor's reply to the demand notice admitted that the last payment towards the price of goods was made on 26.08.2019. That written admission satisfied the statutory requirement of acknowledgment. The cited authorities were distinguished on their facts because no comparable acknowledgment or running-account basis was established there.
Conclusion: The conditions of Section 19 were satisfied and the operational creditor was entitled to a fresh period of limitation.
Final Conclusion: The limitation objection failed, and the order rejecting the preliminary objection was sustained.
Limitation - application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - Section 19 of the Limitation Act - Article 137 of the Limitation Act - acknowledgment in writing - date of default / last payment - exclusion of limitation period by Supreme Court suo motu order (15.03.2020-28.02.2022)
Limitation - Section 19 of the Limitation Act - acknowledgment in writing - date of default / last payment - application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - exclusion of limitation period by Supreme Court suo motu order (15.03.2020-28.02.2022) - Whether the Section 9 application was barred by limitation or was saved by payment on account and acknowledgment so as to attract Section 19 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority treated the date of default as the date of the last payment received (26.08.2019) and applied Article 137 for computation of limitation. The court noted that Section 19 operates only if (i) payment on account of the debt was made within the prescribed period and (ii) an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of or in a writing signed by the person making the payment. It is undisputed that invoices related to supplies in Jan-Aug 2018 and that a payment was received on 26.08.2019 (ledger entry described as "bank receipt"). The corporate debtor, in its written reply to the demand notice dated 28.09.2022, expressly admitted the last payment of 26.08.2019. Applying the principle in Shanti Conductors (which reaffirms Sant Lal Mahton), the court held that the two statutory conditions under Section 19 are satisfied: the payment was within the limitation period and there is an acknowledgment in writing by the debtor (the reply to the demand notice). The court further applied the Supreme Court's suo motu exclusion of the period 15.03.2020-28.02.2022 in computing the outer date for filing, and on that basis the limitation would expire on 10.08.2024; the Section 9 application filed within that recalculated period was therefore within time. Having found both conditions of Section 19 fulfilled and the recalculated expiry date extending beyond the filing date, the Adjudicating Authority correctly rejected the preliminary objection of time-bar and the appeal was dismissed. [Paras 7, 9, 11, 12, 24]
Section 9 application is not time-barred; payment on 26.08.2019 together with the corporate debtor's written acknowledgment attracts Section 19 and, with the exclusion of the COVID period, the petition was filed within the extended limitation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; the Adjudicating Authority correctly held that the Section 9 petition was within limitation by virtue of the last payment and the debtor's written acknowledgment, and by applying the Supreme Court's exclusion of the COVID period.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Compliance with Section 30(2) of the Code
Issue 2: CoC's Commercial Wisdom
Issue 3: Treatment of Creditors
Issue 4: Management and Implementation Post-Approval
Issue 5: Eligibility under Section 29A
Issue 6: Reliefs and Concessions
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment concludes by approving the resolution plan submitted by the Successful Resolution Applicant, making it binding on all stakeholders involved, and outlining the next steps for implementation and supervision.
Seeking approval of the resolution plan under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('the Code') read with Regulation 39 (4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 - HELD THAT:- It is satisfied that all the requirements of Section 30 (2) of the Code are fulfilled and no provision of the law appears to have been contravened.
Section 30(6) of the Code enjoins the Resolution Professional to submit the Resolution Plan as approved by the CoC to the Adjudicating Authority. Section 31 of the Code deals with the approval of the Resolution Plan by the Authority if it is satisfied that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC under section 30(4), meets the requirements provided under section 30(2) of the Code. Thus, it is the duty of the Adjudicating Authority to satisfy itself that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC, meets the above requirements.
In K Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank & Others [2019 (2) TMI 1043 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon'ble Apex Court held that if the CoC has approved the Resolution Plan by requisite percent of voting share, then as per section 30(6) of the Code, it is imperative for the Resolution Professional to submit the same to the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT). On receipt of such a proposal, the Adjudicating Authority is required to satisfy itself that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC, meets the requirements specified in Section 30(2). The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the role of the NCLT is 'no more and no less'. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the discretion of the Adjudicating Authority is circumscribed by Section 31 and is limited to scrutiny of the Resolution Plan "as approved" by the requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors. Even in that enquiry, the grounds on which the Adjudicating Authority can reject the Resolution Plan is in reference to matters specified in Section 30(2) when the Resolution Plan does not conform to the stated requirements.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited [2021 (4) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT] held that on the date of the approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority, all such claims which are not a part of the Resolution Plan, shall stand extinguished and no person will be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in respect to a claim which is not a part of the Resolution Plan.
Conclusion - The instant Resolution Plan meets the requirements of Section 30(2) of the Code and Regulations 37, 38, 38(1A), and 39 (4) of the Regulations. The Resolution Plan is also not in contravention of any of the provisions of Section 29A of the Code and is in accordance with law.
Application allowed.
Issues: Whether the admission of the application under the insolvency framework for a personal guarantor was vitiated by non-application of mind, and whether the record supported a finding of default by the personal guarantor.
Analysis: The application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was preceded by service of the demand notice under the prescribed rules, and the personal guarantor did not respond with evidence of repayment. The recommendation report under Section 99 contained its own assessment, including the guarantor's acknowledgment that no payment had been made, which satisfied the statutory requirement under Section 99(2) concerning proof of repayment. The earlier observation recorded at the stage of appointing the resolution professional did not control the later recommendation, because the report disclosed an independent basis for concluding that default existed. The contention regarding partial recovery by the creditor did not displace the subsisting unpaid claim that remained above the threshold.
Conclusion: The finding of default and the resulting admission of the insolvency application were upheld; the challenge based on alleged non-application of mind failed.
Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings against a personal guarantor, an admission order will not be interfered with where the resolution professional's report records an independent statutory assessment of default and the debtor fails to establish repayment in the manner contemplated by Section 99(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Admissibility of application - initiation of the Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) against the personal guarantor u/s 95 of IBC - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the Appellant stood as a guarantor for the loan availed by the CD. A supplementary deed of guarantee was executed on 05.09.2017. There is also no dispute that the CD has already been admitted into CIRP. The Respondent Bank has proceeded in accordance with law by filing the application under Section 95 through the RP appointed by it. The Respondent served a demand notice dated 25.08.2020 on the Appellant about the unpaid debts of the CD in terms of Rule 7(1) of the Rules and evidence has been led that the said notice was duly delivered to the Appellant on 19.09.2020 to which there is no response to deny its liability. The application under Section 95 was filed after the expiry of 14 days after the date of service of demand notice and was duly served upon the Appellant who did not file any response.
The judgment relied upon by the Appellant in the case of Mr. Ravi Ajit Kulkarni [2021 (9) TMI 60 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI] may be of some help to the Appellant had the RP not given independent finding in its report dated 23.07.2021 which is already reproduced in the earlier part of this order, for a quick reference, in which it has been categorically said that “in the virtual meeting organized on 19.06.2021, the Appellant acknowledged the existence of debt and stated that he has not made any payment in capacity of guarantor towards the debt due by the CD of the Respondent Bank” Section 99(2) provides that the debtor has to prove repayment of the debt claimed as unpaid by the creditor by furnishing evidence of electronic transfer of the unpaid amount from the bank account of the debtor, evidence of encashment of a cheque issued by the debtor or a signed acknowledgment by the creditor accepting receipt of dues whereas in the present case the Appellant categorically denied to have made payment which was sufficient to hold that there is a default.
Conclusion - The procedural compliance with Section 95 and the independent verification by the RP are critical for admitting insolvency applications against personal guarantors.
Appeal dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether a delay in submitting export documents, despite the underlying exports having been effected within the maximum permissible period, disqualifies the advances as export credit and disentitles the borrower to subvention in respect of the First Lot; (ii) Whether, where the exports did not materialise within the maximum permissible period, the advances cease to qualify as export credit and subvention is not available in respect of the Second Lot.
Issue (i): Whether a delay in submitting export documents, despite the underlying exports having been effected within the maximum permissible period, disqualifies the advances as export credit and disentitles the borrower to subvention in respect of the First Lot.
Analysis: The Master Circular was construed as a purposive regulatory instrument intended to provide short-term working capital to exporters at competitive rates and to ensure that export finance remained tied to timely export performance. The provision requiring submission of export documents within the stipulated period was treated as evidentiary and machinery in character, designed to prove that exports had in fact been effected within time, rather than as an absolute condition that would nullify export credit upon a short delay in document submission. A literal reading that would treat the credit as non-export credit ab initio merely because documents were filed late, notwithstanding timely exports and realisation, was held to be arbitrary and inconsistent with the object of the circular. Substantial compliance with the time requirement for exports was held to be sufficient, while the delayed period beyond the maximum tenure could attract normal interest and any applicable penal interest.
Conclusion: The advances relating to the First Lot continued to qualify as export credit and remained eligible for subvention for the period within the maximum permissible tenure; only the delayed period beyond that tenure could be excluded from subvention.
Issue (ii): Whether, where the exports did not materialise within the maximum permissible period, the advances cease to qualify as export credit and subvention is not available in respect of the Second Lot.
Analysis: The same purposive reading led to the conclusion that the regulatory scheme did not contemplate indefinite retention of the concessional export credit character where exports failed to materialise within the stipulated period. The circular drew a clear temporal line: export credit was available only so long as the exports materialised within the maximum period and were capable of being marked off against export performance. Where the borrower itself foreclosed the credit within the period and the exports still did not materialise within that period, the credit could not be treated as export credit for the purposes of the concession or subvention. Treating such advances as export credit despite non-materialisation of exports within time would convert a short-term export finance regime into a device for long-term cheap credit, which would defeat the regulatory objective.
Conclusion: The advances relating to the Second Lot did not qualify for export credit treatment or subvention, and the reversal of subvention for that lot was justified.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded in part: relief was granted for the First Lot by restoring subvention for the timely exports, while the challenge failed for the Second Lot where exports had not materialised within the prescribed period.
Ratio Decidendi: Under a beneficial export-credit regime, the requirement to submit export documents within the stipulated period is directory where the exports themselves were effected within that period and the documents merely evidence that fact, but the concession fails where exports do not materialise within the maximum permissible tenure.
Interpretation of the RBI’s Master Circular on Rupee/Foreign Currency Export Credit & Customer Service to Exporters (“Master Circular”) - Banking Ombudsman dismissed the Petitioners’ grievance against the very same interpretation that had been taken by HDFC Bank Limited (Respondent No. 4, “HDFC Bank”) - according to HDFC Bank, since the Subvention Scheme provides Government-sponsored discount only to “export credit”, the exporter would not be entitled to any benefit of the Subvention Scheme where the advance ceases to be “export credit” ab initio - exports actually having been effected within 450 days
HELD THAT:- In our opinion, the Master Circular and the Subvention Scheme, are both instruments of law that seek to implement the stated economic policy objectives. When such instruments fall for interpretation, they ought to be read purposively, contextually, and in a manner that has due regard to the text as well as context, without inflicting violence on the policy objective.
Master Circular on Export Credit - The Master Circular is explicit in terms of its purpose and objective. The Master Circular seeks “to make short-term working capital finance available to exporters at internationally comparable interest rates”.
The crux of the Master Circular is that export credit at competitive interest rates must be made available to exporters in the form of short-term working capital. The very same Master Circular requires banks to keep a close watch on the end-use of funds advanced and to ensure that the credit supplied at special rates under the Master Circular are genuinely used for the purposes of exports.
Crux of the Master Circular is that the maximum period of the export credit would be 360 days (extended to 450 days); one of the multiple means of liquidating it may be used; and the exports so financed would need to be performed within 360 days (extended to 450 days). Within such period, if the exports financed have indeed materialised, banks may purchase the export bills or discount the export bills, and thereby adhere to the period, simply converting the pre-shipment credit into a post-shipment credit (which is also another form of “export credit”). So also, if the exports did not materialise at all in 360 days, the credit extended to the exporter would have to be charged interest at the domestic lending rate and not at the special rate applicable to exports, for the entire period of the credit.
First Lot - We hold that the advances that financed the exports forming part of the First Lot clearly constitute “export credit” and are fully eligible for the subvention under the Subvention Scheme. Any subsequent period of the credit before its redemption i.e. the period of delay in submission of the export documents after the expiry of the maximum period of export credit, would be the period for which the Borrower enjoyed subvention despite the expiry of the maximum permissible period under the Master Circular. The Subvention Scheme is very clear that the subvention would be available only until the date on which the export credit becomes overdue. Reversal of any subvention for such period of delay would be a natural requirement, and we hold that HDFC Bank’s first reaction on October 4, 2021 i.e. of reversing the subvention only for such delayed period was the correct approach that would get support under the Master Circular. HDFC Bank must compute the precise period of delay under each of the underlying exports and charge and effect the reversal of the subvention only for such period of delay insofar as export credit that financed the First Lot is concerned.
Second Lot - The application of the domestic lending rate along with penal interest can only come into effect, if exports do not materialise at all within 450 days.
The special rate applicable to export credit, and the benefits flowing from the Subvention Scheme would not be available to the Borrower in relation to the Second Lot. In any case, HDFC Bank had cash collateral in the form of the fixed deposits for the entire amount, and on the instructions of the Borrower, the cash collateral was to be liquidated and the loan was to be closed out. Any effect of the subvention becoming inapplicable would indeed need to be charged to the Borrower. It was the subvention reversal on the First Lot that led to a mismatch of figures between the two parties. Consequently, we are of the opinion that just as the subvention ought to be made available to the Borrower in relation to the First Lot, HDFC Bank was justified in reversing the subvention amount applicable to the exports underlying the Second Lot. We are unable to agree with Mr. Sridharan, who moulded his argument to submit that as and when the export eventually took place, at least the subvention for the first 450 days ought to be available.
Principle for Drawing a Line - The controversy is only about whether the export documents should be submitted within 450 days and whether the exports should materialize within 450 days.
We have articulated above that in our view, considering the objective of the Master Circular, the core requirement is for exports to have materialised within 450 days and the export documents evidencing the same ought to be submitted. If the export documents, even if submitted later, demonstrate that the exports indeed took place within 450 days, the fact that they were filed a few days late would not be fatal. One would be compelled to hold that the First Lot reasonably falls on the right side of the line. However, where not only have the exports not taken place at all within 450 days, but also the exporter himself has foreclosed the export credit within the 450-day period stating that it is unlikely to be completed within the period, we have no hesitation in holding that Second Lot does not reasonably fall on the right side of the line.
Conclusions and Directions -
a) The Master Circular is required to be read purposively, and is to be implemented in letter and spirit, in a manner that does not undermine its very objective and reason for introduction. It must not be read in a narrow, technical and literal sense and that too with one of its many provisions being read in a manner that undermines its objective;
b) The maximum tenure of pre-shipment credit under the Master Circular is 360 days (extended to 450 days during the Covid-19 pandemic) and exports have to materialise within such period;
c) If exports materialise within such period and export documents demonstrate that the exports have materialised, the credit advanced to the exporter would indeed not be disqualified for being treated as “export credit”, merely on the ground that the export documents that prove the timely materialisation of exports were submitted late;
d) The period of delay in submission of export documents would not be fatal to the treatment of the advances as “export credit” – what is vital is that the export documents ought to prove that exports took place within the stipulated period;
e) The credit enjoyed after the maximum permissible period of export credit i.e. during the period of the delay in submitting the export documents, would attract interest at the normal interest rate along with penal interest in terms of the bank’s policy (published pursuant to the Master Circular);
f) If exports did not materialise within the stipulated period (360 days, extended to 450 days), for purposes of the Master Circular, it would be treated as exports not materialising at all. In such event, the very purpose of providing short-term working capital to finance successful exports would be undermined if the credit extended were to be treated as export credit despite exports not having materialised. Therefore, the credit advanced ought not to be treated as “export credit”;
g) Consequently, subvention would be available to the Borrower in respect of the finance provided in relation to the First Lot;
h) Subvention would not be available to the Borrower in respect of the finance provided in relation to the Second Lot;
i) HDFC Bank shall rectify the reversal of the subvention pertaining to the First Lot within a period of four weeks from the date this judgement is uploaded on this Court’s official website;
j) Consequently, the RBI and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall reimburse HDFC Bank with the funds that correspond to the subvention reversal in relation to the First Lot having been corrected as above;
k) HDFC Bank shall within a period of four weeks from today, provide to the Borrower, a detailed statement of account and the computation of the manner in which it has worked out the dues owed and owing between them, in accordance with the declaration of the law in this judgement;
l) There shall be no change to the reversal of subvention in relation to the advances made in connection with the Second Lot.
Issues: Whether the goods seized in transit were covered by Section 22A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and whether the revisional challenge to the penalty order was liable to succeed.
Analysis: Explanation II to Section 22A defines goods under transport as goods handed over to a carrier in respect of which complete delivery has not yet been taken from the carrier. The materials on record showed that the consignments had been entrusted to the transporter and had not been fully delivered to the intended purchasers at the time of interception. The absence of acceptance by the named consignee and the complaint by Satyam Enterprises supported the conclusion that the goods remained in transit. On that basis, the authorities were justified in treating the movement as falling within the ambit of Section 22A and in proceeding against the petitioner.
Conclusion: The seizure and penalty proceedings were within jurisdiction under Section 22A, and the challenge failed.
Final Conclusion: The civil revision was dismissed and the impugned tax authority orders were left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Goods handed over to a carrier but not yet completely delivered to the consignee remain goods in transit for the purposes of Section 22A, and are amenable to check-post action and penalty proceedings under that provision.
Civil revision under Section 86 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 challenging the order of Rajasthan Tax Board - exercise of jurisdiction under Section 22 A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act - HELD THAT:- Evidently, explanation II of Section 22 A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, makes it abundantly clear that “goods in transport” means goods which have been handed over to a carrier and complete delivery thereof has not taken from such carrier. In the case on hand, none of the five asserted consignee claimed that in fact they had purchased the goods as claimed by the petitioner. The addressee Satyam Enterprises gone to the extent of making complaint against act of the petitioner. Therefore, at the time of seizure, the goods was with the carrier as such was in transit and covered by the explanation of Section 22A.
Conclusion - The goods are considered in transit until delivery is confirmed by the consignee, and proper documentation is essential to avoid penalties.
This Court does not find any merit in this Civil Revision. Accordingly, this Civil Revision stands dismissed.
Issues: Whether the writ court should interfere with the appellate order directing the petitioner to make the mandatory pre-deposit for entertaining the appeal.
Analysis: The mandatory pre-deposit requirement was held not to be open to interference in the present writ proceedings. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioner, noting that the cited precedent upheld the statutory pre-deposit provisions and recognised only a limited, exceptional writ jurisdiction where gross injustice or palpable illegality is shown. On the facts, no sufficient ground was found to invoke that exceptional jurisdiction. The Court also disagreed with the contrary view taken by another High Court on waiver of pre-deposit in similar circumstances.
Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere with the impugned order directing pre-deposit; the challenge was rejected and the petitioner's writ plea failed.
Maintainability of appeal - requirement of 7.5% pre-deposit as a condition for appeal can be waived or interfered with by the court - HELD THAT:- It is clear from Manoranjan Chakraborty [2000 (11) TMI 1079 - SUPREME COURT] that the provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court. So much so, there was no exercise of power under article 142 in the Constitution to do complete justice, to permit the respondent to pay any lesser amount than 50%. Nevertheless, the Court said, it was clear that if gross injustice is done and it can be shown for good reason Court should interfere then notwithstanding alternative remedy, a writ Court can in an appropriate case exercise its jurisdiction to do substantive justice.
Conclusion - Statutory pre-deposit requirements are generally binding unless gross injustice is clearly demonstrated.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether the period for filing objections to an arbitral award under the Arbitration Act, 1940 commenced only on service of a formal notice of filing of the award, or whether prior knowledge or intimation of the filing of the award was sufficient to start limitation.
Analysis: Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 requires the Court to give notice of the filing of the award, while Article 119(b) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 begins limitation from the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. The governing principle is that the parties must be made aware that the award has been filed so that objections may be taken within time. The form of notice is not decisive. Informal intimation, if it clearly conveys the filing and availability of the award, is sufficient. The order passed on 21.09.2022, directing payment of the arbitrator's balance fees and stating that the award would then be furnished, amounted to sufficient notice because it informed the respondents that the award had been filed and was accessible upon compliance with the direction.
Conclusion: Formal notice on 18.11.2022 was not necessary for the commencement of limitation. Limitation had already begun from the earlier intimation and had expired when the Section 17 application was filed. The issue is answered in favour of the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of filing objections to an award under the Arbitration Act, 1940, notice of filing need not be formal in character; what is required is sufficient intimation that the award has been filed and is available to the parties.
Notice of filing the award - awareness/knowledge of the award as trigger for limitation - compliance with Section 14(2) requires notice sufficient to make parties aware, not necessarily formal service - limitation under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 begins from notice of filing of award - judgment in terms of award under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 - formal notice versus informal intimation
Notice of filing the award - awareness/knowledge of the award as trigger for limitation - compliance with Section 14(2) requires notice sufficient to make parties aware, not necessarily formal service - limitation under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 begins from notice of filing of award - Whether the period of limitation for filing objections to an arbitral award under Article 119(b) is triggered by formal service of notice of filing of the award or by knowledge/awareness of the award. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be read to effectuate the object of speedy arbitration. Section 14(2) requires the Court to give notice of filing, but does not prescribe a specific form of notice; what the provision requires is that parties become aware of the filing so that objections can be raised within the prescribed period. Reliance was placed on this Court's precedents which treated informal intimation or awareness as sufficient compliance with Section 14(2), including Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti and Ch. Ramalinga Reddy , and on decisions holding that communication to a party's pleader or an order making the award available suffices as notice, for example Food Corporation of India v. E. Kuttappan and Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd. . The Court rejected the respondents' contention that only a later formal notice (service of a copy) can trigger limitation, observing that such a formalistic rule would permit parties aware of an award to delay filing objections and frustrate the object of the Act. Applying these principles, the Court found that the District Court order of 21.09.2022 directing payment of arbitrator's fees and stating that the award would be furnished thereafter constituted sufficient notice/awareness of the award to the respondents, and therefore the 30 day period under Article 119(b) began to run from that date. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
Limitation under Article 119(b) began when the respondents were made aware of the filing of the award (21.09.2022), not when a formal notice/copy was later served (18.11.2022).
Judgment in terms of award under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 - formal notice versus informal intimation - Whether the appellant's application under Section 17 filed on 10.11.2022 was prematurely filed during the subsistence of the period for objections. - HELD THAT: - Applying the conclusion that limitation expired on 20.10.2022 because awareness arose on 21.09.2022, the Court held that the Section 17 application filed on 10.11.2022 was not premature. The District Court and High Court erred in treating the later formal service date (18.11.2022) as the triggering event for limitation. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the trial court to proceed to dispose of Misc. (J) No. 61/2022 expeditiously. [Paras 19, 20, 21]
Application under Section 17 filed on 10.11.2022 was valid and not premature; appeal allowed and matter remitted for expeditious disposal.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the 30 day limitation for filing objections under Article 119(b) commenced from the date the respondents became aware of the filing of the award (21.09.2022), not from the later formal service date; the Section 17 application filed on 10.11.2022 was therefore not premature. The High Court's order is set aside and the District Judge is directed to dispose of Misc. (J) No. 61/2022 expeditiously.
Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to grant a further opportunity to cross-examine the witness despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting that request; and whether the Tribunal had already afforded sufficient opportunity for cross-examination so as to make further judicial interference unwarranted.
Analysis: The arbitral record showed that the witness was cross-examined on multiple dates for substantial duration, including extended sessions, and the Tribunal found that sufficient opportunity had already been given. The governing framework under Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 requires equal treatment and full opportunity to present the case, but judicial interference in arbitral proceedings must remain restrained and is justified only in exceptional cases of clear perversity. The High Court did not identify any perversity in the Tribunal's order and interfered only on the general premise that cross-examination is an important tool for discovering truth.
Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have interfered. The Tribunal's refusal to grant any further time for cross-examination was upheld and the direction granting additional opportunity was set aside.
Final Conclusion: Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be used to disturb a reasoned arbitral order in the absence of demonstrable perversity, particularly where adequate opportunity has already been afforded in the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: Interference under Article 227 in arbitral proceedings is permissible only in exceptional cases where the impugned order is clearly perverse, and a party that has already been given full and sufficient opportunity cannot demand further judicially mandated indulgence.
Principles of natural justice - whether the High Court has correctly exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in granting the respondent/claimant one more opportunity to crossexamine appellant/respondent’s witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting such a prayer? - HELD THAT:- Section 11 application was allowed by the High Court on 08.05.2023 leading to the constitution of the Tribunal which held the first hearing on 19.05.2023. It is evident that the cross-examination of the appellant/respondent’s witness RW-1 commenced on 09.12.2023 when the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked 9 questions on that very day and the cross was adjourned for 10.02.2024. On 10.02.2024, the record shows that the crossexamination commenced at 11 am and concluded by 7 pm during which time the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked as many as 104 questions to the said witness. After a long lapse of almost 8 months, during which period the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was exhausted, the cross-examination commenced on 01.10.2024. Even on that day the cross-examination was commenced at 5.35 pm and concluded at 7.40 pm, which is more than two hours.
The Arbitral Tribunal seems to have given full opportunity to all parties, which is amply evident from the record. On the other hand, the unrestrained cross-examination of RW-1 by the respondent/claimant has already exceeded 12 hours, but the respondent/claimant does not seem to be satisfied with it.
Even as per the quote hereinabove interference under Article 226/227 is ‘permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.’ Condition (vi) to (x) underscores the reason why High Courts ought not to interfere with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals for more than one reason.
Conclusion - There are no justification in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with the directions of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that full and sufficient opportunity to cross-examine RW-1 has already been given and no further extension of time is warranted.
Appeal allowed.
TaxTMI