Issues: (i) Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification. (ii) Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed transitional input tax credit attributable to input services, exceeding the closing balance reflected in the ER-1 and ST-3 returns, required verification.

Analysis: Section 140(1) permits carry-forward of eligible credit under the existing law. The difference between the credit declared in TRAN-1 and the balance reported in the pre-GST returns required verification against the relevant records before entitlement could be determined.

Conclusion: The transitional credit claim is to be verified by the Proper Officer/Adjudicating Authority through a reasoned order.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 74(1) could be sustained on the alleged wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Analysis: Invocation of section 74(1) requires material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with a deliberate intent to evade tax. Mere incorrect information or an ordinary non-declaration does not by itself establish those elements. No investigation or evidence establishing such deliberate intent was on record.

Conclusion: The notice issued under section 74(1) was not sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional-credit claim remains subject to factual verification, but the fraud-based notice cannot be maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: An incorrect declaration, without material evidence of a deliberate intent to evade tax, does not establish wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for invoking section 74(1).

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on an allegation of suppression of facts.

Analysis: The differential demand arose from an audit-based verification of the assessee's books of account and invoices, with a prior departmental communication quantifying the liability. The record disclosed no material establishing deliberate suppression of facts or an intent to evade tax. Mere delayed payment and detection upon scrutiny of accounts were insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation. A show-cause notice issued beyond the normal limitation period raises a jurisdictional challenge and cannot sustain the demand.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the show-cause notice and consequential demand were time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the GST appellate authority could dismiss the appeal for an alleged pre-deposit shortfall without issuing a defect memo, notice, or hearing, despite the petitioner's prior deposit during investigation.

Analysis: The governing requirement of statutory pre-deposit must be applied consistently with principles of natural justice. The prior deposit of Rs. 1.50 crore, which exceeded the required pre-deposit, was a material fact requiring consideration. Where an appellate authority perceives a shortfall in pre-deposit, it must issue a defect memo, notice, or afford an opportunity of hearing to enable the appellant to cure the asserted deficiency before dismissing the appeal.

Conclusion: The appellate rejection without considering the prior deposit or granting an opportunity to address the alleged pre-deposit shortfall was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings and orders founded on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 could survive after its omission without a saving clause.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted by Notification No. 20/2024-Central Tax with effect from 08.10.2024. The binding position accepted by the revenue was that, in the absence of an express saving clause or other legal mechanism preserving pending proceedings, the omitted rule could not be applied to proceedings pending on the date of omission. The departmental memorandum also accepted that the restrictions under the omitted rule could not govern such pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings and consequential orders based on Rule 96(10) were vitiated and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether later e-way bills generated against the same invoices evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes; (ii) Whether the appellant established that the later e-way bills merely continued the physical consignments covered by the earlier e-way bills; and (iii) Whether the confirmed IGST demand, interest and penalty warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether later e-way bills generated against the same invoices evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes.

Analysis: Rule 138 permits change of conveyance through Part-B updating and permits extension of an existing e-way bill in exceptional circumstances. A later e-way bill does not by itself create a conclusive presumption of a second taxable supply; however, separately generated e-way bills with distinct electronic bill numbers, validity periods and movement particulars are independent contemporaneous declarations. Although the burden to establish tax short-payment under Section 73 remains with the Department, the facts concerning continuity of movement, trans-shipment and vehicle changes are especially within the taxpayer's knowledge.

Conclusion: The later e-way bills, considered with their separate movement particulars and the unreconciled record, evidenced separate consignments and additional outward supplies not disclosed for tax purposes.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established that the later e-way bills merely continued the physical consignments covered by the earlier e-way bills.

Analysis: For the first invoice, the original e-way bill expired without a recorded extension, whereas the subsequent e-way bill was generated afresh from the original dispatch point. For the second invoice, the original e-way bill showed repeated vehicle updates and an extension, but the later e-way bill declared a new vehicle, fresh validity cycle and the full original journey. Changes in transport-document dates, the inconsistent route narrative and the absence of delivery acknowledgments, transporter continuity records, recipient confirmation, toll records or other contemporaneous evidence left the claimed continuity unproved.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to discharge the evidentiary burden of proving that the later e-way bills continued the same physical consignments.

Issue (iii): Whether the confirmed IGST demand, interest and penalty warranted interference.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to tax not paid or short-paid otherwise than by fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression; absence of fraudulent intent therefore does not negate a tax liability established under that provision. The additional outward movements were not shown to have been separately accounted for or taxed. Interest followed from delayed payment, and the penalty conformed to Section 73(9), with the adjudicated tax remaining below the amount proposed in the notice.

Conclusion: The confirmed IGST, interest and penalty were legally sustainable and required no interference.

Final Conclusion: The statutory e-way bill framework and the unreconciled transport record justified treating the later electronic declarations as additional taxable outward movements with corresponding fiscal liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Separately generated e-way bills against the same invoice can support an inference of additional taxable movements under Section 73 where distinct movement particulars remain unreconciled and the taxpayer fails to establish continuity through contemporaneous transport evidence.

Issues: Whether the eight appeals involving an identical question of law should be heard by the Principal Bench of the GSTAT.

Analysis: Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Notification No. S.O. 4219(E) dated 17.09.2025, provides for the Principal Bench to hear cases pending before different State Benches where an identical question of law is involved and the President is satisfied of such identity. The appeals raised the same question concerning refund of interest paid on tax discharged through the electronic credit ledger following retrospective substitution of the proviso to Section 50(1).

Conclusion: The appeals involve an identical question of law and are required to be heard by a Division Bench of the Principal Bench, GSTAT.

Issues: (i) Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008; and (iii) Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Issue (i): Whether full CENVAT credit was available on specified input services used for both taxable management, maintenance and repair services and exempt renting of immovable property services for 16.06.2005 to 01.06.2007.

Analysis: Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permits whole credit of service tax on the specified taxable services notwithstanding Rule 6(1) to Rule 6(3), except where the input service is used exclusively in relation to exempt goods or exempt services. Management, maintenance and repair services were taxable output services, and the credit was used for both those services and renting of immovable property services. The requirement of exclusive use for exempt services was therefore not met, notwithstanding that separate credit accounts were not maintained.

Conclusion: Full CENVAT credit was available under Rule 6(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit relating to renting of immovable property services after 01.06.2007 could be denied under Board Circular No. 98/1/2008-ST dated 04.01.2008.

Analysis: After 01.06.2007, renting of immovable property was a taxable output service. The Circular incorrectly addressed eligibility of input-service credit with reference to immovable property rather than the taxable output service of renting. Eligibility was required to be determined by the nexus between the input services and the output service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: The Circular could not justify denial of the credit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether fit-out charges forming part of leased office premises were liable to service tax despite payment of VAT.

Analysis: The lease documentation showed that the fit-outs included infrastructure forming part of the leased office premises, rather than merely movable articles independently supplied to tenants. The related consideration formed part of the value of the leasing arrangement. Payment of VAT does not, by itself, exclude service-tax liability where the factual requirements for both levies are satisfied; additionally, proof of VAT payment on the fit-outs was absent.

Conclusion: Fit-out charges were liable to service tax, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's common-credit claims for the relevant periods remain valid, but consideration attributable to fit-outs supplied as part of the leased premises is includible for service-tax purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Full CENVAT credit under Rule 6(5) is available where the specified input service is used for both taxable and exempt output services, unless its use is exclusively attributable to exempt services.

Issues: Whether the hospital fulfilled the requirement of existing solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit, and was consequently eligible for approval under Section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 10(23C)(via) does not impose a requirement that a hospital's receipts and expenditure must exactly balance every year. An incidental surplus is relevant but not conclusive; its source, deployment and the institution's actual objects and activities determine whether a profit motive exists. Capital expenditure on medical equipment and hospital facilities represents application of income towards medical relief, while depreciation recognises the consumption of those assets. Both were relevant for determining the institution's real financial position during the relevant years.

Analysis: The hospital's governing instruments confined its funds to medical objects, prohibited distribution of profits to members and dedicated its residual assets to charitable purposes on dissolution. Its funds were applied to hospital infrastructure, equipment and medical services, without evidence of private diversion or disguised distribution of profits. The provision of consultation rooms, collection of consultants' fees, retention of charges for hospital facilities, and payment of professional fees for medical services did not establish a separate commercial activity or private benefit.

Analysis: Philanthropic purpose is not confined to free treatment of indigent patients, and treatment of paying patients does not by itself negate medical philanthropy. Section 10(23C)(via) prescribes no minimum ratio of free or concessional treatment to total receipts. Compliance with statutory obligations for indigent and weaker-section patients, coupled with the application of funds to medical care, supported the hospital's philanthropic character. Earlier recognition of its charitable character did not create an automatic entitlement but required consistency in tax treatment unless a material change in facts or law justified departure.

Conclusion: The hospital existed solely for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes of profit, satisfying Section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The refusals of approval for the relevant assessment years were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the addition for peak cash deposits and bank interest was sustainable as unexplained money despite agricultural-income evidence.

Analysis: Under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an addition for unexplained money could not rest on rejection of material evidence without enquiry or reasons. The record showed that the assessee was an agriculturalist, had disclosed agricultural income, and had produced evidence regarding agricultural income and landholding; regular cash withdrawals and redeposits were also acknowledged. The evidence could not be brushed aside on surmises, although certain documents were self-serving and did not warrant complete acceptance. An ad hoc estimation at 10% of the aggregate amount was considered appropriate to account for inconsistencies in the evidence.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to Rs. 1,16,554, taxable at normal rates and not under Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether revision of the assessment for failure to examine the applicability of Section 56(2)(vii)(b) to an immovable-property purchase was valid under Section 263.

Analysis: The assessment order contained no inquiry or verification concerning the substantial difference between the stated purchase consideration and the stamp-duty value of the property, despite the potential applicability of Section 56(2)(vii)(b). Under Explanation 2(a) to Section 263(1), an assessment made without inquiries or verification that ought to have been made is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. No material established that the Assessing Officer had consciously examined the issue or formed a sustainable view; consequently, the limited revisional direction for fresh inquiry was not a substitution of opinion.

Conclusion: The exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was valid, and the limited direction for fresh assessment on the specified issue was sustained.

Issues: Whether the addition for unexplained investment could be sustained on the basis of an unsigned agreement to sell and the seller's affidavit.

Analysis: An addition for unexplained investment requires credible material establishing actual payment by the assessee. The agreement was unsigned by the assessee and bore a stated execution date preceding the purchase of the stamp paper. The property was ultimately conveyed to another person, while the assessee denied the transaction. The seller's affidavit and the disputed agreement, without independent corroborative evidence of the actual flow of funds from the assessee, lacked sufficient evidentiary reliability.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 10,00,000 for unexplained investment was deleted.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer could examine and disallow the claim for in-house research and development expenditure under section 35(2AB) in a Limited Scrutiny assessment selected for verification of deduction on account of donation for scientific research.

Analysis: The notified CASS issue was confined to deduction on account of donation for scientific research. A donation or contribution for scientific research and expenditure incurred by an eligible company on its own approved in-house research and development facility are distinct statutory claims involving different transactions and conditions. Limited Scrutiny is issue-specific, and a claim under one limb of section 35 cannot be treated as opening all claims under that provision for examination. The applicable CBDT framework permitted examination of an additional issue only upon receipt of qualifying credible information regarding tax evasion, recording of reasons, and prior administrative approval; none of these jurisdictional conditions was established. A questionnaire under section 142(1) could not enlarge the permitted scope, and the assessee's participation or furnishing of Form No. 3CL could not confer jurisdiction. Sections 124(3) and 292B did not cure this substantive jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The examination of the section 35(2AB) claim exceeded the permissible scope of Limited Scrutiny; consequently, the disallowance arising from that enquiry was invalid in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment was invalid as a change of opinion; (ii) Whether deduction under section 54B was allowable for agricultural land purchased before execution of the registered sale deed; (iii) Whether the addition for differential commission income from petrol and diesel sales was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was invalid as a change of opinion.

Analysis: The original assessment recorded the furnishing of documents relating to immovable-property transactions and the petrol and diesel business, but neither the eligibility of the deduction under section 54B nor the quantum of total commission income had been specifically examined or determined. No opinion on either issue had therefore been formed in the original assessment, and the reasons recorded disclosed a basis to believe that income had escaped assessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment was valid and this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under section 54B was allowable for agricultural land purchased before execution of the registered sale deed.

Analysis: The agreement to sell provided for phased payment of consideration and proportionate delivery of possession. Substantial consideration had been received before the purchases of replacement agricultural land, and the investment was sourced from that consideration. The agreement created enforceable rights in favour of the purchaser and correspondingly extinguished rights of the sellers in the original agricultural land; the subsequent registered sale deed did not justify denial of the relief solely because the replacement land was purchased earlier.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 54B was allowable and the related addition is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition for differential commission income from petrol and diesel sales was sustainable.

Analysis: The tax-credit statement and the profit and loss account established commission receipts of Rs. 24,27,853, comprising commission credited and evaporation loss. The higher figure adopted for making the differential addition was unsupported and erroneous.

Conclusion: The differential commission addition was unsustainable and is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment remains legally valid, but neither of the two disputed additions can be retained in computing the taxable income.

Ratio Decidendi: Relief for reinvestment in agricultural land cannot be denied merely because the replacement land was acquired before the registered conveyance where a binding agreement to sell had already transferred enforceable rights, yielded consideration, and funded the investment.

Issues: Whether long-term capital gains from the sale of shares, claimed as exempt, could be treated as bogus accommodation entries and added under Section 68.

Analysis: The addition rested on an investigation report and general allegations of price rigging in the relevant scrip. Contract notes, bank statements, demat holding and transaction statements established that the shares were purchased and sold through a broker and recorded in the assessee's demat account. No material linked the assessee to accommodation-entry providers or synchronised trading, and no money trail, cash exchange, or incriminating statement was produced. A finding of bogus penny stock transactions requires evidence connecting the assessee with the alleged price-rigging operation; presumption alone cannot displace documented share transactions.

Conclusion: The long-term capital gains could not be treated as bogus, and the addition under Section 68 was deleted.

Issues: Whether penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars was sustainable on an addition for unexplained fixed deposits.

Analysis: The fixed deposits were accepted from the public under a deposit scheme, and the assessee had furnished names, addresses, and transaction details of the depositors. The addition under Section 68 rested on the absence of confirmations and failure to establish the credits to the required standard. However, the record contained no material from an external source or enquiry establishing that the deposits represented the assessee's undisclosed income. The explanation that some deposits were renewals pertaining to an earlier year, together with the supporting details furnished, could not be regarded as wholly untenable or lacking bona fides. An addition under the deeming provision did not, by itself, establish circumstances warranting penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not sustainable and was deleted.

Issues: Whether reassessment notice issued after three years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid where the escaped-income threshold under Section 149(1)(b) was not specifically determined.

Analysis: For reopening beyond three years, Section 149(1)(b) required material showing that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment to the prescribed threshold or was likely to exceed it. The order under Section 148A(d) contained no categorical finding quantifying the escaped income at Rs. 50 lakh or more. Aggregate cash deposits in the bank account could not, by themselves, be treated as escaped income. The approval was consequently unsupported by a recorded finding satisfying the statutory precondition.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 and the consequential reassessment were void ab initio and were quashed.

Issues: Whether a reassessment under Section 147, made after a regular assessment under Section 143(3), qualifies as a regular assessment under Explanation 1 to Section 234D for levy of interest on excess refund.

Analysis: Section 234D permits interest on excess refund only where the refund becomes recoverable on regular assessment. Section 2(40) defines regular assessment as an assessment under Section 143(3) or Section 144. Explanation 1 to Section 234D extends that expression to an assessment made for the first time under Section 147 or Section 153A. Since a regular assessment under Section 143(3) had already been completed, the subsequent reassessment under Section 147 was not the first assessment and could not be treated as a regular assessment for Section 234D.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 234D was not chargeable on the reassessment, and its levy was liable to be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the declared exempt long-term capital gain from the sale of penny-stock shares was genuine and whether the additions of sale proceeds under Section 68 and estimated commission under Section 69C could be sustained; (ii) Whether the denial of cross-examination of third-party operators and exit providers violated natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the declared exempt long-term capital gain from the sale of penny-stock shares was genuine and whether the additions of sale proceeds under Section 68 and estimated commission under Section 69C could be sustained

Analysis: Under Section 68, the assessee bore the burden to establish the genuineness of the share transactions and the source of the receipts. The extraordinary rise and subsequent fall in the scrip price, thin and manipulated trading, regulatory findings regarding price rigging, the role of identified exit providers, and the assessee's non-compliance with summons collectively supported the inference of a pre-arranged accommodation-entry arrangement. Contract notes, demat records, and banking-channel receipts did not, in these circumstances, establish genuine transactions. Applying human probabilities and preponderance of probabilities, the claimed gains were found to be sham. The established modus operandi also supported estimation of commission expenditure under Section 69C.

Conclusion: The claimed long-term capital gain was non-genuine; the addition of the sale proceeds under Section 68 and the estimated commission addition under Section 69C were sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the denial of cross-examination of third-party operators and exit providers violated natural justice

Analysis: Audi alteram partem requires disclosure of adverse material but does not invariably require formal cross-examination. Cross-examination becomes material where an addition rests solely or principally upon a directly incriminating statement. The additions rested on corroborative material, including regulatory findings, trading patterns, financial circumstances, investigation material, and the assessee's failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation; third-party statements were not the sole basis. The relevant material had been confronted to the assessee, who did not comply with summons or effectively rebut it.

Conclusion: No breach of natural justice was established, and the absence of cross-examination did not invalidate the additions.

Final Conclusion: The exemption claim was unavailable, and the taxable treatment of the impugned share-sale receipts and related commission was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a penny-stock transaction, documentary banking and demat records do not discharge the burden of proving genuineness where surrounding circumstances establish manipulation and the assessee fails to provide a satisfactory explanation; cross-examination is not indispensable where third-party statements are not the sole or principal basis of the addition.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings were invalid; and (ii) whether the entire cash deposits in the bank account were liable to be assessed as income from other sources.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings were invalid.

Analysis: The challenge to reassessment was unsupported by the recorded reasons or the approval for reopening. On the available facts, the ground challenging reopening could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were valid. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the entire cash deposits in the bank account were liable to be assessed as income from other sources.

Analysis: No supporting evidence established the claimed business receipts from sale of cosmetics and confectionery items. However, the bank account showed that the cash deposits were followed by cash withdrawals and cheque payments whose destinations had not been examined. Having regard to the magnitude of deposits, the assessee's status, absence of books, and lapse of time, a lump-sum determination of income was warranted.

Conclusion: Income attributable to the cash deposits was restricted to Rs. 3,00,000, inclusive of the returned income of Rs. 1,95,520, and the balance addition of Rs. 27,35,850 was deleted. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment was sustained, but the income assessable from the disputed bank deposits was confined to Rs. 3,00,000.

Issues: Whether concessional customs-duty exemption for components used in manufacturing electric buses was unavailable because fabrication was undertaken through a job worker and tax invoices recorded the components as supplied to that job worker.

Analysis: Condition No. 9 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017 required compliance with the Customs (Import of Goods at Concessional Rate of Duty) Rules, 2017. Rule 7 concerns re-export or domestic clearance of unutilised or defective goods; it did not apply where the imported components were actually used for the prescribed manufacture. The required intimations, continuity bond and returns had been furnished. The components remained at the shared manufacturing premises and were used to fabricate electric buses through a job-work arrangement. The tax invoices reflected the business arrangement and did not establish diversion of the components or non-fulfilment of the end-use condition. Manufacture through a job worker was not prohibited by the exemption or the IGCR regime, and any documentation-related procedural lapse was outweighed by substantial compliance with the substantive end-use requirement.

Conclusion: Use of the imported components through job work at the shared premises constituted substantial compliance with the end-use condition; the exemption remained available in favour of the assessee and the duty demand was unsustainable.