Issues: (i) Whether accumulation of 15 per cent of income was allowable under section 11(1)(a); (ii) Whether accumulation exceeding 15 per cent was allowable where Form No. 10 was furnished before the extended return-filing due date; (iii) Whether exemption under section 11 could be denied for delayed electronic furnishing of Form No. 10BB where the audit report was available before processing.

Issue (i): Whether accumulation of 15 per cent of income was allowable under section 11(1)(a).

Analysis: The 15 per cent accumulation permitted by section 11(1)(a) is statutorily available and is distinct from the specified accumulation governed by section 11(2). Eligibility for charitable exemption and application of income towards charitable objects were undisputed.

Conclusion: The 15 per cent accumulation was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether accumulation exceeding 15 per cent was allowable where Form No. 10 was furnished before the extended return-filing due date.

Analysis: Under Rule 17 read with section 139(1), the relevant deadline for Form No. 10 corresponded to the extended due date for filing the return. Form No. 10 was furnished before the extended due date notified by Circular No. 16/2023 dated 18.09.2023.

Conclusion: The specified accumulation under section 11(2) could not be denied as belated, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether exemption under section 11 could be denied for delayed electronic furnishing of Form No. 10BB where the audit report was available before processing.

Analysis: The audit report was furnished before processing of the return, and there was no finding that the accounts were unaudited or that substantive conditions for exemption were unmet. A procedural delay in furnishing the prescribed audit report does not defeat a substantive exemption claim when the report is available before completion of proceedings.

Conclusion: Exemption under section 11 could not be denied merely for delayed furnishing of Form No. 10BB, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the statutory and specified accumulations claimed and to charitable exemption notwithstanding the alleged delay in furnishing the prescribed forms.

Ratio Decidendi: Procedural delay in furnishing prescribed forms or an audit report does not defeat a substantive charitable-exemption claim where the form is furnished within the valid extended deadline or the report is available before completion of proceedings.

Issues: Whether delayed filing of Form No. 67 precludes grant of foreign tax credit claimed under Sections 90/90A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee had claimed foreign tax credit in the return, but Form No. 67 was filed subsequently. Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 prescribes the timeline for furnishing that form. Applying the jurisdictional High Court decision and the earlier decision in the assessee's own case, delayed filing of Form No. 67 was treated as a directory procedural lapse that could not defeat the substantive foreign tax credit claim. The foreign tax credit remains subject to verification of the relevant facts and supporting documents by the Assessing Officer, with an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: Delay in filing Form No. 67 is condoned, and the assessee is entitled to foreign tax credit subject to factual verification by the Assessing Officer.

Issues: Whether an importer's written acceptance of enhanced assessable value dispenses only with a speaking order or also bars the statutory challenge to reassessment and enhancement of transaction value.

Analysis: Written acceptance under Section 17(5) constitutes, at most, a waiver of the requirement for a speaking order; it does not extinguish the statutory right of appeal under Section 128. Rejection of the declared transaction value requires compliance with Section 14 and Rule 12(2), including written communication of the grounds for reasonable doubt. The acceptance letters did not disclose the underlying contemporaneous-import data or comparable particulars and, particularly where clearance on enhanced value was sought under protest, could not establish an unconditional abandonment of the challenge to valuation. Estoppel Against Statute does not apply to defeat statutory rights in taxation matters.

Conclusion: The written acceptance did not bar the assessee from challenging the reassessment or enhancement of value; the orders rejecting the appeals solely on that basis were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the de novo confirmation of service-tax demand was sustainable despite directions for requantification under Rule 2A and reconciliation of Form 26AS with the books of account.

Analysis: The remand directions required fresh quantification of construction-service liability under Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The de novo adjudication repeated the earlier confirmation without undertaking that exercise. The year-wise reconciliation of Form 26AS and the books of account had been furnished, and the balance tax identified through reconciliation had been deposited.

Conclusion: The de novo demand confirmation could not be sustained; the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the demand for recovery of the sanctioned refund could be sustained despite the appellate tribunal's final order upholding the assessee's entitlement to refund and rejecting the limitation objection.

Analysis: The impugned demand order relied on an appellate order which had already been set aside by the appellate tribunal. The tribunal had substantively upheld refund of the CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 and had expressly found the refund claim to be within limitation. An adjudicating authority was required to give effect to the operative appellate determination directly governing the refund entitlement and limitation; it could not proceed on a premise nullified by that determination.

Conclusion: The demand order and the demand-cum-show cause notice were unsustainable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Vanaspati whose invoices mentioned the name 'Shiva', but whose containers bore no such marking, was excluded from exemption under Notification No. 6/2003-CE dated 1st March, 2003; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether Vanaspati whose invoices mentioned the name 'Shiva', but whose containers bore no such marking, was excluded from exemption under Notification No. 6/2003-CE dated 1st March, 2003.

Analysis: The notification excludes specified vegetable fats, oils and Vanaspati only where the goods bear a brand name and are put up in unit containers for retail sale; these requirements are cumulative. A brand name must be used in relation to the product so as to indicate a trade connection. The burden lay on the Revenue to establish that the goods removed after 1 March 2003 bore the brand name. The agents' and distributors' statements relied upon in the enquiry confirmed that 'Shiva' appeared on invoices but not on the containers. Prior manufacture of branded goods raised no more than suspicion and could not prove brand-name use on the subsequently cleared goods.

Conclusion: Mention of 'Shiva' only in sale invoices was not use of a brand name on the goods; the notification exclusion was inapplicable and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was sustainable.

Analysis: The penalty was dependent upon the duty demand, which was unsustainable once the exemption applied. Independently, the dispute concerned the construction of an exemption notification, and no material established fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty, being prerequisites for penalty under Section 11AC.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 11AC was unsustainable and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption was available, with the consequential duty demand, interest and penalty rendered unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption conditioned on goods bearing a brand name cannot be denied merely because the brand name appears in invoices; actual use of the brand name on the goods must be proved by the Revenue.

Issues: Whether income from the sale of stock-in-trade, for which consideration was received and possession was handed over in FY 2013-14, was taxable in AY 2014-15 rather than AY 2016-17 merely because the conveyance deed was subsequently registered, and whether Section 43CA could be invoked in AY 2016-17.

Analysis: The transfer had been completed in substance when the entire consideration was received, possession was handed over and the income was recognised in FY 2013-14. Section 2(47)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with the principle of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, supported taxation upon completion of these substantive acts. Applying substance over form and the doctrine of accrual of income, the subsequent registration was a procedural continuation of the earlier transaction and did not create a fresh taxable event. The deeming fiction under Section 43CA presupposes a taxable transfer in the relevant previous year and could not be applied solely because the instrument relating to an already completed and taxed transaction was registered later; taxing the same income again would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The income arose in AY 2014-15 and not in AY 2016-17; the subsequent registration did not shift the year of taxability, and Section 43CA was inapplicable in AY 2016-17.

Issues: Whether a writ of mandamus should issue for unblocking input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger blocked under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Rule 86A(3) limits the restriction on utilisation of blocked credit to one year. The statutory framework also enables the registered person to seek an order from the Commissioner under Rule 86A(2) after the credit is blocked. That remedy was not pursued. Subsequent cancellation of registration and demand proceedings could be separately challenged before seeking unblocking of the credit.

Conclusion: No entitlement to a mandamus for unblocking the input tax credit was established; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a return filed after the period stipulated in a notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 could be treated as non est; (ii) Whether reassessment could be completed without serving a notice under Section 143(2) after the return had been filed.

Issue (i): Whether a return filed after the period stipulated in a notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 could be treated as non est.

Analysis: Under the regime applicable to the relevant assessment year, the stipulated thirty-day period did not render the subsequently filed return non est. The record established that the return had been filed, while the subsequent departmental communication incorrectly proceeded on the premise that no return had been furnished.

Conclusion: The return was valid and could not be treated as non est.

Issue (ii): Whether reassessment could be completed without serving a notice under Section 143(2) after the return had been filed.

Analysis: Once the return and the required materials had been furnished in the reassessment proceedings, service of notice under Section 143(2) was mandatory before completion of the assessment. No such notice was issued or served.

Conclusion: The reassessment completed without the mandatory notice under Section 143(2) was invalid.

Final Conclusion: The filed return had to be recognised and the statutory scrutiny notice had to be served before reassessment could lawfully be completed.

Ratio Decidendi: A return filed pursuant to a reassessment notice cannot be treated as non est merely for being filed beyond the period stated in that notice where the applicable law permits its filing, and reassessment on such return requires service of the mandatory notice under Section 143(2).

Issues: Whether mobile phones and bank debit cards seized under the GST law could be retained beyond six months without an order extending the seizure.

Analysis: Section 67(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retention of seized articles beyond six months only where an extension of seizure has been ordered. No order extending the seizure existed.

Conclusion: The seized mobile phones and bank debit cards could not be further detained and were required to be returned to the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to place documents demonstrating the genuineness of transactions before continuation of the blocking of input tax credit under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Rule 86A permits blocking of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger where the statutory conditions are met. The hearing intimation and postal acknowledgement disproved the assertion that no pre-decisional opportunity had been provided. However, the claim that the supplier was registered and that transactions were supported by valid invoices and banking-channel payments required evaluation on supporting material. The blocking could not be automatically lifted merely because a further opportunity was being granted.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee to the limited extent that it may submit a detailed response and supporting documents, which must be considered after an opportunity of hearing before deciding whether the blocking of input tax credit should continue.

Issues: (i) Whether cash/currency could lawfully be seized under Section 67(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; and (ii) Whether the seized mobile phones, pen drives and bank card could continue to be retained after issuance of the demand-cum-show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether cash/currency could lawfully be seized under Section 67(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 67(2) authorises seizure only of articles falling within its statutory scope. The interpretation that cash/currency is not a "thing" capable of seizure under that provision was adopted, there being no impediment to following that view. The cash had already been refunded, but it had remained withheld from 5 June 2025 until 19 August 2026.

Conclusion: Seizure of the cash was illegal. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee, who is entitled to interest on the wrongfully withheld amount, payable within six weeks.

Issue (ii): Whether the seized mobile phones, pen drives and bank card could continue to be retained after issuance of the demand-cum-show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory restriction permits retention of seized documents, books or things only so long as necessary for examination, enquiry or proceedings. Since the demand-cum-show-cause notice had already been issued, continued retention of the identified articles was not justified.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee. The mobile phones, pen drives and bank card must be returned forthwith upon production of a certified copy of the order and acknowledgment.

Final Conclusion: The statutory power of search and seizure does not extend to cash/currency under Section 67(2), and it cannot support continued retention of other seized articles once their retention is no longer necessary for the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 67, seizure and retention are confined to articles lawfully seizable and necessary for the statutory enquiry or proceedings; cash/currency is not a "thing" within the authorised class of seizure.

Issues: Whether the amendment to the exemption notification, which came into force after the date of the bill of lading, could be relied upon to refuse consideration of the request for provisional release of imported goods.

Analysis: The bill of lading pre-dated the commencement of the amendment. In the absence of an express provision conferring retrospective operation, a statutory notification operates prospectively and cannot govern imports covered by a bill of lading issued before its commencement. No distinguishing feature justified departure from the earlier directions governing provisional release of similar goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The amendment could not be relied upon to deny consideration of the request for provisional release; the request must be considered in accordance with law and the goods released upon compliance with the conditions imposed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory notification without express retrospective operation cannot be applied to imports covered by a bill of lading issued before the notification came into force.

Issues: Whether recorded and pre-recorded audio/video CDs and DVDs were taxable at 5% under Entry 68(5)(d) rather than at 14.5% as DVDs and CDs under Entry 68(30) of the First Schedule.

Analysis: Entry 68(5) covers information-technology software and the media on which it is embedded, including recorded and pre-recorded DVDs and CDs under clause (d). The expression "on other media" and the placement of clause (d) within the software entry distinguish recorded media containing software from blank DVDs and CDs. The principle of noscitur a sociis supports this construction, as the recorded and pre-recorded media take their character from the associated software-related clauses. The clarification issued by the Authority for Clarification and Advance Rulings, the Commissioner's clarification, and consistent assessments of similar goods corroborated this classification. Since the material facts were undisputed, recourse to the statutory appellate remedy was unnecessary.

Conclusion: Recorded and pre-recorded audio/video CDs and DVDs are taxable at 5% under Entry 68(5)(d) of Part B of the First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, and are not taxable as blank DVDs and CDs at 14.5%.

Issues: Whether, upon transition from an export-oriented unit to the Export Promotion Capital Goods scheme, non-registration of the EPCG authorisation at the original port of import, non-production of the authorisation for debit, and non-submission of an undertaking in the prescribed form disentitled the assessee to exemption under Notification No. 16/2015-Customs dated 01.04.2015.

Analysis: Condition 2 of the notification ordinarily requires registration of the authorisation at the specified port of import and its production for debit at clearance. The capital goods had, however, already been imported under the export-oriented unit scheme and were being dealt with at the stage of debonding and transition to the EPCG scheme. The required particulars and EPCG authorisation had been furnished to the jurisdictional authorities, the exit and no-dues permissions were issued, and the export obligation was undertaken. The authorisation was available for debit, while the undertaking furnished for discharge of any future duty shortfall substantially met the relevant requirement.

Conclusion: The alleged failures were procedural lapses in the circumstances and did not constitute a substantive breach warranting denial of the EPCG exemption; no substantial question of law arose.

Issues: Whether registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G could be granted subject to a condition that their applicability and consequential tax benefits would depend on the outcome of future Supreme Court proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory framework permits the Commissioner to grant or reject registration and approval in accordance with law; it does not authorise conditional registration or approval whose efficacy is kept contingent upon a future judicial outcome. A quasi-judicial authority may exercise only powers expressly conferred by statute. Once registration and approval are granted, their legal consequences must operate according to law, and any future cancellation or withdrawal can occur only through the statutory mechanism.

Conclusion: The contingent conditions attached to the registration and approval were beyond statutory jurisdiction and were directed to be deleted; the registration and approval shall operate in accordance with law without those conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India; (ii) Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India.

Analysis: Section 7(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covers supplies of goods made for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. Aircraft are movable goods under Section 2(52), and transfer of title is treated as a supply of goods under Section 7(1A) read with Entry 1(a) of Schedule II. The aircraft are manufactured in Gujarat, procured by the applicant from the Indian aircraft contractor, and supplied ex-works in Gujarat to the government purchaser for contractual consideration. Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 does not provide an exemption for aircraft.

Conclusion: The supply of forty aircraft is liable to GST in India and is not exempt. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Analysis: Sections 22 and 25 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require registration in the State from which taxable supplies are made once the applicable aggregate-turnover threshold is exceeded. The outward supply is made from Gujarat, and its stated transaction value exceeds the registration threshold.

Conclusion: GST registration in Gujarat is required. This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The domestic procurement and onward ex-works supply of the aircraft constitute a taxable supply chain situated in Gujarat, with the corresponding registration nexus in that State.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of title in movable goods for consideration in the course of business is a taxable supply under GST, and the supplier must register in the State from which the taxable supply is made once the statutory threshold is crossed.

Issues: Whether cognizance on the complaint could validly be taken without affording the accused an opportunity of hearing as required by Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 223(1) mandates that cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall not be taken without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard. The cognizance order was passed without such opportunity.

Conclusion: Cognizance taken without granting the accused the mandatory opportunity of hearing was invalid.

Issues: Whether reassessment notice issued more than three years after the relevant assessment year satisfied the monetary threshold under Section 149(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: For a notice issued beyond three years, Section 149(1)(b) requires, cumulatively, that income chargeable to tax which escaped assessment is represented in the form of an asset and amounts to or is likely to amount to at least Rs. 50 lakh. The recorded basis treated the alleged escaped income as the income embedded in contractual receipts. The assessing authority subsequently estimated that income at 8% of the gross receipts and made an addition of Rs. 26,06,420. The actual alleged escaped income was therefore below the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional requirements of Section 149(1)(b) were not met; the notice under Section 148 and consequential reassessment proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether an assessment made under the faceless assessment framework could be sustained when the assessee's specific request for a personal hearing through video conferencing was not effectively granted.

Analysis: The record showed that, after the requested video-conference hearing did not commence, the assessee sought rescheduling. The portal material reflected no further hearing notices, and the Revenue did not place any such notices on record. Where a personal hearing is specifically sought, an effective opportunity of hearing is required before finalising the assessment; its denial violates the requirements of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment and consequential demand and penalty proceedings could not be sustained. Fresh assessment is required after permitting a further reply, granting an effective personal hearing, disclosing any material proposed to be relied upon, and issuing a reasoned order.