Issues: (i) Whether the Department could challenge the appellate finding on utilisation of IGST input tax credit where that point was not specified in the Commissioner's authorisation under Section 112(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether utilisation of IGST input tax credit, despite an equivalent unutilised CGST and SGST credit balance, constituted unjust enrichment barring refund; (iii) Whether the Supreme Court ruling that invalidated the ocean-freight IGST reverse-charge levy operated retrospectively; (iv) Whether a taxpayer that was not a party to that ruling could claim refund and rely on it as the order required by Rule 89(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the Department could challenge the appellate finding on utilisation of IGST input tax credit where that point was not specified in the Commissioner's authorisation under Section 112(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 112(3) confines a departmental application to the points specified by the Commissioner. The authorisation did not dispute the appellate finding concerning utilisation of IGST credit; an authorised officer could not enlarge that scope by raising the omitted objection.

Conclusion: The credit-utilisation objection was outside the authorised appeal and could not be raised. This was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether utilisation of IGST input tax credit, despite an equivalent unutilised CGST and SGST credit balance, constituted unjust enrichment barring refund.

Analysis: The utilisation framework under Section 49A and Section 49B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 88A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires priority utilisation of IGST credit. An equivalent unutilised balance under the CGST and SGST heads, capable of debit towards the refund amount, constituted non-utilisation in substance and did not yield a double benefit.

Conclusion: Utilisation of IGST credit did not result in unjust enrichment or bar the refund. This was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Supreme Court ruling that invalidated the ocean-freight IGST reverse-charge levy operated retrospectively.

Analysis: Judicial declarations ordinarily operate retrospectively because they declare the law rather than legislate it. Prospective overruling is an exception requiring an express limitation. The ruling did not limit its operation prospectively; consequently, the ultra vires levy lacked legal authority from its inception and was void ab initio.

Conclusion: The invalidation of the ocean-freight IGST reverse-charge levy applied retrospectively. This was in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether a taxpayer that was not a party to that ruling could claim refund and rely on it as the order required by Rule 89(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Articles 265 and 300A of the Constitution of India prohibit collection of tax without authority of law. A declaration that the levy is unconstitutional removes its legal foundation as against all taxpayers, including non-parties, except a taxpayer whose own unsuccessful challenge to the levy has attained finality. The judicial declaration itself supplied the legal foundation contemplated by Rule 89(2).

Conclusion: A non-party taxpayer could claim the refund and rely on the judicial declaration as the requisite order under Rule 89(2). This was in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Tax paid under the void ab initio ocean-freight reverse-charge levy is recoverable by refund, with statutory interest consequentially payable for delayed payment.

Ratio Decidendi: A judicial declaration that a tax levy is ultra vires operates retrospectively unless expressly limited, rendering the levy void ab initio and permitting taxpayers who were not parties to the litigation to seek recovery of tax collected without authority of law, subject to established finality exceptions.

Issues: (i) Whether return transit of fully duty-paid imported goods to a customs warehouse after an aborted delivery, without a fresh e-way bill, amounts to tax evasion or a procedural lapse; (ii) Whether intent to evade tax is a prerequisite for penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (iii) Whether the precedents relied on by the assessee governed the documentation lapse and rendered the Revenue's contrary authorities inapplicable.

Issue (i): Whether return transit of fully duty-paid imported goods to a customs warehouse after an aborted delivery, without a fresh e-way bill, amounts to tax evasion or a procedural lapse.

Analysis: Section 68 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 regulates movement documentation. The imported goods were supported by bills of entry, import invoices and customs-clearance records; physical verification disclosed no discrepancy in description or quantity. Their return to secure warehouse storage followed the missed delivery slot and did not involve an unrecorded commercial sale, revenue loss, or diversion of goods.

Conclusion: The omission to generate a return transit document was a bona fide procedural lapse and not tax evasion, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether intent to evade tax is a prerequisite for penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 cannot operate as an absolute strict-liability penalty where the transaction is fully accounted for, taxes on the imported goods stand paid, and the material reveals no intention to evade tax. A confiscatory tax-evasion penalty requires material establishing mens rea; a technical documentation omission without such intent attracts, at most, the general penalty applicable to the procedural default.

Conclusion: Intent to evade tax is a necessary prerequisite to the Section 129 penalty in the circumstances; the Section 129 penalty was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the precedents relied on by the assessee governed the documentation lapse and rendered the Revenue's contrary authorities inapplicable.

Analysis: The governing jurisdictional precedent treated bona fide transit-documentation failures unaccompanied by tax evasion as outside Section 129 and required substitution of a nominal general penalty under Section 125. The Revenue authority concerned materially different facts of a commercial movement displaying indications of deliberate non-compliance and did not displace that principle.

Conclusion: The binding precedents applied to the return transit and the contrary Revenue authority was distinguishable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The technical omission was confined to a general penalty of Rs. 25,000 under Section 125, while the confiscatory penalty founded on Section 129 was set aside and consequential refund and release relief followed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Section 129 penalty cannot be sustained for a bona fide documentation lapse involving fully tax-paid and accounted goods unless the material establishes an intent to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 empowers the revisional authority to remand a matter for fresh adjudication; (ii) Whether the revisional authority's order pre-judged redemption or exceeded the scope of revisional jurisdiction; (iii) Whether absence of a separate notice under Section 129DD(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 invalidated the remand; and (iv) Whether the departmental revision was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 empowers the revisional authority to remand a matter for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Section 129DD(1) authorises annulment or modification of an appellate order. The power to annul necessarily permits setting aside that order and, in the absence of an express statutory prohibition, carries the incidental power to remit the matter for a fresh decision. The separate provision governing the appellate tribunal does not restrict the revisional authority's powers under Section 129DD.

Conclusion: The revisional authority had jurisdiction to annul the appellate order and remand the matter for fresh adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the revisional authority's order pre-judged redemption or exceeded the scope of revisional jurisdiction.

Analysis: Revisional scrutiny of legality and propriety permits interference where material evidence has been overlooked or findings are unsupported or legally unsustainable; it does not amount to appellate reappreciation of all evidence. The recovery circumstances, the contemporaneous statement indicating a carrier arrangement, and unresolved inconsistencies in the subsequently produced purchase invoice justified review of whether redemption was legally available. Under Section 123, the burden to establish that seized gold is not smuggled rests upon the person from whose possession it was seized or a person claiming ownership. The remand left the ultimate question of confiscation and redemption for fresh determination on the evidence.

Conclusion: The remand neither pre-judged redemption nor exceeded the limits of revisional jurisdiction.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of a separate notice under Section 129DD(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 invalidated the remand.

Analysis: The notice requirement in Section 129DD(5) applies where enhancement of penalty or redemption fine, or confiscation of goods of greater value, is proposed. A remand for fresh adjudication did not involve any such enhancement. An opportunity of hearing had been afforded in the revision proceedings, and the fresh adjudication also preserved an opportunity to meet the case under Section 123.

Conclusion: No separate notice under Section 129DD(5) was required for the remand.

Issue (iv): Whether the departmental revision was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 129DD(2) prescribes three months from communication of the appellate order, with a further maximum period of three months upon sufficient cause. The record did not establish the date on which the appellate order was communicated to the department, and no limitation objection had been raised before the revisional authority. There was consequently no factual basis to find that the revision was filed beyond the permissible period.

Conclusion: The revision could not be invalidated as time-barred on the available record.

Final Conclusion: The order directing fresh adjudication, with a fresh opportunity to establish the lawful nature of the seized gold and the defence against confiscation, remains legally effective.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory revisional power to annul or modify an appellate order includes the incidental power to remand for fresh adjudication unless that power is expressly excluded.

Issues: (i) Whether a dealer whose quarterly return was accepted under self-assessment was entitled to refund under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 in the absence of proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59; (ii) Whether Section 40A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 justified rejection of the refund on an allegation that the transactions were paper transactions intended to defeat the Act.

Issue (i): Whether a dealer whose quarterly return was accepted under self-assessment was entitled to refund under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 in the absence of proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59.

Analysis: Section 31 treats a compliant return as a self-assessment. Sections 32 and 58 provide distinct mechanisms for default assessment and audit, while Section 38 requires refund of the excess amount remaining after adjustment of outstanding dues. The quarterly return had been accepted, no outstanding demand remained, and no proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59 had been initiated. Section 34 concerns assessment or reassessment proceedings and does not govern a refund application.

Conclusion: The accepted self-assessment entitled the assessee to the refund due under Section 38(3)(a)(ii), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 40A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 justified rejection of the refund on an allegation that the transactions were paper transactions intended to defeat the Act.

Analysis: Section 40A could not be invoked merely on an allegation of paper transactions. No arrangement between the parties had been declared null and void, and no inquiry or investigation had produced evidence of collusion or identified a contract intended to defeat the Act.

Conclusion: Section 40A was not attracted and could not support rejection of the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unadjusted refund arising from an accepted self-assessment remained statutorily payable and could not be withheld on unsubstantiated allegations of collusive transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory refund arising from an accepted self-assessed return cannot be withheld where no applicable assessment, audit or other statutory proceedings have been initiated and no void arrangement has been legally established.

Issues: Whether the assessment order required reconsideration in light of the available GSTR 2A/2B data, GSTR 3B returns and annual return.

Analysis: The available portal records and annual return furnished prima facie evidence of input tax credit. Since the assessment was confirmed for non-production of return copies, fresh consideration was warranted after verification of the asserted recovery of 40% of the tax demand and after affording a reasonable opportunity.

Outcome: The impugned assessment order was set aside for fresh consideration, with consequential lifting of bank attachment upon verification of the asserted recovery.

Issues: Whether notional rental income under Section 23(1)(a) could be assessed in respect of unsold flats for the period before issuance of an occupancy certificate.

Analysis: A property lacking an occupancy certificate is legally incapable of occupation. Where the property was neither legally occupiable nor actually occupied during the relevant period, no annual letting value could be attributed on a notional basis under the head income from house property. The completion certificate did not establish legal occupiability in the absence of the occupancy certificate.

Conclusion: No notional rental income was chargeable for the period preceding issuance of the occupancy certificate.

Issues: (i) Whether an amendment effective 15.06.2026 applied to an imported consignment handed to the first carrier on 08.06.2026 under a combined transport Bill of Lading; and (ii) Whether the request for provisional release of the imported goods required consideration under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether an amendment effective 15.06.2026 applied to an imported consignment handed to the first carrier on 08.06.2026 under a combined transport Bill of Lading.

Analysis: The relevant date was determined with reference to the handing over of the goods to the first carrier. The goods had been so handed over before the amendment came into force. Multimodal transport is recognised under Chapter 11 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, and the later date on the shipment document did not alter the position. The amendment therefore operated prospectively and could not govern the consignment.

Conclusion: The amendment effective 15.06.2026 was inapplicable to the consignment and could not be a ground to refuse consideration of the release request, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the request for provisional release of the imported goods required consideration under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 provides the statutory framework for provisional release. No distinguishing feature justified departure from the approach applicable to similar imported goods. The release request was required to be decided under that provision, with conditions permissible in law, while the merits of the adjudication proceedings remained independent.

Conclusion: The request for provisional release must be considered under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 and, upon compliance with lawfully imposed conditions, the goods must be provisionally released, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release request must be addressed without applying the subsequent amendment, while the merits of the customs adjudication remain open for independent determination.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment brought into force after goods are handed to the first carrier in a recognised multimodal shipment cannot be applied to that consignment.

Issues: Whether a corporate debtor, after approval of a resolution plan resulting in a change of management or control, is immune under Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 from prosecution for alleged offences committed before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: Section 32A(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ceases the corporate debtor's criminal liability for pre-CIRP offences and bars its prosecution once a resolution plan approved under Section 31 results in management or control passing to an unconnected new person. The approved resolution plan resulted in such a change of management and control, and the alleged environmental offences related to the period of the previous management. The statutory conditions for immunity were therefore satisfied.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor was entitled to statutory immunity from prosecution for the pre-CIRP offences. The criminal proceeding and cognizance order were quashed insofar as they concerned the petitioner-company, without any adjudication of the case against the remaining accused persons.

Issues: Whether an individual shareholder is an aggrieved person entitled to maintain an appeal against approval of a resolution plan.

Analysis: Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confers appellate standing upon a person aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority. The binding interpretation of that expression excludes an individual shareholder from challenging approval of a resolution plan, since shareholders' interests are represented through the resolution professional or liquidator and permitting individual shareholder challenges would undermine the time-bound insolvency process. Allegations of fraud or collusion, unsupported by specific material, do not create an exception to this rule. Homebuyers who did not independently challenge the resolution plan cannot indirectly contest it by supporting the shareholder's appeal.

Conclusion: An individual shareholder is not an aggrieved person under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and cannot maintain an appeal against approval of a resolution plan.

Issues: Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable despite the assessee's claimed opening cash balance supported by prior bank withdrawals.

Analysis: The cash-flow statement and bank records demonstrated the availability of cash in hand from withdrawals made from various bank accounts, which was subsequently re-deposited. No defect in the cash-flow statement was identified. The addition rested solely on an inference based on perceived normal human behaviour and the preponderance of human probabilities, notwithstanding the documented source of cash.

Conclusion: The cash deposits stood explained by the available opening cash balance; the addition was deleted.

Issues: Whether a timeframe for deciding applications for cancellation of duplicate Permanent Account Numbers should be prescribed.

Analysis: The grievance concerned the absence of a prescribed period for disposal of duplicate PAN cancellation applications and the resulting difficulties in accessing PAN-linked services. Since no representation seeking prescription of such timeframe had first been made to the CBDT, the matter was considered appropriate for consideration by that authority.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted liberty to submit a representation to the CBDT within two weeks, and the CBDT was directed to decide it within eight weeks of receipt and communicate its decision.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could reject appeals for want of territorial jurisdiction despite their administrative transfer to the Delhi Bench.

Analysis: Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 and the situs of the assessees' business and Assessing Officer ordinarily connected the matters with Lucknow. However, the appeals had been transferred to the Delhi Bench by an administrative order of the President, and the appellate orders had been passed by the Delhi Commissioner (Appeals) pursuant to an order under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A Tribunal Bench cannot judicially nullify or disregard an administrative transfer order. The principle governing High Court jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, following a transfer under Section 127, does not govern the place of hearing of appeals before the Tribunal after an administrative transfer.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's rejection of the appeals for lack of territorial jurisdiction was erroneous; the restored appeals shall be heard and decided on merits by the Delhi Bench.

Issues: (i) Whether gains from sale of shares and securities were taxable as capital gains or business income; (ii) Whether payments for purchases from a non-resident parent attracted withholding tax and disallowance under section 40(a)(i); and (iii) Whether an additional administrative-expense disallowance relating to exempt income could be made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) without recorded satisfaction.

Issue (i): Whether gains from sale of shares and securities were taxable as capital gains or business income.

Analysis: The factually identical prior rulings were followed. Consistent investment treatment, deployment of non-interest-bearing surplus funds, absence of trading activity, and the investment intention underlying the transactions supported capital-gains character; transaction volume alone did not convert the investments into business activity.

Conclusion: The gains are assessable as capital gains and not as business income, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payments for purchases from a non-resident parent attracted withholding tax and disallowance under section 40(a)(i).

Analysis: Under section 195, withholding tax arises only where the non-resident payment is chargeable to tax in India. The payments were for imported materials supplied from outside India and had been accepted as international transactions without a transfer-pricing adjustment. The related chargeability and permanent-establishment aspects could not support a withholding disallowance on the purchase payments.

Conclusion: No tax was deductible at source on the purchase payments; consequently, no disallowance under section 40(a)(i) is permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether an additional administrative-expense disallowance relating to exempt income could be made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) without recorded satisfaction.

Analysis: Section 14A(2) read with Rule 8D(1) requires recorded dissatisfaction, having regard to the accounts, with the correctness of the assessee's own expenditure disallowance before the Rule 8D formula may be applied. The assessment applied the formula without identifying expenditure relatable to exempt income or recording the requisite satisfaction despite the assessee's voluntary disallowance.

Conclusion: The additional administrative-expense disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The recharacterisation adjustment, the withholding-tax purchase disallowance, and the incremental exempt-income expense disallowance do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A disallowance under Rule 8D(2) is permissible only after the assessing authority, upon examination of the accounts, records dissatisfaction with the assessee's computation as required by section 14A(2).

Issues: Whether referral commission, calculated as a percentage of sales made by the Indian group entity to referred customers, constituted fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty.

Analysis: Article 12(5)(b) requires technical or consultancy services to make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, or to involve development and transfer of a technical plan or design. The commission invoices, memoranda of understanding and sales reports established that the receipts were fixed-rate commission for referring potential customers, correlated to sales concluded by the Indian entity. No design, technical or consultancy service was provided, and no technology, knowledge, skill or know-how was transferred so as to enable the Indian entity to apply it independently in future.

Conclusion: The referral commission did not constitute fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty; it was business income not taxable in India under Article 7 in the absence of a permanent establishment.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court despite objections as to territorial jurisdiction, alternative remedy and non-impleadment of the Kanpur office; (ii) Whether DEL orders based on pre-CIRP export-obligation defaults could continue after approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court despite objections as to territorial jurisdiction, alternative remedy and non-impleadment of the Kanpur office.

Analysis: A material part of the cause of action arose in Delhi because the competent headquarters there was seized of the representation and its inaction was challenged. The availability of an alternative remedy does not oust writ jurisdiction. The Kanpur office was also effectively represented through the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court, and the preliminary objections failed.

Issue (ii): Whether DEL orders based on pre-CIRP export-obligation defaults could continue after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: Nine DEL orders were issued during the statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, rendering adverse coercive action against the corporate debtor void ab initio. The government claim arising from the same export-obligation defaults was lodged as operational debt and was provided for at nil value in the resolution plan approved by the adjudicating authority. Under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the approved plan bound governmental authorities and extinguished pre-CIRP claims not preserved in it. Continuance of DEL status, being a coercive mechanism to enforce those extinguished pre-CIRP liabilities, was incompatible with the clean slate principle. Verification of the credentials of the new management and action for any independent fresh default remained permissible in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The DEL orders were invalid and could not be continued against the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Final Conclusion: Pre-CIRP government dues and coercive restrictions founded on them stand extinguished by an approved resolution plan and cannot burden the corporate debtor under its new management, without prejudice to action for independent fresh defaults.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved resolution plan binds governmental creditors and extinguishes pre-CIRP claims; a coercive administrative restriction imposed to recover or enforce such extinguished liabilities cannot subsist thereafter.

Issues: Whether amounts received from foreign entities as actual costs, without markup, constituted reimbursable expenses rather than consideration for a taxable service under the reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the invoices separating taxable and non-taxable charges, supporting transport and clearance documents, and chartered-accountant certification showing that air freight, ocean freight and pure-agent charges were recovered at actuals without markup. The allegation of markup lacked documentary support. It was also noted that no review ground challenged the finding on invocation of the extended period of limitation. Under the service-tax valuation framework, actual reimbursable expenses demonstrably recovered without markup were distinguishable from consideration for taxable services.

Conclusion: The amounts received from foreign entities were reimbursable expenses and were not liable to be treated as consideration for a taxable service under the reverse charge mechanism.