Strict construction of power of attorney limits tribunal representation unless written authority clearly extends to that forum.

An application for reference under Rule 22-A was not invalid merely because it was signed only by the assessee's authorised representative, as compliance was treated as sufficient if either the assessee or the representative signed the prescribed form. However, a power of attorney authorising representation in specified courts was strictly construed and did not, on its language, extend to proceedings before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which was not treated as a court for that purpose. Because no written authority covered appearance before the Tribunal, the request for reference failed for lack of proper authorisation.

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Issues: (i) Whether an application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, requiring a reference to the High Court, was invalid because it was signed only by the authorised representative and not by the assessee himself. (ii) Whether the general power of attorney relied on by the assessee authorised the attorney to act and sign the application before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (i): Whether an application under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, requiring a reference to the High Court, was invalid because it was signed only by the authorised representative and not by the assessee himself.

Analysis: Rule 22-A contemplated an application in a prescribed form with signatures of the applicant and, if any, the authorised representative. The requirement was construed in the light of the earlier binding decision of the Madras High Court, which held that the form did not require two signatures and that compliance was sufficient if either the assessee or his authorised representative signed the application. The Court accepted that interpretation.

Conclusion: The application was not invalid merely because it was signed by the authorised representative and not by the assessee personally.

Issue (ii): Whether the general power of attorney relied on by the assessee authorised the attorney to act and sign the application before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The expression in the power of attorney was strictly construed. The document authorised representation in specified courts and certain other authorities, but it separately referred to vakalats and did not show an intention to include the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal within the description of courts. The Tribunal was not a court, and the language used was not wide enough to cover proceedings before it. There was therefore no written authority within section 61(1) authorising attendance before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The attorney was not duly authorised in writing to act before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The request for reference failed because the person who signed the application was not shown to have the necessary written authority to represent the assessee before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: A power of attorney authorising representation in specified courts must be strictly construed, and an Income-tax Appellate Tribunal will not be treated as included unless the authority clearly extends to that forum; where written authority is lacking, the application cannot be maintained through that representative.

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