Court status of statutory tribunals: absence of strict judicial power permits legislative procedural conditions and differential appeal fees.

Whether a statutory adjudicatory body is a 'Court' turns on possession of judicial power in the strict sense; possessing court-like powers (examining witnesses, summoning, oath) does not alone confer Court status, and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was held to exercise quasi judicial/administrative functions rather than strict judicial power, so it is not a Court. Separately, differential imposition of an appeal fee on assessees but not on the Commissioner constitutes a reasonable classification related to the statute's object and does not violate Article 14; the fee provision is constitutionally valid.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 33 of the Income-tax Act is a "Court" for the purpose of limiting the Central Legislature's power to levy fees; (ii) Whether sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Income-tax Act, by requiring an assessee to pay a fee of Rs.100 for preferring an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal while not imposing a similar requirement on the Commissioner, contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a "Court".

Analysis: The distinguishing factor is whether judicial power in the strict sense is vested in the body. Characteristics such as power to examine witnesses, decide disputes, or finality of decision do not alone convert an administrative or statutory tribunal into a Court. Provisions permitting certain court-like powers (e.g., enforcing attendance, examining on oath) do not by themselves confer Court status. The Appellate Tribunal's constitution, procedures, and statutory context show it exercises quasi-judicial/administrative functions without possessing judicial power in the strict sense that would make it a Court.

Conclusion: The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not a "Court".

Issue (ii): Whether Section 33(3) of the Income-tax Act violates Article 14.

Analysis: Article 14 permits reasonable classification related to the statute's purpose. The distinction between assessees and the Commissioner (a representative of the State) is a classification with a rational nexus to the legislative objective of regulating appeals by assessees. The requirement of a fee for an assessee's appeal but not for a Commissioner does not constitute arbitrary or invidious discrimination within the Act's sphere.

Conclusion: Section 33(3) of the Income-tax Act does not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The impugned provision is within legislative competence and constitutionally valid; the petition seeking refund and declaration fails and is dismissed without costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions but not vested with judicial power in the strict sense is not a "Court"; consequently, the legislature may lawfully prescribe procedural conditions, including fees, for appeals to such a tribunal, and a differential procedural requirement applicable to assessees and the Commissioner is constitutionally permissible if it constitutes a reasonable classification related to the statute's object.

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