Administrative directions in permit appeals cannot override the public-interest test or create vested rights for competing operators.

Directions issued by a State Government under section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were treated as administrative instructions regulating transport authorities, not as retrospective law altering adjudicatory rights in stage carriage permit matters. The permit-granting function under Chapter IV remained quasi-judicial and had to be assessed under section 47 on public-interest considerations. The Government order could guide the appellate authority, but it did not create a vested right in favour of an applicant or confer a superior claim merely because an earlier application had been decided differently. The appeal was therefore to be determined by the applicable administrative directions and the public-interest test.

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Issues: (i) Whether orders and directions issued by the State Government under section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were merely administrative directions and not law so as to preserve the vested position of an applicant for a stage carriage permit; (ii) Whether the appellate authority was bound to decide the permit appeal only by reference to the Government order in force when the Regional Transport Authority decided the original application, and whether the preference given to the competing operator was valid on the construction of the applicable Government order.

Issue (i): Whether orders and directions issued by the State Government under section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were merely administrative directions and not law so as to preserve the vested position of an applicant for a stage carriage permit.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished between legislative rules, judicial power in revision, and administrative control. Section 43A empowered the State Government to issue orders and directions of a general character in respect of road transport to transport authorities, while the permit-granting process under Chapter IV remained quasi-judicial and governed by section 47 and the related provisions. The directions under section 43A were held to regulate the administrative field and to guide the authorities, not to alter the legal criteria governing adjudication of permit claims. As a result, no vested right arose in favour of the applicant that could be defeated by treating the later Government direction as a new law made during the appeal.

Conclusion: The directions under section 43A were not treated as retrospective law affecting the appellant's vested position, and the challenge on that ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority was bound to decide the permit appeal only by reference to the Government order in force when the Regional Transport Authority decided the original application, and whether the preference given to the competing operator was valid on the construction of the applicable Government order.

Analysis: The applicable Government order was construed in light of its object of encouraging viable units and regulating preferences among competing operators. On that construction, the preference clause did not create an inter se preference within the first category merely because one operator was numerically nearer the target than another; it governed preference among the stated categories. Even so, the Court held that the Government order itself was only an administrative direction and could not control the quasi-judicial evaluation under section 47, where public interest was the governing consideration. The appellate authority was therefore entitled to consider the relevant Government directions in the appeal, and its conclusion that the competing operator better served the public interest was within jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The appellate authority's decision was upheld, and the construction of the Government order did not give the appellant a superior claim to the permit.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the Government directions under section 43A did not amount to new retrospective law, and the permit decision made on public-interest considerations was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Directions issued under section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were administrative instructions binding on transport authorities, not laws altering adjudicatory rights, and a permit appeal could be decided on the basis of such binding directions consistently with the public-interest criterion under section 47.

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