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Issues: (i) Whether the impugned State transport legislation infringed the right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) and could be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. (ii) Whether exclusion of private bus operators amounted to deprivation of property or interest in a commercial undertaking within Article 31(2) of the Constitution without compensation. (iii) Whether the legislation was discriminatory and offended Article 14 of the Constitution.
Issue (i): Whether the impugned State transport legislation infringed the right to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) and could be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
Analysis: The right to carry on a trade or business extends to carrying on transport business on public roads, subject to lawful regulation. The impugned enactment excluded private operators altogether and created a State monopoly. The question was whether such total exclusion could be treated as a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. The reasoning stressed that restriction ordinarily connotes limitation and not extinction, and that reasonableness must be judged in the setting of the particular trade and surrounding circumstances. On the material before the Court, no facts were shown to justify the monopoly as reasonably necessary for the public interest.
Conclusion: The legislation infringed Article 19(1)(g) and was not shown to be protected by Article 19(6); it was invalid against the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether exclusion of private bus operators amounted to deprivation of property or interest in a commercial undertaking within Article 31(2) of the Constitution without compensation.
Analysis: The business of running buses for gain on public roads was treated as an interest in a commercial undertaking. The legislation did not merely regulate the business but deprived the operators of that interest by taking the field exclusively for the State. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 were read together, and deprivation of such an interest was held to fall within the protection of Article 31(2). Since the Act made no provision for compensation, the constitutional requirement was not satisfied.
Conclusion: The legislation offended Article 31(2) and was invalid on that ground as well.
Issue (iii): Whether the legislation was discriminatory and offended Article 14 of the Constitution.
Analysis: Mere differentiation does not violate equality if the classification is rational and related to the legislative object. The State's separate treatment in a monopoly scheme was not, by itself, impermissible. The discretion conferred by Section 3 was read as a regulated discretion to be exercised in accordance with the statutory scheme and the Motor Vehicles Act, rather than an unguided power of arbitrary selection.
Conclusion: The legislation was not struck down under Article 14.
Final Conclusion: The impugned Act could not be sustained because it unconstitutionally curtailed the appellants' business rights and also operated as an uncompensated deprivation of a protected commercial interest; the challenge based on discrimination failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A law that wholly excludes citizens from an otherwise lawful trade, without justification on the material before the Court, is not saved as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6), and if it deprives them of a protected commercial interest without compensation it also falls within Article 31(2).