Quasi-judicial permit discretion cannot be fettered by executive directions under transport law, and invalid orders fall with the tribunal decision.

Executive directions issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could not control the quasi-judicial discretion of transport authorities when deciding rival stage carriage permit claims. The provision was limited to administrative power, so a Government order purporting to govern permit adjudication was outside its scope and invalid. As the Appellate Tribunal had treated that order as binding rather than making an independent merits determination, its decision lost its foundation and could not stand. The writ remedy of certiorari was therefore appropriate, and the Tribunal's order was set aside with the matter remitted for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Government order issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was valid in so far as it laid down directions governing the grant of stage carriage permits; (ii) Whether the Appellate Tribunal's decision, founded on that order, could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the Government order issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was valid in so far as it laid down directions governing the grant of stage carriage permits.

Analysis: Section 43A was construed in the setting of the Act as conferring only administrative power on the State Government. The transport authorities deciding applications for permits function quasi-judicially, and their discretion in that sphere cannot be controlled by executive directions. Reading the provision as authorising directions that govern the adjudication of rival claims would trench upon the quasi-judicial domain, render the safeguards attached to rule-making under the Act ineffective, and be inconsistent with the rule that tribunals must decide according to their own judgment.

Conclusion: The Government order was outside the scope of Section 43A and was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellate Tribunal's decision, founded on that order, could be sustained.

Analysis: The Appellate Tribunal acted on the footing that it was bound to apply the impugned order, and its decision was therefore not an independent determination on the merits. Once the order itself was held invalid, the foundation of the Tribunal's decision disappeared. The proper course was correction of that decision under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by certiorari.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's order could not be sustained and was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was reversed, and relief was granted by quashing the Tribunal's order and remitting the matter for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Executive directions issued under Section 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 cannot validly control or fetter the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion by transport authorities.

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