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Issues: Whether the Arbitral Tribunal's order permitting adjudication of the claim and counterclaim could be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution; and whether the Tribunal's refusal to reject the counterclaim during the insolvency moratorium suffered from such jurisdictional error as to justify supervisory interference.
Analysis: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code with a limited scheme of challenge, and the constitutional power under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly. Interference with arbitral proceedings is warranted only in rare cases where the impugned order discloses patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, bad faith, or exceptional circumstances. The Tribunal's reasoning that the counterclaim could be taken up with the claim, and that the effect of the insolvency moratorium would arise at the stage of enforcement or execution, was treated as an adjudicatory view on the scope of the proceedings rather than a jurisdictional nullity. The existence of statutory remedies and the policy of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration weighed against interference.
Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was not held to be perverse or patently without jurisdiction, and no basis was found for Article 227 interference.
Final Conclusion: The petition was held not maintainable and the challenge to the arbitral order was declined, leaving the Tribunal's decision undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 over arbitral orders can be invoked only in exceptional cases of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction or comparable grave infirmity, and not to correct a debatable view taken within the Tribunal's adjudicatory sphere.