Revisional jurisdiction and plaint rejection: declaratory reliefs aimed at defeating cheque dishonour remedies can be barred by law.
The revisional court, acting under the Orissa amendment to Section 115 CPC, could allow an Order VII Rule 11 application and reject the plaint because such rejection finally disposes of the suit at the threshold. The plaint did disclose a dispute arising from the memorandum of understanding and the cheque, but the declaratory reliefs were, in substance, aimed at preventing action on dishonour of the cheque and were barred by law under the Specific Relief Act and the Negotiable Instruments Act. The absence of consequential reliefs also supported rejection. The High Court's contrary view was set aside and the order rejecting the plaint was restored.
Issues: (i) Whether the revisional court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as applicable in Orissa, could allow the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and thereby reject the plaint; (ii) Whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action and whether the declaratory reliefs sought were barred by law under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): Whether the revisional court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as applicable in Orissa, could allow the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and thereby reject the plaint?
Analysis: The Orissa amendment to Section 115 permits the revisional court to vary or reverse an order if, had it been made in favour of the revision petitioner, it would have finally disposed of the suit. The rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 ends the suit at the threshold. The revisional court therefore acted within jurisdiction in allowing the application and rejecting the plaint. The High Court erred in holding that such action exceeded revisional jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The revisional court had jurisdiction to reject the plaint, and the High Court's contrary view was wrong.
Issue (ii): Whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action and whether the declaratory reliefs sought were barred by law under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
Analysis: The plaint, read as a whole, disclosed the dispute arising out of the memorandum of understanding and the alleged handing over and misuse of the cheque. However, the reliefs were framed only as declarations and were, in substance, intended to prevent the defendants from pursuing remedies arising from dishonour of the cheque. Such reliefs were hit by the bar against restraining criminal proceedings and were also inconsistent with the statutory presumptions and liabilities arising from dishonoured cheques. The omission to seek appropriate consequential reliefs further supported rejection at the threshold.
Conclusion: The plaint was barred by law to the extent of the declaratory reliefs sought, and rejection under Order VII Rule 11 was justified.
Final Conclusion: The impugned High Court order was set aside, the revisional court's order rejecting the plaint was restored, and the suit stood rejected, while leaving the plaintiff free to pursue any other remedy available in law.
Ratio Decidendi: A revisional court may reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 where the governing revision provision permits reversal of an order that would finally dispose of the suit, and a plaint seeking declarations that effectively restrain lawful proceedings or defeat statutory remedies is liable to rejection as barred by law.