Civil courts cannot use interim injunctions to block Section 138 criminal proceedings where statutory bar applies.

A civil court cannot restrain institution or prosecution of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as such proceedings are criminal in nature and outside the scope of civil injunctive control. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act bars injunctions against proceedings in a court not subordinate to the granting court and applies equally to criminal proceedings. The same statutory bar also governs temporary injunctions, because interlocutory relief cannot be granted where the final injunction itself would be impermissible. The interim restraint order was therefore unsustainable and had to be dissolved.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether an interim injunction can restrain a party from instituting or prosecuting proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. (ii) Whether the statutory bar under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 applies to temporary injunctions as well as final injunctions.

Issue (i): Whether an interim injunction can restrain a party from instituting or prosecuting proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: A proceeding under Section 138 is a criminal proceeding and not a civil proceeding. Where a party is left to pursue a criminal complaint before a competent court, a civil court cannot interdict that forum by injunction. The prohibition in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 squarely applies when the restraint is sought against proceedings in a court not subordinate to the court granting relief, and it also applies where the restraint is against a criminal proceeding.

Conclusion: The interim injunction restraining institution of proceedings under Section 138 could not be granted and was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory bar under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 applies to temporary injunctions as well as final injunctions.

Analysis: Temporary relief can only support a relief that can lawfully be granted at the final stage. If the final injunction is barred by statute, an interim injunction of the same nature cannot be granted either. The statutory prohibition in Section 41 therefore controls interlocutory relief as well, and a court lacks jurisdiction to pass a temporary order that would be impermissible in the final decree.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 41 governs interim injunctions also, and the impugned ex parte order was rightly set aside.

Final Conclusion: The civil court could not restrain the contemplated criminal proceeding, and the appeal succeeded by dissolving the injunction order.

Ratio Decidendi: A civil court cannot grant either final or interim injunctions to restrain institution or prosecution of a criminal proceeding, or proceedings in a court not subordinate to it, where Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits such restraint.

---