Statutory bar on anti-suit injunctions prevents restraint of winding-up proceedings in a non-subordinate court.

Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars injunctions that restrain a person from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a court not subordinate to the court granting relief, and that bar cannot be avoided through Order 39 CPC, section 151 CPC, or inherent powers. An interim injunction is only ancillary to final relief, so where the final restraint is itself statutorily prohibited, temporary restraint in the same terms is likewise unavailable. The Companies Act, 1956 and the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 already contain safeguards against vexatious winding-up petitions, so apprehended hardship does not justify bypassing the statutory prohibition.

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Issues: Whether an interim injunction can be granted to restrain a party from instituting or prosecuting proceedings, including a winding-up petition, in a court not subordinate to the court granting injunction.

Analysis: Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an express restriction on the grant of injunctions and, by its plain language, prohibits restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a court not subordinate to the court from which relief is sought. The provision deliberately altered the earlier statutory text and must be given full effect, so that courts may not, by invoking Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 151 of that Code, or inherent powers, do indirectly what the statute forbids directly. An interim injunction is only ancillary to and in aid of final relief; where the final relief itself is barred by statute, temporary relief in the same terms cannot be granted. The Companies Act, 1956 and the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 provide their own safeguards against vexatious or mala fide winding-up petitions, including scrutiny at the admission stage and notice before advertisement, so apprehended hardship does not justify bypassing the statutory bar.

Conclusion: An injunction restraining the presentation of a winding-up petition in the circumstances was not permissible, and the order granting such restraint was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the appellate order was set aside, and the order of the learned single judge refusing injunction was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: When a statute expressly bars injunctions restraining institution or prosecution of proceedings in a non-subordinate court, neither interim relief nor inherent jurisdiction can be used to circumvent that prohibition.

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