Negative covenant and specific enforceability barred injunction, and appellate interference with discretionary refusal was declined.

A temporary injunction to stop performance of a construction contract was unavailable because the memorandum disclosed no express or implied negative covenant, the underlying contract was not specifically enforceable under Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and Section 41(e) therefore barred injunctive relief; Section 42 did not apply because the proviso was not satisfied. The appellate court also refused to disturb the trial court's discretionary denial of interim relief, applying the settled rule that interference is justified only where discretion is exercised unreasonably or on irrelevant considerations. On the facts, the absence of supporting material, the performance dispute, and the balance of convenience did not favour the appellant.

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Issues: (i) whether a temporary injunction could be granted to restrain the respondent from proceeding with the construction contract in the absence of a specifically enforceable and negative covenant; (ii) whether the appellate court should interfere with the trial court's discretionary refusal of injunction on the facts and balance of convenience.

Issue (i): whether a temporary injunction could be granted to restrain the respondent from proceeding with the construction contract in the absence of a specifically enforceable and negative covenant.

Analysis: The memorandum relied upon by the appellant was held not to contain any express or implied negative covenant. The relief claimed depended on enforcement of the contractual arrangement itself, but the contract was found to be of a kind that could not be specifically enforced in view of the bar under Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In that situation, Section 41(e) operated against grant of an injunction, and Section 42 could not assist the appellant because the proviso was not satisfied and the alleged negative stipulation was not established on the record.

Conclusion: The injunction was not grantable on the basis of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and the finding was against the appellant.

Issue (ii): whether the appellate court should interfere with the trial court's discretionary refusal of injunction on the facts and balance of convenience.

Analysis: The refusal of interim relief was treated as a proper exercise of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court applied the settled principle that interference is warranted only when the discretion is exercised unreasonably, capriciously, or in disregard of relevant considerations. On the facts, the dispute about performance, the absence of supporting material, and the availability of other remedies showed that the appellant had not established a case for interim protection. The balance of convenience and the risk of irreparable injury were also found not to favour the appellant.

Conclusion: The appellate court declined to interfere with the discretionary order, and this issue was against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the requested injunction was legally unsustainable and the trial court's refusal of interim relief called for no interference.

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