Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be sustained where the cancellation proceedings were materially similar to an earlier decided case.

Analysis: The cancellation arose from non-filing of returns required under Section 39 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The matter was found to be factually similar to the previously decided case relied upon, and the assessee was held entitled to corresponding relief. Directions were also issued for filing overdue returns, payment of statutory dues, and computation of the limitation period under Sections 73(10) and 74(10) from the date of the order, subject to the stated treatment of financial year 2026-27.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed in favour of the assessee, with consequential compliance directions.

Issues: Whether orders treating the assessee as an assessee in default for failure to deduct tax at source on external development charges under Section 194I could be sustained.

Analysis: Sections 201(1) and 201(1A) permit consequences for a person in default in deducting tax at source. The issue of deduction under Section 194I on external development charges paid to the development authority had already been conclusively settled by an earlier decision in favour of the assessee. The impugned original order and the consequential rejection of rectification were contrary to that binding determination. Relegating the assessee to the appellate remedy in these circumstances would be redundant and inefficacious.

Conclusion: The orders treating the assessee as in default and refusing rectification were illegal and were quashed; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) could be refused at the inception stage on the apprehension that accommodation charges might make the activities commercial; (ii) Whether approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) could be directed without an independent inquiry by the competent authority.

Issue (i): Whether registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) could be refused at the inception stage on the apprehension that accommodation charges might make the activities commercial.

Analysis: For initial registration, the relevant inquiry is into the stated objects, project report, and purpose for which the institution is established. Non-commencement of operations does not permit a conclusive presumption that activities will be commercial. Recovery of partial, subsidised, or concessional charges for accommodation or services does not by itself negate charitable character. The undertaking that units would not be sold also removed the apprehension of an outright-sale activity.

Conclusion: Registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) must be granted; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) could be directed without an independent inquiry by the competent authority.

Analysis: Registration under Section 12A entails a preliminary examination of objects, whereas Section 80G approval confers donor-related tax benefits and requires separate satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites under the third proviso to Section 80G(5). Acceptance of registration under Section 12A does not automatically require approval under Section 80G. The project proposal alone did not support an appellate direction granting Section 80G approval without the required inquiry by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The direction granting approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) is set aside, and the application requires fresh determination by the competent authority; decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Initial charitable registration is to be granted, while approval enabling donor deductions remains subject to an independent statutory examination.

Ratio Decidendi: Approval under Section 80G cannot follow automatically from registration under Section 12A and requires an independent inquiry into the applicable statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Allowability of expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds; (ii) Deduction under Section 35(1)(iv); (iii) Deduction under Section 35(2AB) for research and development expenditure; (iv) Deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation; (v) Allowability of agency commissions paid to foreign agents; (vi) Depreciation rate for UPS and voltage stabilizers; (vii) Depreciation rate for temporary construction.

Issue (i): Allowability of expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds.

Analysis: Replacement dies and moulds attached to manufacturing machinery were treated as components necessary for restoring the machinery's specified output, rather than as independent plant and machinery. The expenditure consequently fell for consideration under Section 31 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: expenditure on replacement of dies and moulds is allowable.

Issue (ii): Deduction under Section 35(1)(iv).

Analysis: The issue was governed by the established treatment of the assessee's claim under Section 35(1)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which had sustained the corresponding finding of the Tribunal on materially similar facts.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the deduction under Section 35(1)(iv) is allowable.

Issue (iii): Deduction under Section 35(2AB) for research and development expenditure.

Analysis: The research and development claim, including the component relating to work-in-progress, was governed by the prior determination on identical facts under Section 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the deduction under Section 35(2AB) is allowable.

Issue (iv): Deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation.

Analysis: The computation of profits from the captive power undertaking was governed by the applicable interpretation of Section 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the relevant departmental circular, as applied in the earlier decision on the same issue.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: deduction under Section 80-IA on notional profit from captive power generation is allowable.

Issue (v): Allowability of agency commissions paid to foreign agents.

Analysis: No variation in facts or legal position was shown from the earlier final determination concerning commissions paid to foreign agents, including the issue of their characterization under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the agency commissions are allowable.

Issue (vi): Depreciation rate for UPS and voltage stabilizers.

Analysis: UPS and voltage stabilizers used with computers were treated as integral computer-related equipment. The applicable rate was fixed consistently with the precedents governing depreciation on such equipment.

Conclusion: Partly in favour of the assessee: depreciation on UPS and voltage stabilizers is allowable at 60% instead of 15%.

Issue (vii): Depreciation rate for temporary construction.

Analysis: The temporary construction was a parking shed, for which the applicable depreciation rate under the prior determination was 10%, not 100%.

Conclusion: In favour of the Revenue: depreciation on the temporary construction is allowable only at 10%.

Final Conclusion: The deductions and allowances claimed by the assessee were sustained on the first five issues, depreciation on UPS and voltage stabilizers was confined to 60%, and depreciation on the temporary structure was restricted to 10%.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicants had locus standi for leave to appeal against a direction to register an FIR; (ii) Whether a person accused in a corruption case is entitled to a pre-registration hearing; (iii) Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registration of an FIR in a corruption case where detailed material discloses a cognizable offence.

Issue (i): Whether the applicants had locus standi for leave to appeal against a direction to register an FIR.

Analysis: The direction was to register an FIR on information disclosing cognizable offences and did not adjudicate any individual legal right of the applicants. Registration of the FIR did not foreclose their remedies to seek its quashing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before cognizance, or under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 thereafter. No prima facie legal injury establishing locus standi for appellate leave was shown.

Conclusion: The applicants were not entitled to leave to challenge the direction to register the FIR.

Issue (ii): Whether a person accused in a corruption case is entitled to a pre-registration hearing.

Analysis: The audi alteram partem rule does not confer on an accused public servant a right to be heard before registration of an FIR. A direction for registration based on material disclosing a cognizable offence is not an adjudication of guilt or of the accused person's legal rights.

Conclusion: An accused in a corruption case has no legal right to be heard before registration of an FIR.

Issue (iii): Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registration of an FIR in a corruption case where detailed material discloses a cognizable offence.

Analysis: A preliminary inquiry may be desirable in corruption cases but is not mandatory where detailed and reasoned information, including material furnished under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. In such circumstances, registration of an FIR may proceed without a preliminary inquiry.

Conclusion: The accused cannot demand a preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR where the available material discloses cognizable corruption offences.

Final Conclusion: The direction to register and investigate the FIR on the material furnished remained legally unobstructed, without prejudice to the accused persons' independent remedies against the FIR or subsequent proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where credible material prima facie discloses a cognizable corruption offence, neither a preliminary inquiry nor a prior hearing to the suspected accused is a condition precedent to registration of an FIR.

Outcome: Delay condoned; review petitions dismissed; applications for oral hearing rejected; pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

Issues: Whether the assessee could be permitted to operate the locker and receive the jewellery kept therein when no tax demand or attachment subsisted.

Analysis: The block assessment had been completed, and the Revenue confirmed that no demand remained outstanding and that no attachment over the locker was in force. The Revenue also raised no objection to the assessee operating the locker in accordance with the bank's procedure and undertook to hand over the jewellery.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to operate the locker, and the jewellery was directed to be handed over to him.

Issues: Whether GST registration could be cancelled retrospectively from 2 July 2017 when the show-cause notice issued under Rule 21(a) did not propose retrospective cancellation.

Analysis: The show-cause notice alleged that no business was conducted from the declared place of business, but contained no indication that cancellation was proposed with retrospective effect. Cancellation from 2 July 2017 therefore exceeded the scope of the notice. The earlier cancellation for the same period had been revoked, and the subsequent penalty adjudication recorded that the input tax credit availed was genuine under Section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation without prior notice was unsustainable; the cancellation order was set aside, the registration was revived, and the show-cause notice was directed to be adjudicated afresh after the petitioner responds.

Issues: Whether the transfer applications relating to 450 appeals involving an identical question of law were required to be placed before the Principal Bench.

Analysis: The appeals raised a common question concerning GST on royalty payments under mining leases and consequential refund claims. Under the third proviso to Section 109(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with the notification dated 17.09.2026, the Principal Bench had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the common question.

Conclusion: The Principal Bench has exclusive jurisdiction over the 450 appeals, which shall be listed and heard before the appropriate Bench of the Principal Bench.

Issues: Whether an appeal remaining defective despite notice and repeated opportunities, coupled with the appellant's continued non-appearance, may be rejected under the Tribunal's inherent and procedural powers.

Analysis: Rule 24 of the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits the Bench to reject an appeal where notified defects remain unrectified after the prescribed scrutiny process. Rule 10 preserves the Tribunal's inherent powers to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. Persistent failure to cure defects, absence on successive listings, and lack of any explanation demonstrated abandonment of the appellate proceedings. Retaining such defective proceedings would unjustifiably burden the Tribunal's docket.

Conclusion: The Tribunal may exercise its powers under Rules 10 and 24 to reject a defective appeal where the appellant fails to remove defects and abandons its prosecution; no opinion is expressed on the underlying merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal; (ii) Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular; (iii) Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous; and (iv) Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Issue (i): Whether the State Bench could adjudicate a jurisdictional challenge to an advance ruling when the ruling was unappealed and the challenge was absent from the show-cause notices and grounds of appeal.

Analysis: The statutory appellate hierarchy under Sections 100 to 104 provides specific remedies against an advance ruling, including appeal, rectification, and declaration of voidness for fraud or suppression. The jurisdictional challenge was not raised before the Authority, in the show-cause notices, or in the authorised grounds of appeal, and was introduced only through rejoinder. Section 75(7) precludes a demand on grounds outside the notice, while Section 109(4) does not empower a State Bench to test the validity of an unchallenged ruling of the Authority.

Conclusion: The belated jurisdictional challenge to the advance ruling could not be adjudicated by the State Bench. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the unchallenged advance ruling remained binding on the jurisdictional officer despite the subsequent circular.

Analysis: Section 103(1) makes the ruling binding on the applicant and the concerned or jurisdictional officer. The ruling was neither appealed against, rectified, nor declared void. The later circular was an administrative instruction under Section 168 and not a change in the Act, Rules, or rate notification for purposes of Section 103(2). A later adverse administrative circular could not retrospectively displace the finality of a quasi-judicial ruling.

Conclusion: The advance ruling continued to bind the jurisdictional officer, and the circular did not permit Revenue to resile from it. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST at 18% for the relevant period could be determined through the circular and whether the refund was consequently erroneous.

Analysis: Section 9(1) requires the GST rate to be prescribed by Government notification on the recommendation of the Council. Under Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the relevant licensing service attracted the rate applicable to like goods involving transfer of title; the applicable rate was 5% for the period up to 31.12.2018. The 18% rate was notified only with effect from 01.01.2019. An administrative circular cannot create a levy or substitute for a rate notification, consistently with Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The circular could not fix the rate at 18% for the relevant period; the refund was lawfully sanctioned and was not an erroneous refund. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether Revenue could raise, at the second-appellate stage, the grounds that only the supplier could claim refund and that the claim was barred by unjust enrichment.

Analysis: These grounds were not contained in the show-cause notices or adjudication orders and were barred by the show-cause notice limitation in Section 75(7). In any event, the recipient had borne the incidence of tax, furnished the prescribed chartered accountant certificate under Rule 89(2)(m), and reversed the corresponding input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger. The requirements for payment of refund to the applicant under Section 54(8)(e) were satisfied.

Conclusion: Revenue could not introduce those new grounds at the second-appellate stage, and unjust enrichment was not attracted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unchallenged and binding advance ruling governed the applicable rate for the disputed period, and the absence of a notified 18% levy preserved the legality of the refund; the demands treating it as erroneous could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an unappealed advance ruling fixes the applicable GST rate under a notification, a subsequent administrative circular cannot displace that binding ruling or create a contrary levy without authority of law.

Issues: Whether an inordinate delay of 1,141 days in filing the appeal was supported by sufficient cause for condonation.

Analysis: The order-in-original had been duly communicated to the appellant in July 2021. Remote working, internal communication failures, subsequent resignation of an employee, and failure to capture the order in the litigation-tracking system did not establish that the appellant was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The appellant also remained inactive after responsibility for the matter was transferred in 2022. COVID-19 disruptions could not justify the delay, particularly as normalcy had returned by the time of communication and the appellant had been represented in the adjudication proceedings. Examination of the merits was unnecessary for deciding limitation.

Conclusion: The delay was not supported by sufficient cause and was not liable to be condoned.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could validly be initiated solely on third-party information without independent inquiry, verification, or application of mind by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires the Assessing Officer to form a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Information received from another departmental authority may be relevant material, but does not by itself establish the required belief. The material did not demonstrate any independent examination or preliminary verification linking the third-party information to escapement of income in the assessee's case; the recorded reasons therefore reflected only a reason to suspect.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of demonstrated independent application of mind and a legally sustainable reason to believe. The reassessment orders were set aside and the additions deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales; (ii) Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether estimated income based on rejection of books for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 should be computed at 5% or 2% of sales.

Analysis: The 5% estimation for the two years departed from the rate adopted in the original assessment and from the 2% rate accepted for the immediately preceding year on substantially similar facts. Consistency required computation on the 2% basis after rejection of books of account.

Conclusion: The estimated addition for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 is restricted to 2% of sales, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under section 68 were sustainable.

Analysis: Banking channels, confirmations, returns and repayment documentation established only a paper trail and did not establish genuine creditworthiness or genuineness. The lenders did not comply with repeated summons, their directors had admitted that the entities were accommodation-entry providers, and the assessee failed to produce them for verification. Applying the burden of proof and human-probabilities test, the surrounding evidence outweighed the apparent documentation.

Conclusion: The unsecured-loan additions under section 68 are sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Income estimation for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16 must be recomputed at 2% of sales, while the cash-credit additions and related interest disallowance remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Banking documentation does not discharge the assessee's burden to prove creditworthiness and genuineness of a cash credit where independent evidence establishes that the creditors are accommodation-entry providers and they fail to verify the transactions.

Issues: Whether a tax demand could be confirmed on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice, consistently with Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand on a ground different from that specified in the show-cause notice. The DRC-01 proposed tax at 14% on a specified turnover, whereas the subsequent DRC-07 and adjudication order confirmed tax at 9% on a different turnover without confirming the demand originally proposed. The confirmed demand therefore rested on an unnotified ground.

Conclusion: Confirmation of the demand on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice violated Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was invalid.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal could be condoned in the circumstances stated by the petitioner.

Analysis: The appellate authority had rejected the appeal as time-barred on the basis that the delay exceeded the period condonable under Section 107(1) of the Goods and Services Tax Act. The appeal memorandum attributed the delay to the serious illness and subsequent death of the proprietor's husband, for whom she was the sole caregiver. The State accepted that the matter could be heard on merits upon compensation by costs.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned, the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the appellate authority for a fresh decision on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.
(ii) Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.
(iii) Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.
(iv) Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.
(v) Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Issue (i): Whether the notification retrospectively impaired a vested right to export stock acquired but not shipped before its effective date.

Analysis: Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 and Paragraphs 1.05(b) and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 make the policy prevailing on the date of export applicable prospectively. Procurement, payment, storage at port, or possession of stock, without shipping bills, loading, or final export clearances before the effective date, does not create an accrued right to export under the earlier policy.

Conclusion: The notification operates prospectively and does not impair a vested right to export unshipped stock.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier free-export policy or export tenders created a legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel against the policy change.

Analysis: A free classification under the policy is not a clear governmental assurance that the classification will remain unchanged. The statutory framework permits policy amendment in public interest, and export tenders issued by a State undertaking do not amount to an assurance by the Union that export policy will not change. The strategic-resource and national-security rationale supplies an overriding public-interest basis for the regulatory change.

Conclusion: Neither legitimate expectation nor promissory estoppel restrains the policy change.

Issue (iii): Whether the notification is arbitrary or imposes an unreasonable restriction on trade for want of a separate grace period.

Analysis: A general export-policy notification issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 need not record its reasons on its face where a rational basis exists. Conservation of depleted strategic mineral reserves, national security, and resource planning provide such a basis. The measure regulates exports through licensing rather than imposing an absolute prohibition, and Paragraph 1.05(b) already supplies a defined transition mechanism. Judicial deference is warranted in economic and strategic policy, and the licensing regime bears a rational and proportionate connection to the public-interest objective under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The notification is valid, non-arbitrary, and constitutes a reasonable restriction on trade.

Issue (iv): Whether Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 is invalid for confining transitional protection to exporters holding an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) creates a limited exception to the ordinary rule that the policy on the export date governs. An Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit is bank-backed, objectively verifiable, and not readily alterable or cancellable, unlike private purchase orders or other payment arrangements. This provides an intelligible basis for distinguishing qualifying commitments from other commercial arrangements and bears a rational nexus to preventing unverifiable claims for transition. The absence of an Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date determines eligibility; no exporter is required to anticipate a future regulatory change.

Conclusion: Paragraph 1.05(b) is constitutionally valid, and exporters without a valid Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit on the effective date are not entitled to its transitional protection.

Issue (v): Whether the licensing authority may indefinitely defer a restricted-export authorisation application pending policy review.

Analysis: Section 3(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 permits export restrictions, but an open-ended freeze on all licensing applications would convert the chosen licensing regime into a prohibition in practice. A restricted-export authorisation application must receive timely, individual, and reasoned consideration after a personal hearing, with due regard to the pre-existing procurement, economic hardship, absence of an alternative domestic market, shipping disruption, and national-security considerations.

Conclusion: The licensing authority cannot indefinitely defer the restricted-export authorisation application solely because a policy review is pending and must decide it by a reasoned order after hearing the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The restrictive export regime and its Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit-based transitional framework remain operative, while the statutory licensing mechanism must be exercised through timely, individual, reasoned consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: A prospective export-policy restriction validly governs unshipped goods, and a transitional exception confined to objectively verifiable irrevocable commitments satisfies reasonable-classification requirements.

Issues: Whether alleged inclusion in one unit's assessment of turnover already taxed in another separately registered unit constitutes a rectifiable mistake.

Analysis: Section 161 permits correction of a mistake where overlapping turnover has resulted in the same turnover being subjected to tax more than once. The departmental records relating to separately registered units must be examined holistically to verify the claimed overlap and ensure that turnover is taxed only once. The alleged overlap requires factual verification through the assessee's computation and the records of both units.

Conclusion: If established, double taxation of the same turnover is a rectifiable mistake. The impugned decision was set aside solely for fresh examination and reworking of turnover on the alleged overlap.

Issues: Whether the impugned order could confirm tax proposals for GSTR-1/GSTR-3B reconciliation and excess input tax credit that had already been dealt with in an earlier order under appeal.

Analysis: Legal framework: a later tax adjudication cannot sustain duplicative confirmation of the same tax proposals already determined by an earlier order that is pending in appeal. Comparison of the orders showed complete overlap in respect of the proposals concerning reconciliation of GSTR-1 with GSTR-3B and excess input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B vis-a -vis auto-populated GSTR-2A.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed insofar as it confirmed the duplicated proposals relating to GSTR reconciliation and excess input tax credit.

Issues: Validity of the approval for reopening and the consequential reassessment where the approval proforma invoked Section 149(1)(b) despite the alleged escaped income being Rs. 7 lakh and approval having been granted by the PCIT.

Analysis: The approval proforma recorded that the proceedings were covered by Section 149(1)(b), applicable to cases beyond three years, while recording alleged escaped income of only Rs. 7 lakh. The approval was nevertheless granted by the PCIT. Applying the principle that statutory safeguards governing reassessment approval require due application of mind, and following the analogous ruling relied upon, the approval was found invalid.

Conclusion: The approval was invalid; the order under Section 148A(d), notice under Section 148, and the consequential reassessment order were quashed.