Issues: Whether the Delhi High Court should exercise territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution to challenge an SFIO investigation order concerning companies having their registered offices, records and related proceedings in Mumbai.

Analysis: The issuance of the investigation order by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs from New Delhi and the location of SFIO headquarters in Delhi did not establish a substantial nexus between the dispute and Delhi. The companies under investigation had registered offices in Mumbai; their statutory and financial records were maintained there; the concerned Registrar of Companies and pending insolvency proceedings were in Mumbai; and any consequential prosecution would fall within the jurisdiction of the competent Special Court in Mumbai. Even where part of a cause of action may arise within a High Court's territory, Article 226(2) confers discretionary jurisdiction, to be exercised having regard to forum conveniens and the forum with the closest connection to the dispute. Related proceedings involving the same investigation were also pending before the High Court of Bombay.

Conclusion: The Delhi High Court declined to exercise territorial jurisdiction; the High Court of Bombay was the appropriate and convenient forum for adjudication of the challenge to the investigation.

Issues: Whether an appellate dismissal on limitation and the underlying adjudication could stand where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under "Additional Notice and Orders", preventing a response and hearing.

Analysis: The appeal under Section 107 had been rejected solely as time-barred without examination on merits. The show-cause notice was uploaded under a portal tab without separate intimation, as a result of which the petitioner could not respond. This denial of an effective opportunity to reply constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The appellate dismissal on limitation, the adjudication order, and the consequential bank attachment were quashed, with a direction for fresh adjudication on the appeal grounds after affording a hearing.

Issues: Whether detention of goods and penalty for alleged reuse of an e-way bill were sustainable where the goods were accompanied by valid tax documents and the alleged second transportation was based only on inference.

Analysis: No discrepancy was established in the description, quantity, value or ownership of the goods, which were accompanied by an invoice, e-invoice and e-way bill. The inference of re-transportation rested on an earlier e-way bill verification and a later vehicle location, without independent evidence that the same goods had completed an earlier journey or been delivered. Reuse of the e-way bill and intention to evade tax required cogent proof; suspicion and presumptions could not replace evidence.

Conclusion: The department failed to prove reuse of the e-way bill, contravention of GST law, or intention to evade tax; the detention and penalty proceedings were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether detention and penalty proceedings for alleged reuse of e-way bills were sustainable where the goods matched the accompanying tax documents and the alleged re-transportation was unsupported by independent evidence.

Analysis: The goods were accompanied by valid invoices, e-invoices and e-way bills, with no discrepancy in their description, quantity, value or ownership. Under Section 129(3), a penalty action must rest on an established contravention. The allegation of reuse was drawn solely from the vehicle having been checked twice on the same day. No cogent material established that the goods had completed an earlier journey, been delivered, or were re-transported. The repair bill and driver's explanation were not disproved. Suspicion or an inference from a prior e-way bill verification could not establish either the underlying contravention or an intention to evade tax.

Conclusion: The alleged reuse of e-way bills and intention to evade tax were not proved; the detention and penalty orders were unsustainable, and the amount deposited was refundable in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the imported mixed lot of polyester warp knitted fabrics could be reclassified from Customs Tariff Item No. 6005 9000 as fabrics exclusively of synthetic fibres, with consequential denial of concessional duty and imposition of differential duty, interest and penalties.

Analysis: The burden to establish that the declared tariff classification was incorrect lay on the Revenue. Classification of textile fabrics depends on fibre composition, predominance and textile construction, which could not be determined merely from the invoice description or visual examination. No samples were drawn and no laboratory report, technical literature, expert opinion, market enquiry or other corroborative material established that the fabrics were exclusively of synthetic fibres. The expression polyester warp knitted fabrics did not by itself prove that the entire fabric was composed wholly of polyester, particularly where the goods were declared as mixed lots. The original self-assessment and clearance had accepted the declared classification, and no fresh evidence was produced to justify reopening it. Further, classification across multiple tariff entries without identifying a specific applicable entry was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The classification under Customs Tariff Item No. 6005 9000 was upheld; the concessional duty benefit was available; and the reclassification, differential duty demand with interest, and penalties were set aside.

Issues: Whether penalty for transporting an excavator without an e-way bill was sustainable despite the claimed return of own machinery under a delivery challan and the asserted short-distance exemption.

Analysis: Section 68 read with Rule 138 requires prescribed documents and an e-way bill for movement of goods, including movement otherwise than by way of supply, unless a specified exemption is established. Ownership of the excavator and its return to the registered premises did not by themselves displace e-way bill compliance. The claimed exemption under Rule 138(14) was unsupported by satisfactory evidence of its applicability. Further, the absence of evidence regarding the consideration received for use of the excavator and the corresponding GST treatment, together with transport without an e-way bill, supported an inference of intention to evade tax; the lapse was therefore not merely procedural or without revenue implications.

Conclusion: The penalty action for movement without an e-way bill was justified; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether transportation of taxable goods without an E-Way Bill, subsequently produced after interception, constituted substantive non-compliance establishing an intention to evade tax and justified tax and penalty proceedings.

Analysis: Rule 138(1) requires generation of an E-Way Bill before commencement of movement of goods above the prescribed consignment value. The E-Way Bill was admittedly unavailable at interception. Its online generation, unlike a manually issued invoice, forms an essential statutory mechanism for monitoring movement of taxable goods. Subsequent production of the E-Way Bill could not cure the lapse. The short inter-State route, the nature of the goods, post-interception production of the E-Way Bill, and repetition of the same lapse demonstrated a deliberate course of conduct rather than a technical or procedural error. The precedents relied upon by the first appellate authority were factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: Transportation without the mandatory E-Way Bill constituted substantive non-compliance and established an intention to evade tax; invocation of the detention, tax and penalty provisions was justified.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to interfere with reassessment proceedings when the reassessment order was not challenged in the writ petition and the assessee had already pursued a statutory appeal against that order.

Analysis: The reassessment order was passed during the pendency of the petition, and the assessee thereafter filed a statutory appeal which remained pending. The reassessment order itself was not impugned in the writ petition. Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary, and a party that has invoked an efficacious statutory remedy for the same cause cannot simultaneously pursue multiple proceedings seeking substantially the same relief.

Conclusion: No writ interference was warranted; the challenge was not maintainable in view of the pending statutory appeal and the unchallenged reassessment order.

Outcome: Matter released for hearing before the regular Bench, with status quo maintained for four weeks.

Issues: (i) Whether revocation and security forfeiture were warranted for the customs broker's alleged breaches under the licensing regulations; (ii) Whether the customs broker was liable for exporters' excess RoSL availment and whether the penalty required modification.

Issue (i): Whether revocation and security forfeiture were warranted for the customs broker's alleged breaches under the licensing regulations.

Analysis: Regulation 10(o) imposes a time-bound obligation to intimate changes in address; its breach is a regulatory contravention for which Regulation 18 provides a monetary penalty. Failure to obtain permission under Regulation 7(3) for operations at ICD Loni was a compliance failure and did not constitute a breach of the primary obligations under Regulation 10. The signature-related irregularities indicated procedural lapses in employment and supervision, but did not establish a serious breach of the Customs Act warranting revocation.

Analysis: The allegation of subletting was unsupported by concrete evidence. Electronic filing through ICEGATE did not require the broker's physical presence at each Customs station, and clearances at multiple ports could not, by themselves, establish subletting. Dealings through intermediaries did not establish a breach because physical verification of every client's premises was not required. The alleged concealment of DRI notices was also not established in the absence of proof of service.

Conclusion: Revocation of the customs broker licence and forfeiture of the security deposit were unwarranted and were set aside in favour of the assessee; the monetary penalty for procedural violations was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the customs broker was liable for exporters' excess RoSL availment and whether the penalty required modification.

Analysis: The obligations of due diligence and client advice under Regulation 10 are confined to compliance matters arising from documents handled during customs clearance. They do not extend to downstream lapses or excess RoSL availed by exporters after the broker's statutory function has been discharged. The finding fastening responsibility on the broker for the exporters' conduct lacked an independently sustainable basis.

Conclusion: The customs broker was not liable for the exporters' excess RoSL availment, and the penalty was reduced to Rs. 5,000 in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Licensing sanctions must remain proportionate to established substantive misconduct; unproved allegations and procedural regulatory failures may justify monetary penalty but not revocation of a customs broker licence.

Ratio Decidendi: Revocation of a customs broker licence cannot be sustained solely on procedural licensing breaches or unsubstantiated allegations where no serious substantive breach affecting customs revenue or integrity is established.

Issues: (i) Whether charges deducted by foreign or intermediary banks while transmitting export proceeds rendered the exporter liable to service tax under reverse charge as recipient of Banking and Other Financial Services; (ii) Whether preparation and compilation of regulatory dossiers and assistance in obtaining overseas pharmaceutical approvals constituted Scientific or Technical Consultancy Services.

Issue (i): Whether charges deducted by foreign or intermediary banks while transmitting export proceeds rendered the exporter liable to service tax under reverse charge as recipient of Banking and Other Financial Services.

Analysis: Under the reverse-charge framework of the Finance Act, 1994, liability requires an established service provider-recipient relationship. The foreign buyer remitted export consideration through its own banking arrangements, and the intermediary banks' role formed part of the inter-bank fund-transfer process. There was no evidence that the exporter engaged those banks, contracted with them, or was obliged to pay them consideration. Economic incidence of deductions from the remittance did not by itself establish receipt of a taxable service. The materially identical issue for an earlier period had also been decided on the same basis.

Conclusion: The foreign-bank charges did not make the exporter the recipient of Banking and Other Financial Services; the reverse-charge demand is unsustainable and decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether preparation and compilation of regulatory dossiers and assistance in obtaining overseas pharmaceutical approvals constituted Scientific or Technical Consultancy Services.

Analysis: Classification depends on the essential character of the activity actually performed, rather than the professional qualifications of the service provider. Scientific or Technical Consultancy requires advice, consultancy, or scientific or technical assistance in a discipline of science or technology. Compiling existing data and published material into documentation for regulatory filings, and assisting in obtaining marketing approvals, without independent scientific research, experimentation, technical study, or such advice, did not satisfy that character. The same foreign service providers and substantially identical activities had previously been determined not to fall in that taxable category.

Conclusion: Regulatory documentation and approval-assistance services were not Scientific or Technical Consultancy Services; the demand under that classification is unsustainable and decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: As neither substantive tax demand survived, the associated interest and penalties also lacked basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Reverse-charge liability requires proof that the assessee received the taxable service, and service classification must follow the actual essential character of the activity rather than its incidental commercial effect or the provider's technical qualifications.

Outcome: The interlocutory applications for early hearing were allowed, and the appeals were directed to be listed together after three weeks.

Issues: Whether waiver of interest and penalty under Section 128A was available where the disputed excess input tax credit was availed in December 2020 but was claimed to relate to debit notes of financial year 2018-19.

Analysis: Section 128A grants waiver only where the demand covered by the specified notice, statement or order pertains to the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 March 2020 and the prescribed statutory conditions are cumulatively met. The decisive consideration is when the disputed input tax credit was actually availed and became the subject matter of proceedings under Section 73. The records established that the excess credit was first claimed in GSTR-3B for December 2020, rather than having been availed during financial year 2018-19 and carried forward. The origin of the underlying debit notes could not alter the tax period of the demand. The statutory period under the waiver provision could not be enlarged by interpretative or procedural considerations.

Conclusion: The demand pertained to December 2020, outside the period covered by Section 128A; consequently, waiver of interest and penalty was unavailable to the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notification approving the Port Trust as custodian of a customs area under Section 45(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was valid, and whether such approved custodian incurs customs-duty liability for pilfered imported goods under Section 45(3).

Analysis: Section 45(1) permits approval of the person having custody of imported goods, while Section 45(3), introduced with an overriding clause, imposes customs-duty liability on the approved custodian where goods are pilfered in its custody. Section 13 absolves the importer from duty on pilfered goods, making the approved custodian's liability the mechanism for protecting collection of duty. The saving clause in Section 45(1) applies where another law provides a corresponding liability in respect of pilfered goods.

Analysis: The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 regulates the Port Board's conditional civil responsibility as a bailee towards the owner for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods. That liability is distinct in source, nature and object from the independent statutory liability to Revenue under Section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962. Since the Major Port Trusts Act does not impose customs-duty liability for pilferage, it neither displaces the Commissioner's approval power nor conflicts with Section 45(3). Approval under Section 45(1) is, however, necessary before liability under Section 45(3) can arise.

Conclusion: The notification approving the Port Trust as custodian under Section 45(1) was valid, and the approved custodian is liable under Section 45(3) for pilferage occurring during the period of its approval. No such liability arose for the pre-notification demands.

Issues: Whether an exception under the National Litigation Policy could be invoked in a Special Leave Petition when that ground had not been raised before the High Court.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was declined as the purported Policy exception had not been urged before the High Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported mixed lots of polyester knitted fabric were classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 9000 or Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 3200, with consequential entitlement to concessional duty; (ii) Whether penalty for wilful misstatement or suppression was imposable for the disputed classification.

Issue (i): Whether the imported mixed lots of polyester knitted fabric were classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 9000 or Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 3200, with consequential entitlement to concessional duty.

Analysis: The goods were originally assessed and cleared under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 9000. Each Bill of Entry required classification by reference to the goods actually imported. The description as mixed lots of fabrics of assorted colours and weights did not, without more, establish that every imported fabric was of synthetic fibres. No laboratory test or other cogent technical evidence was produced to establish the actual composition necessary for classification under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 3200. A subsequent change of perception could not displace the accepted assessment without such evidentiary foundation. Contemporaneous acceptance of the declared classification in comparable imports further supported the declared classification.

Conclusion: The goods are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 9000, not under Customs Tariff Item No. 6006 3200; the differential customs-duty demand and interest are unsustainable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for wilful misstatement or suppression was imposable for the disputed classification.

Analysis: The dispute was interpretational and the record did not establish deliberate suppression, wilful misstatement, or mala fide intent to evade duty. The classification declared by the importer was also sustained.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 is not imposable and is set aside. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The accepted tariff classification and the corresponding concessional-duty treatment remain operative, with no surviving fiscal or penal liability arising from the proposed reclassification.

Ratio Decidendi: A classification accepted at assessment cannot be displaced by a subsequent change of view unless the Revenue establishes, through cogent evidence relating to the actual imported goods, that a different tariff entry applies.

Issues: Whether personal penalties for alleged aiding and abetting of gold smuggling could be sustained against a Customs official under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The evidence against the official consisted principally of co-accused statements, call-data material and an allegation concerning use of a syndicate member's SIM card. No incriminating material or SIM card was recovered from the official. Under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, statements may constitute substantive material, but an accomplice's statement required corroboration in material particulars under Section 114 illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The recorded calls to the Superintendent before the seizure supported the explanation that the official had furnished information about the concealed gold. The alleged SIM usage was unverified and the failure to contact other officers could not establish complicity. Suspicion, however strong, could not replace proof.

Conclusion: The alleged involvement in smuggling was not proved; the personal penalties under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether an application for attachment and disgorgement was validly instituted in the name of the Central Government when presented through the Serious Fraud Investigation Office pursuant to ministerial authorization; (ii) Whether disgorgement relief is available only under Section 212(14A) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Issue (i): Whether an application for attachment and disgorgement was validly instituted in the name of the Central Government when presented through the Serious Fraud Investigation Office pursuant to ministerial authorization.

Analysis: The investigation report was submitted to the Central Government, which approved institution of proceedings and directed the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to place the report before the Tribunal and seek attachment and disgorgement. The application was instituted in the name of the Union of India. Under the Allocation of Business Rules and Transaction of Business Rules framed under Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India, the authorized officer could implement the Central Government's decision. Since the essential decision-making discretion remained with the Central Government, the authorization to present and execute the application was ministerial implementation, not delegation of statutory power requiring a notification under Section 458.

Conclusion: The application was validly instituted on behalf of the Central Government; the maintainability objection is rejected against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether disgorgement relief is available only under Section 212(14A) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: Disgorgement is an equitable remedy to prevent retention of undue gains and is not confined to Section 212(14A). The statutory scheme also permits the Central Government to seek such relief under Sections 241(2), 242, 246 and 339 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Conclusion: Disgorgement relief is not exclusively available under Section 212(14A) of the Companies Act, 2013; this contention is rejected against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The Central Government's decision to initiate the proceedings and its implementation through an authorized officer were legally effective, and the statutory framework permits the relief sought.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory decision-maker itself takes the substantive decision, authorization of an officer to implement and present that decision does not amount to delegation of statutory discretion.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice issued to the insolvency professional was valid under the pre-amendment statutory scheme when the investigation report found no actionable material and the notice rested on matters extraneous to that investigation; (ii) Whether the disciplinary order finding contraventions concerning constitution of the stakeholders' consultation committee, disclosure of liquidation costs, and delay in auction notices was vitiated by procedural infirmity and breach of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the show cause notice issued to the insolvency professional was valid under the pre-amendment statutory scheme when the investigation report found no actionable material and the notice rested on matters extraneous to that investigation.

Analysis: Under Section 219 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as it stood before the amendment of 6 April 2026, a show cause notice could follow completion of investigation under Section 218. Regulation 11 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Inspection and Investigation) Regulations, 2017 required consideration of the investigation report and formation of a prima facie opinion that sufficient cause existed for action. The investigation report found no actionable material on the complaints that initiated the inquiry, whereas the notice alleged five distinct matters outside those complaints and the investigation findings. Although the regulator may act on its own motion where warranted, it must identify and furnish the material forming the basis for such action.

Conclusion: The show cause notice was procedurally vitiated, being founded on extraneous and undisclosed material despite the investigation report containing no adverse actionable material; this finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the disciplinary order finding contraventions concerning constitution of the stakeholders' consultation committee, disclosure of liquidation costs, and delay in auction notices was vitiated by procedural infirmity and breach of natural justice.

Analysis: Writ review was confined to procedural legality and not an appellate reassessment of disciplinary findings. The disciplinary authority failed to consider material circumstances and defences relevant to each charge. The liquidator's view that secured financial creditors who had relinquished security formed one class under Regulation 31A(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 was a reasonably possible interpretation, particularly as the other creditors attended the meetings and raised no objection. The finding on liquidation costs improperly considered meetings beyond those specified in the show cause notice, while Regulation 31A(6B) had not yet come into force when notice for the fourth meeting was issued. The authority also disregarded material showing that obstruction by the promoters affected the auctions and that the adjudicating authority had condoned the auction delays.

Conclusion: The disciplinary findings and suspension order were vitiated by failure to consider relevant material, consideration beyond the charged meetings, and violation of principles of natural justice; this finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The regulatory disciplinary action could not stand under the applicable pre-amendment procedure, and the order imposing suspension was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: A disciplinary show cause notice and consequential order under the pre-amendment insolvency framework are invalid where they depart from the investigation findings without disclosing the independent material relied upon and ignore material defences and relevant circumstances bearing on the alleged contraventions.

Issues: (i) Whether construction of individual houses on independent plots constituted taxable Construction of Complex Service; (ii) Whether demands raised under Construction of Complex Service could be sustained for composite construction contracts involving transfer of materials; (iii) Whether extended limitation and penalties were invocable.

Issue (i): Whether construction of individual houses on independent plots constituted taxable Construction of Complex Service.

Analysis: Section 65(91a) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires a residential complex to comprise more than twelve residential units, a common area, and specified common facilities within premises approved by the competent authority. The constructions were individual houses on separate plots for respective purchasers, while roads and open spaces had been transferred to the municipal authority. The Department did not establish the existence of common areas and common facilities forming part of a residential complex. Construction of several independent houses in a common layout, without the statutory ingredients, does not attract the taxable category.

Conclusion: The individual houses did not constitute a residential complex under Section 65(91a) of the Finance Act, 1994 and were not taxable under Construction of Complex Service; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether demands raised under Construction of Complex Service could be sustained for composite construction contracts involving transfer of materials.

Analysis: The contracts involved construction along with supply or transfer of materials and were, to that extent, composite works contracts. Their classification and taxability required examination under the statutory framework governing works contract service, rather than a simpliciter demand under Construction of Complex Service.

Conclusion: A demand under Construction of Complex Service without addressing the true nature and classification of the composite works contracts is unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether extended limitation and penalties were invocable.

Analysis: The Department had issued periodic show-cause notices concerning the same activity over successive periods, demonstrating departmental knowledge of the activity. Further, refund of service tax for an earlier period on the same activity had been granted, showing that the issue admitted of differing interpretation. These circumstances negate suppression or wilful misstatement and deliberate evasion.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and penalties were not sustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands, with related interest and penalties, lacked a sustainable legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Construction of independent residential houses is not taxable as Construction of Complex Service unless the Department proves every statutory ingredient of a residential complex, including common areas and specified common facilities.