Just a moment...
Convert scanned orders, printed notices, PDFs and images into clean, searchable, editable text within seconds. Starting at 2 Credits/page
Try Now →Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference in an appeal against acquittal, in the light of the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 and the requirement of proving a legally enforceable debt.
Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is justified only where the trial court's view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or unsupported by the evidence. The cheque dishonour by itself was not enough in the present facts, because the complainant did not produce the account allegedly maintained for the accused, did not give date-wise particulars of lending, and did not substantiate that the liability was legally enforceable. The accused raised a probable defence and rebutted the statutory presumption on a preponderance of probabilities. Once that happened, the burden shifted back to the complainant, who failed to discharge it. The trial court's appreciation of evidence was found to be proper, and the cited precedents on dishonour of cheque did not assist the appellant on these facts.
Conclusion: The acquittal did not warrant interference and the appeal against acquittal failed.
Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the appellate court will not interfere unless the acquittal is perverse or manifestly unsustainable, and in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 the complainant must prove a legally enforceable debt once the accused rebuts the statutory presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.