Appellate interference with acquittal requires a perverse or unreasonable trial view; otherwise the acquittal stands.

An appellate court should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court's view is perverse, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence. The trial court had cogent reasons to doubt the prosecution case, including delay in forwarding the first information report, inconsistencies in the investigation record, doubt about the injured witness, and mismatch between the medical and ocular evidence. Because those defects were not satisfactorily explained and the High Court's contrary approach rested on conjecture, interference with the acquittal was held to be unjustified and the acquittal was affirmed.

---

---

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants on the basis of the prosecution evidence, including the timing of the first information report, the medical evidence, and the credibility of the eyewitnesses.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only when the view taken by the trial court is perverse or wholly unreasonable. The trial court had given cogent reasons for doubting the prosecution case, including delay in the forwarding of the first information report, inconsistencies in the investigation record, doubts regarding the injury to the injured witness, and the fact that the medical and ocular versions did not fully tally. The evidence on record also did not satisfactorily explain the delay and irregularities in the police and medical process, and the High Court's contrary view rested on surmises and conjectures rather than clear evidence.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in interfering with the acquittal; the trial court's view was a possible one and the appellants were entitled to acquittal.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate court should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court's view is perverse, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence on record.

---