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Issues: Whether the grant of pardon under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a judicial act requiring the court to consider the accused's complicity and the interests of justice and whether interference with the Special Judge's order was warranted.
Analysis: The power to tender pardon is not mechanical and cannot be exercised solely because the prosecution supports the request. The court must apply its mind to the nature of the evidence likely to be given, the extent of the applicant's role in the offence, the degree of culpability in relation to the co-accused, and the broader policy of justice. The settled line of authority under the old Code and Section 306 of the 1973 Code was reaffirmed: while the approver's evidence is treated with caution, the decision to grant pardon remains a judicial act and the court may take into account relevant surrounding circumstances, including the effect on fair trial and public policy. The High Court's interference was examined in light of these principles and the material before the Special Judge.
Conclusion: The grant of pardon is a judicial act requiring consideration of culpability and public policy, but on the facts the High Court's interference was not found justified.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the High Court's order quashing the pardon and remitting the matter was left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: An order granting pardon under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a judicial decision that must be made on application of mind to the approver's complicity, the interests of justice, and the public policy implications, rather than mechanically on prosecutorial support alone.