Special Judge's power to tender pardon extends to an accused, though prosecution consultation remains the preferred practice.

Section 8(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 is an enabling provision wide enough to permit a Special Judge to tender pardon to a person concerned in the offence, including an accused before the court, after cognizance and during trial. The deeming fiction referring to section 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 applies only for the limited purpose stated and does not make a prosecution motion a condition precedent. Section 540 of the Code is distinct and does not control the pardon power. As a matter of proper practice, the prosecution should ordinarily be consulted before pardon is tendered on an accused's request, but the grant was not interfered with because the prosecution supported it.

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Issues: Whether a Special Judge under section 8(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 could tender pardon to an accused at his own request without the prosecution first moving the Court, and whether the discretion was properly exercised in the circumstances.

Analysis: Section 8(2) is an enabling provision and its language is wide enough to permit the Special Judge to tender pardon to a person supposed to be concerned in or privy to the offence, including an accused before him. The power is available after cognizance and throughout the trial. The fiction that the pardon is deemed to have been tendered under section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for the purposes of sections 339 and 339A does not import the whole of section 338 or make prosecution motion a condition precedent. Section 540 of the Code is distinct and cannot control the pardon power. At the same time, the proper exercise of discretion requires caution, and the prosecuting agency should ordinarily be consulted before pardon is tendered on an accused's request.

Conclusion: The Special Judge had jurisdiction to entertain and grant pardon under section 8(2), and although the practice of acting suo motu on an accused's request is to be avoided, the order did not warrant interference because the prosecution itself supported the tender of pardon.

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