1974 (7) TMI 121 - SC - Indian Laws

Section 7-A eviction appeal dismissed as State Government properly considered tenant hardship in cinema operation since 1953

Murlidhar Aggarwal and Anr. Versus State of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. And Ram Agyan Singh

SC dismissed appeal regarding eviction order under Section 7-A. State Government's rejection of eviction application was upheld as it properly considered ... Challenged the order of eviction inexpedient under Section 7-A - order for release on the ground that the appellants required the premises for their personal occupation - Maintainability of the suit for recovery of possession without the District Magistrate's permission under Section 3(1) - Legality of the Clause 20 of the lease deed. HELD THAT:- We are not satisfied that the order of the State Government was vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record. As already stated, the considerations which weighed with the State Government in rejecting the application, namely, the hardship to respondent No. 2 who was conducting a cinema in the premises from 1953 cannot be said to be irrelevant. As the order of the State Government did not suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of the record, the learned Single Judge was, not justified in quashing the order and the Division Bench rightly set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the appeal. We dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, make no order as to costs. The Act makes a distinction between a tenant by virtue of an allotment order and a tenant otherwise than by virtue of an allotment order. In most of the sections of the Act the word 'tenant' alone is used. If the word 'tenant' in s 3 is construed as 'tenant under an allotment order', then the tenants who have been occupying an accommodation without an allotment order will be deprived of several material privileges conferred upon them by the Act Having regard to the definition clause and the scheme of the Act, we are of opinion that the respondent is a tenant under Section 3 even though he is occupying the accommodation without an allotment order It follows that the respondent would get the protection under Section 3 and that the appellants' suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed as it was found that it was instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate. We think that Section 3 is based on public policy. As we said, it is intended to protect a weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. Although the section is primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy. The respondent could not have waived the benefit of the provision. The language of the section as already stated, is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit. We think the High Court was right in its conclusion. We dismiss the appeal with costs. Issues Involved:1. Legality of the State Government's order under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.2. Maintainability of the suit for recovery of possession without the District Magistrate's permission under Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.3. Validity of Clause 20 of the lease deed in light of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.Detailed Analysis:1. Legality of the State Government's Order under Section 7-F:The appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the State Government's order dated October 20, 1967, which allowed a revision filed by the respondent and denied the appellants possession of the premises under Section 7-A of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The Additional District Magistrate had initially allowed the appellants' application for possession, deeming the respondent's occupation illegal. However, the State Government later reversed this, citing the respondent's long-term possession and lawful occupation under a cinema licence as reasons for its decision. The High Court's learned Single Judge quashed the State Government's order, but the Division Bench reversed this, stating that the State Government's order did not suffer from any jurisdictional or legal errors apparent on the record. The Supreme Court upheld this view, emphasizing the wide discretion vested in the District Magistrate and the State Government under the proviso to Section 7-A(1), which allows them to consider various factors, including the respondent's long-term possession and lawful occupation.2. Maintainability of the Suit for Recovery of Possession:The second issue concerned whether the appellants' suit for recovery of possession was maintainable without the District Magistrate's permission under Section 3(1) of the Act. The trial court held that although the respondent was a tenant, he could not claim the benefit of Section 3 due to Clause 20 of the lease deed, and decreed the suit. However, the High Court reversed this, holding that the suit was not maintainable without the requisite permission. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court, stating that the respondent was a tenant under Section 3, even though he occupied the premises without an allotment order. The Court referenced the Full Bench decision in Udho Dass v. Prem Prakash, which held that a lease made in violation of Section 7(2) would still create a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, although it might not bind the authorities.3. Validity of Clause 20 of the Lease Deed:Clause 20 of the lease deed stated that the parties would not claim the benefit of the Rent Control and Eviction Act and that its provisions would be inapplicable to the lease. The High Court found this clause illegal, and the Supreme Court upheld this view. The Court reasoned that Section 3 of the Act, which restricts eviction without the District Magistrate's permission, is based on public policy intended to protect tenants from frivolous suits and harassment. The Court cited Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which voids agreements that defeat any provision of law or are opposed to public policy. The Court distinguished between statutory provisions enacted for private benefit and those based on public policy, concluding that Section 3 falls into the latter category. Therefore, the respondent could not waive the benefit of this provision, and Clause 20 was deemed void.Conclusion:The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the State Government's discretion under Section 7-F and the necessity of obtaining the District Magistrate's permission for eviction suits under Section 3. Additionally, it invalidated Clause 20 of the lease deed as contrary to public policy. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs in the first appeal and with costs in the second appeal.