Default bail and remand in criminal procedure: timely charge-sheet filing defeats release, even if sanction and cognizance are pending.

Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC arises only when investigation is not completed and the charge-sheet is not filed within the prescribed time; once the charge-sheet is filed in time, the right to statutory bail does not survive. The absence of sanction for prosecution, and the fact that cognizance has not yet been taken, do not revive that right. The Code also permits continuity of custody between investigation and trial stages: remand under Section 167 remains effective after filing of the charge-sheet, and Section 309 becomes relevant only after cognizance. Accordingly, the accused was not entitled to release on default bail, and the remand orders and custody remained lawful.

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Issues: (i) Whether the accused was entitled to statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely because sanction for prosecution had not been obtained and cognizance had not been taken, despite the charge-sheet having been filed within the prescribed period; (ii) Whether remand orders could continue to be passed after filing of the charge-sheet and before cognizance, and whether Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had any bearing on the accused's custody.

Issue (i): Whether the accused was entitled to statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely because sanction for prosecution had not been obtained and cognizance had not been taken, despite the charge-sheet having been filed within the prescribed period.

Analysis: The right to default or statutory bail arises only on failure to complete investigation and file the charge-sheet within the period prescribed by Section 167(2). Once the charge-sheet is filed within time, the statutory consequence of release on bail under that provision does not survive. Non-obtaining of sanction for prosecution is distinct from completion of investigation and does not affect compliance with Section 167(2). The absence of cognizance, by itself, does not revive the right to default bail when the charge-sheet has already been filed within the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The accused was not entitled to statutory bail on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether remand orders could continue to be passed after filing of the charge-sheet and before cognizance, and whether Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had any bearing on the accused's custody.

Analysis: The scheme of the Code contemplates continuity of custody from the investigation stage to the trial stage. During investigation, remand operates under Section 167(2); after cognizance, remand is governed by Section 309. The filing of the charge-sheet within time satisfies Section 167(2), and the fact that cognizance has not yet been taken because sanction is awaited does not render custody illegal or terminate the court's authority over the accused. Section 309 becomes relevant only after cognizance, but its absence before that stage does not create a right to release where Section 167(2) has already been complied with.

Conclusion: The remand orders were not vitiated and the custody of the accused remained lawful.

Final Conclusion: The filing of the charge-sheet within the statutory period defeated any claim to default bail, and the pending sanction did not invalidate the remand or entitle the accused to release.

Ratio Decidendi: Default bail under Section 167(2) is available only when investigation is not completed and the charge-sheet is not filed within the prescribed time; once a charge-sheet is filed in time, absence of sanction or cognizance does not revive that right or invalidate continued judicial custody pending the next procedural stage.

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