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Issues: Whether, in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, remand before filing of the complaint is governed by Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and remand after filing of the complaint and cognizance is governed by Section 309 of the Code; and whether remand orders beyond fifteen days in one stretch, or passed by the Reader, invalidate the custody and entitle the accused to bail.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was read with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by virtue of Section 65 of the Act. The complaint under Section 44 was treated as analogous to a final report, and once cognizance had been taken on the complaint against co-accused, the tagged complaint against the petitioner was also treated as attracting cognizance. On that basis, custody after filing of the complaint was held to fall within the post-cognizance stage, where Section 309 of the Code applies, while custody during investigation before filing of the complaint remained within Section 167. The Court further held that further investigation may continue after filing of the complaint, and that custody for such purpose is not barred merely because cognizance has been taken. However, the Court deprecated remand for more than fifteen days at one time and noted that remand orders must be passed by the Court itself, not mechanically by the Reader.
Conclusion: The remand was held not to be illegal so as to justify bail, though the remand practice followed by the Special Court was strongly disapproved and treated as a procedural irregularity rather than a jurisdictional nullity.