Default bail and charge-sheet filing: delayed sanction or mistaken forum did not revive the accused's statutory right.

For default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC, completion of investigation is shown by filing the charge-sheet within the prescribed period; pending or delayed sanction for prosecution under the UAPA and the Explosive Substances Act does not make that filing non est, because sanction goes to cognizance, not investigation. A charge-sheet filed in time therefore defeats default-bail claims even if sanction is produced later. Filing first before the Magistrate rather than directly before the Special Court under the NIA Act was likewise treated as a forum or cognizance defect only, not a defect that revived the right to default bail after timely filing.

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Issues: (i) Whether a charge-sheet filed within the extended statutory period becomes incomplete for default-bail purposes because sanction for prosecution under the UAPA and the Explosive Substances Act had not yet been granted or placed before the court; (ii) Whether failure to file the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court under the NIA Act, instead of before the Magistrate followed by committal proceedings, entitled the accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether a charge-sheet filed within the extended statutory period becomes incomplete for default-bail purposes because sanction for prosecution under the UAPA and the Explosive Substances Act had not yet been granted or placed before the court.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished investigation from cognizance. The filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 marks completion of investigation, whereas sanction is required only at the stage of cognizance. Section 167(2) governs completion of investigation within the prescribed period and does not make default bail depend on prior grant of sanction. The Court held that sanction may be produced later and that delay in obtaining or filing sanction may affect cognizance or trial management, but it does not convert a duly filed charge-sheet into a non est filing for the purpose of default bail.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the accused. Filing of the charge-sheet within time was sufficient compliance with Section 167(2), and no right to default bail accrued on the ground that sanction had not yet been granted or filed.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to file the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court under the NIA Act, instead of before the Magistrate followed by committal proceedings, entitled the accused to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Court held that although prosecutions under the UAPA read with the NIA Act should proceed before the Special Court and committal under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not required, the initial filing before the Magistrate did not affect the accused's right under Section 167(2). The defect related to forum and procedure for cognizance, not to completion of investigation. Since the charge-sheet had already been filed within time and the application for default bail was moved after that filing, the procedural error did not revive an extinguished statutory right.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the accused. The mistaken filing before the Magistrate and subsequent committal did not create a right to default bail.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the investigation had been completed within the extended period and the subsequent defects complained of were procedural to cognizance and forum, not grounds to reopen the extinguished claim for statutory default bail.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, completion of investigation is evidenced by filing of the charge-sheet within the prescribed time, and the absence or delay of sanction for prosecution concerns cognizance rather than investigation.

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